Three essays in financial economics: systemic risk, pension economics and income inequality by Sun, Jingjing
Three Essays in Financial
Economics: Systemic Risk, Pension
Economics and Income Inequality
Jingjing Sun
A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
of Imperial College Business School
Imperial College London
November 2017
1Acknowledgements and Declaration
Originality Declaration Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own original work.
Copyright Declaration The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and is made available
under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives licence. Researchers
are free to copy, distribute or transmit the thesis on the condition that they attribute it, that
they do not use it for commercial purposes and that they do not alter, transform or build upon
it. For any reuse or redistribution, researchers must make clear to others the licence terms of
this work
Acknowledgement I thank my parents for their unconditional love and support of all kinds,
financial and emotional, all through my prevoius academic studies and research, professional
and personal development.
I thank my academic advisors, Prof. Rustam Ibragimov and Dr. Enrico Bi s (Associate Pro-
fessor) at Imperial College Business School (ICBS), Imperial College London (ICL). They provide
all the support I need for my academic research, professional and personal development. I thank
my assessors, Prof. Walter Distaso at ICBS, ICL; Prof. Paul Kattuman at Judge Business
School, University of Cambridge for their detailed and constructive comments to improve this
thesis. I thank Dr. Robert Koswoski and Dr. Pasquale Della Corte, both Associate Professors
at ICBS, ICL for their advices and comments at early stage of my research development.
I thank the following parties for their financial support: Imperial College Business School;
Imperial College London; OASIS Loss Modelling; Birkbeck College, School of Oriental and
African Studies (SOAS), University of London; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Deutsche
Bundesbank (German Central Bank); Pension Insurance Corporation, Just Retirement and
Partnership Group (Just Group plc); Epigeum | Oxford University press.
I thank my colleagues at Imperial College Business School, especially the PhD student group.
I thank my friends and families, professional contacts and whoever helped me throughout the
development of this thesis. Without your help, it will not be realized. The list is too long and I
owe you all a lot...
Disclaimers
1. Part I of this thesis is a derivative of my summer project as a Financial Sector Expert
at Monetary and Capital Markets at International Monetary Fund during 2013. It is a
joint work with my supervisor, Jorge A.Chan-Lau, senior economist at the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). This paper won the Best Paper Award (Best Applied Paper) at the
4th European Conference on Banking and the Economy (ECOBATE 2016), Winchester,
2UK. The authors would like to thank seminar participants there, as well as those at the
IMF, the 2nd Young Finance Scholars’ Conference (Quantitative Finance Workshop) at
University of Sussex, UK, May 2014 (especially Carol Alexander, Professor of Finance);
2nd RiskLab/BoF/ECB/ESRB Conference on Systemic Risk Analysis in Helsinki, Finland,
Oct 2016 for their valuable comments and feedback. This paper [Sun and Chan-Lau (2017)
(1)] also benefits greatly from my advisors Prof. Rustam Ibragimov, and Dr Enrico Bi s,
Associate Prof; Prof. Walter Distaso, all at Imperial College Business School Imperial
College London, as well as Prof Paul Kattuman, Judge Business School, University of
Cambridge. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not represent those
of the IMF nor IMF policy. I own the full copyright of this paper. The paper is available
online via several links including:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2895796,
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2895796
and http://risklab.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Sun_Chan-Lau_paper.pdf.
The final (professionally edited) version of this paper is published at Quantitative
Finance, Special Issue on Systemic Risk Analytics
http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/Ndi2dEA8HmDtrgcIcmJi/full
2. Part III of this thesis is a follow-up work from my previous publication [Bi s et al. (2014)
(104)] with my advisor, Dr. Enrico Bi s, Associate Professor at Imperial College Business
School. I have worked with Enrico since 2008/2009 on longevity and catastrophe linked
securities. I thank Enrico very much for his patience and trust for me to take on this
research project. He has also provided generous financial support [through research fund
OASIS] and continuous guidance for the development of my entire thesis. I have obtained
copyright permission from the publisher [John Wiley and Sons] to reproduce several im-
portant figures in this thesis. Permission certificate is attached with thesis. This paper
[Bi s et al. (2014) (104)] is available online via several links below:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1801826
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2782663
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jori.12055/abstract
During the development of this paper, I have also gained real world insights on longevity
insurance market from my time at Pension Insurance Corporation (PIC), through Gary
Heslop [FIA, PhD] at Austin Professional Resourcing. I thank both parties for their
financial and professional supports, During my final thesis correction period (since early
2017), I have been working as a quantitative analyst (financial risk manager) at Just
Group plc. (a FTSE 250 UK-based retirement specialist insurer, formed by merger of Just
Retirement Group and Partnership Group in Apr 2016). I thank Just’s financial support
and I recognize their support to my professional and research development.
This paper has been presented by me in various conferences, including Actuarial Young
Research’s Party in Feb 2013, Switzerland; German Insurance Association Annual Meet-
ing, Berlin, Germany, March 2013; Insurance: Mathematics and Economics International
3Conference in July 2014, Shanghai, China. I thank all participants and discussants at the
meetings for their contribution to my research and professional developments.
3. Part II of this thesis is a derivative of a summer project at Deutsche Bundesbank (German
Central Bank) in 2015. I collected the data from several European central banks and
conduct preliminary statistical analysis. I thank Deutsche Bundesbank Research Centre
for their financial support and host. I thank my colleagues at the Research Centre for
general guidance and helpful discussions.
c• author 2017
4Abstract This thesis is composed of three parts, under the main theme of Extreme
Value Theory, applied to various areas in financial economics. Tail events are low probability,
high impact phenomena. Therefore, understanding distributions of various financial economics
dataset enables us to understand the underlying risks.
Part I explores a banking network in an advanced emerging economy, in the post-crisis period.
Although static in time, it captures the dynamics among factors such as balance sheet size,
interconnectedness and systemic importance. Network structure is examined by classic network
theory, with reference to extreme value theory. It worths noting that interbank network structure
sometimes exhibits (double) heavy-tailedness, which resembles an un-balanced interconnected-
ness among nodes (banks). Network structure may have an impact on network (in)stability.
This is realized by a simulation, using a defined a sequential default mechanism, taking into
account all risks, arising from any single (or multiple) bank(s) default(s). Results show credit
risk (often referred as first round e ect) does not post threat to the banking sector, as much as
fire sales and liquidity shortage (often referred to as secondary e ects).
Part II studies the household income and consumption inequality of the country Spain. It firstly
estimates the lognormal body, as well as both tails of the income and consumption distributions,
across pre, during and post-crisis periods, using household finance data collected by Bank of
Spain. It then examines the Income Elasticity of Spending (consumption) on various goods,
including (a) food, (b) other non-durable goods, (c) vehicle, (d) other durable goods. Method-
ology adopted included the random e ect and fixed e ect models. Results show that income
inequality causes heterogeneity in household consumption behaviours on various goods. House-
hold belonged to di erent income percentiles display asymmetric impacts on their consumption
on various goods, due to income inequality caused by crisis in 2007-2008.
Part III studies a UK occupational pension fund. It shows the pension income displays clas-
sic Pareto behaviour, as pointed by previous literature studying income distribution. It then
shows the negative relationship between pension income and mortality experiences. Applying
Expectation Maximization (EM), the pensioner population can be broken down into several
sub-populations, according to pension income size. This pensioner bucketing strategy can be
used in pension de-risking solution - longevity swaps. In the emerging market for longevity risk
transfers, bespoke solutions [swaps written on the pension fund that provides perfect hedges]
have so far played a major role, as they allow pension funds and annuity providers to hedge
the risk of mortality perfectly. Indexed instruments, such as swaps written on the mortality
experience of a reference population, represent a cost-e ective alternative to bespoke solutions,
but have so far been less popular. One of the main reasons is that they give rise to basis risk,
the risk of mismatch between the mortality experience of the hedger and the one tracked by
the index. The pensioner bucketing strategy developed in this paper quantifies basis risk, at
the same time, shows that the quality of a hedge can only be assessed by jointly considering
the cashflows from the hedging instrument and its mark-to-market/model dynamics. Once such
broader perspective is adopted, the true magnitude of basis risk can appear substantially lower
than expected. Indexed based longevity solution becomes practical.
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Part I.
Financial Networks and
Interconnectedness in an Advanced
Emerging Market Economy
10
Chapter 1
Financial Crisis: Causes and
Evolution
Financial crises, unfortunately, tend to occur more frequently than expected and seemingly
without prior warning. During the post-second world war period, the global economy has been
shaken by several financial crises, including but not limited to the debt crisis in Latin America in
the 1980s, the breakdown of the European Monetary System and the collapse of the Scandinavian
banking system in the early 1990s, the Asian crisis in 1997, followed by the Russian debt default
in 1998. The later contributed to the demise of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), a
relative value hedge fund, prompting its bailout by its major private sector counterparties. The
bailout, organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, aimed at assuaging concerns about
the negative spillovers from a disorderly unwinding of LTCM’s highly levered positions and its
contagion on related counterparties, through losses arising from direct exposures, and also on
unrelated counterparties, from the downward pressure on funding liquidity a ecting the market
value of securities holdings and the ability to roll over short-term funding (Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2009 (18)).
The demise of LTCM was akin to the global financial crisis in 2007-8, which highlighted dramat-
ically the risks of interconnectedness pose to the financial system. The origins of the crisis could
be traced back to a surge of defaults in the subprime mortgage market in the United States,
following a decline in house prices in major urban areas. Given the relatively small size of the
market, the policymaking community believed that problems were likely to be contained in the
area, as Chairman Bernanke suggested in his testimony to the U.S. Congress in 2007. With
the benefit of hindsight, this sanguine assessment ignored several factors, all of them linked to
interconnectedness in the financial system, that amplified the initial shocks and led to a major
crisis which ultimately engulfed all major financial institutions. These factors included:
1. Increased cross-border linkages, which facilitated major international shock spillovers. Hal-
dane (2009) (45), documents a fourteen-fold increase in cross-border stocks of external as-
sets and liabilities in eighteen advanced economies, measured relative to GDP, from 1985
to 2005.
2. Heavy reliance on complex financial instruments, which contributed to higher leverage in
the financial system and the amplification of default losses. In the run-up to the global
11
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recession, the prevailing low rate environment encouraged market participants to boost
the profitability of their investment strategies through the use of collateralized lending
including repurchase agreement (REPO) and reverse REPO operations, collateralized debt
obligations (CDO), mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and asset-backed securities (ABS).
This trend, in turn, led to heightened complexity in financial markets, making it more
di cult for regulators to assess the extent of exposures and embedded leverage both at
the system or macro-level, and at the firm or micro-level.
3. Heightened homogeneity, driven by the adoption of similar investment strategies as market
participants searched for yield, which was further encouraged by regulatory requirements
inducing similar risk management practices across institutions. In the face of an adverse
shock, homogeneous firms react similarly. The ensuing herd behavior could lead to a
disorderly unwinding of exposures, and the fire-sale of assets would amplify the initial
shock, therefore a ect market and funding liquidity adversely. As pointed out by Tiziano
et al. (2013) (61), using standardized analysis in a homogeneous network setting would
lead to late detection of the 2008 crisis, while the more realistic heterogeneous one would
identify early warning signal 3 years earlier before the crisis, using Dutch interbank data.
4. Inadequate understanding of the interaction between credit risk, market risk and fund-
ing risk, which prevented market participants and authorities from assessing adequately
default contagion and its impact on liquidity and funding conditions. The situation was
aggravated by the complexity of the instruments being used, and no prior similar historical
experience.
The linkage between financial crises and interconnectedness risk motivates this paper, and the
analysis is done in the context of an advanced emerging market economy. We approach the anal-
ysis from two di erent perspectives. The first perspective emphasizes the topological properties
of the financial network in the economy; the second perspective uses a simulation approach to
analyze default contagion based on balance-sheet network analysis.
1.1. Systemic Risk and Interconnectedness
The concept of systemic risk is largely associated with the fallout of financial crises, with the
latter closely associated with banking panics and the resulting drying up of liquidity in the
banking system, and its ultimate impact on real economic activity (Friedman and Schwartz,
1963 (38)). Gorton (2010) (41) o ered a more recent iteration, accounting for the interaction
between the banking system and the shadow banking system. Along this line of reasoning,
Franklin and Mishkin (1995) (32) defined a financial crisis as “(an event that) involves sharp
declines in asset prices, failures of large financial and non-financial firms, deflation or disinflation,
disruptions in foreign exchange markets.” This idea feeds naturally in the definition of systemic
risk, advanced in Mishkin (1994) (54)) and Bank of International Settlements (BIS, 1994 (12)),
as the risk of potential disruptions to the funding channel and/or to the payment system in the
event of a financial crisis triggered by the default or failure of a market participant to honor its
obligations. This definition highlights interconnectedness as a source of systemic risk. Along
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this perspective, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission defines systemic risk as “the
risk that a default by one market participant will have repercussions on other participants due
to the interlocking nature of financial markets. Similarly, Kaufman (1995) (49) defined systemic
risk as the “chain reaction of falling interconnected dominoes.” Finally, the U.S. Federal Reserve
relates systemic risk to the disruption of payments system: “... an institution participating on a
private large-dollar payments network were unable or unwilling to settle its net debt position ...
Serious repercussions could, ... spread to other participants ... , to other depository institutions
not participating in the network, and (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2001)
(15)).
But more generally, at least among macroeconomists, disruptions to payment systems or to
the financial system may not represent systemic risk, as long as the real economy continues
functioning normally. Short-lived stock market crashes such as the one experienced in the
United States in October 1987 (Black Monday), or the trillion dollar Flash Crash in May 2010,
attributed to high frequency trading (Kirilenko et al, 2014 (50)), did not constitute systemic
risk events. Accounting for the impact on the real sector, the Group of Ten (2001) (44) defines
systemic risk as “... the event will trigger a loss of economic value ... have significant adverse
e ects on the real economy.” The European Central Bank (ECB), likewise, defines systemic risk
as a financial instability risk that is “so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial
system to the point where economic growth and welfare su er materially (ECB, 2010 (31)).
Billio et al. (2010) (11) define systemic events as “any set of circumstances that threatens the
stability of or public confidence in the financial system” while the G-20 defines systemic risk as
“disruptions to financial services... could a ect the real economy.” We conclude this discussion
by noting that under a systemic risk perspective, financial regulation and supervision needs to
adopt a macro-prudential approach aimed at reducing risks to the financial system as a whole,
instead of the traditional micro-prudential approach aimed at mitigating the risks of individual
institutions on a stand-alone basis (see Brunnermeier et al, 2009a).
Once we settle on a definition of systemic risk, the next challenge is to measure it. Bisias et
al. (2012)(14) documented more than 30 di erent ways to measure systemic risk. They can
be roughly classified into two categories depending on the nature of the shocks and/or factors
a ecting the financial system:
1. Type I systemic risk measures assume that financial instability arises endogenously, and
can be captured ex-ante by analyzing the interaction and feedback between economic and
financial factors. In principle, these measures could help finding early warning signals
based on the identification of behavioral patterns in the financial system, including price
and trading volume dynamics, that characterizes the build-up of systemic risk.
2. Type II systemic risk measures assume that the failure of single firm or a group of firms
generates financial instability though knock-o  e ects on other firms, due to direct and
indirect exposures. Since defaults are typically considered unpredictable events, the mea-
surement of systemic risk in this category relies on what-if scenario analysis attempting
to capture the impact of the default of a firm on others.
Within the Type II measures, there are two categories that are of interest from a regulatory
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standpoint. The first one is the category of Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) measures, which evaluate a
firm’s size relative to the domestic and/or global financial market where it operates, focusing on
its market share and substitutability, i.e. whether other firms could provide similar services at
a similar price if the firm were to cease operations. TBTF measures assume implicitly that the
failure of a dominant firm could pose a substantial threat to the financial system and the markets
where the firm operates, given its linkages to other firms, both financial and non-financial, and
the importance of the services it provides, (Laconte, 2015 (52), BCBS, 2013 (10)).
The second category comprises Too-Interconnected-to-Fail (TICTF) measures which attempt to
capture the likelihood of the failure of a single firm and its e ect on the financial sector and the
real economy. A similar concept was mentioned earlier by Battiston et al (2016) (9) as Too Cen-
tral to Fail (TCTF), which states network topology (formally defined in section 2.2) and node
position, or centrality (formally defined in section 2.2.5) matter to system stability; capturing
these e ects is essential to quantify individual nodes’ systemic importance in the network. De-
spite the implementation di culties, focus on these type of measures seems justified, as concerns
about interconnectedness risk have shaped the response of government o cials in recent crisis
episodes, as it was the case of the bailout of the insurance firm American International Group,
Inc (AIG) in the aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
The remainder of the paper, which focuses on TICTF measures, is organized as follows. Section
1.2 frames the paper’s contribution in the extant literature. Section 1.2.3 presents the key find-
ings. Detailed analysis on network properties can be found in section 2, and default mechanism
can be found in section 3. Section 3.3 concludes. The Appendix (Sec 3.3) provides additional
information.
1.2. Contribution
1.2.1. Microprudential and Macroprudential Approaches
To better understand systemic risk, it is appropriate to analyze it from both the micro and
macroprudential perspectives. At the microprudential level, the systemic importance of an
individual firm in the financial network depends on the size of its balance sheet and its capital
reserves relative to the firm’s overall exposure to other firms (or interbank exposure if we restrict
the analysis to the banking system). At the macroprudential level, which emphasizes the stability
of the system as a whole, the topological properties of the network, or interconnectedness among
the firms, determine how likely domino e ects are, and if triggered, what the potential damages
to the system are. For simplicity, the defaults that trigger the domino e ects are assumed as
exogenous events in this paper.
When studying the banking network, we used a model-free approach to examine the micropru-
dential aspect of this banking network. This approach assesses how the attributes of individual
firms, such as capital bu ers and the size of firms, influenced network properties such as the dis-
tribution of connectivity measures. As suggested by its name, this model-free approach, requires
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no modelling of a clearly defined default mechianism or a contagion chain, which makes it par-
ticularly useful when detailed balance sheet data and interbank exposure data are unavailable
and a specific default contagion mechanism is either unobservable or di cult to discern.
We complemented the microprudential analysis with a macroprudential model-based analysis
that captured the domino e ect or contagion chain triggered by the default of a firm. The
default mechanism, based on the observed behavior of financial firms in past crisis events,
incorporated various factors contributing to a cascade of failures following an initial default,
such as direct counterparty credit exposures, market shocks and liquidity shortages. Hence, the
approach captured the macroprudential dimension associated with interconnectedness.
1.2.2. Related Literature
Several strands of the academic literature and current policy debates influence our study. The
model-free approach builds on the early work on modern network theory of Newman (2003) (58),
which set the foundations for the analysis of the topological properties of financial networks.
Together with Boss et al. (2004) (16) and Cont et al (2012) (27), this paper is among the few
that analyze the empirical structure of a financial system using real-world, highly disaggregated
data on the banking sector of an advanced (emerging) market economy. Having access to disag-
gregated and complete exposures helps the paper stand out from earlier work using aggregate
exposure data. By necessity, the latter relied on maximum entropy methods to infer unobserved
bilateral interbank exposures from aggregate counterparty exposures (Sheldon and Maurer, 1998
(63); Upper and Worms, 2004 (66); Wells, 2004 (69); Elsinger et al., 2006a,b (34; 35); Degryse
and Nguyen, 2007 (29)). But as pointed out by Cont et al (2012), maximum entropy methods
typically assume exposures are shared equally among all counterparts, which is at odds with
data on reported interbank exposures. As a result, maximum entropy-based studies could un-
derestimate the likelihood and severity of contagion and domino e ects in financial networks.
Following the earlier network literature, the model-based approach builds on a numerical simu-
lation framework, first developed by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) (33), who assumed a fictitious
default mechanism to model domino e ects; and Furfine (2003) (40), who assumed a more nat-
ural sequential default mechanism, i.e. firms default one by one if the losses incurred exhaust
their safety bu ers. In Eisenberg and Noe (2001) (33), following an initial default, the exis-
tence of a unique equilibrium requires all surviving firms to liquidate their cross holdings to
determine their equilibrium values, assuming all liabilities receive equal priority. Cont et al.
(2012) (27) argue that such equilibrium is unrealistic. Rather, it may be more appropriate to
assume that when firms facing a liquidity shortage unwind their portfolios, the recovery rate
could be as low as zero in the short-run. This assumption seems consistent with the protracted
and lengthy bankruptcy procedures observed in practice, which forces creditors looking forward
to cut their exposures rapidly to accept low recovery rates. The sequential default algorithm of
Furfine (2003) (40) bypasses Eisenberg and Noe’s equilibrium conditions, modeling instead the
potential cascade of failures that a single default could trigger. Furfine applied his algorithm
to analyze the U.S. federal funds market. Since this market only comprises around one-seventh
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of the U.S. wholesale interbank market, the results might have underestimated systemic risk in
the U.S. financial system (Upper and Worm, 2004 (66), Armantier and Copeland, 2012 (5)).
Our analysis goes some steps beyond the earlier literature discussed above. As in previous
studies, it captures the systemic risk associated with credit risk driven contagion, or primary
e ects. Following a round of initial defaults, or fundamental default, the transmission of the
initial shock relies only on the credit losses resulting from the failure of debtor banks to honor
their obligations. The initial round of credit losses could cause additional banks to fail, triggering
subsequent defaults. But our analysis also looks at the secondary e ects associated with the
funding risk and liquidity shortages when creditor banks demand immediate repayment from
failed or stressed debtor banks. The later set of banks, facing higher funding costs, may be
forced to sell their assets at fire sale values, which in turn would reduce the fair asset and equity
value of banks holding similar assets, creating an adverse positive feedback e ect or liquidity
spiral (Brunnermeier et al, 2009 (17), Caccioli et al., 2015 (19)). We capture both primary and
secondary e ects, the latter linking funding costs and fire-sale losses to the solvency of individual
firms, using an extension of the balance sheet network models of Jo (2012)(48) which in turn
builds on the earlier work of Chan-Lau (2010)(20).
Last, while this study benefits from data availability on interbank exposures, we would like to
discuss briefly alternative approaches based on market price data that could make up for the lack
of exposure data. For instance, Acharya et al. (2010) (1) and Zhou et al. (2009) (70)construct
systemic risk measures based on high frequency historical market data on credit default swap
spreads and/or equity return volatility. Chan-Lau et al (2016) (21) identify systemically im-
portant banks using partial correlation networks, where the links between firms correspond to
the partial correlation of projected probabilities of default. These projections use information
from market prices and balance sheet and income statements. One assumption underlying these
measures is that markets are su ciently e cient, ensuring that market prices capture well in-
formation on the risk profile of the firms analyzed, including their potential interaction during
periods of distress.
1.2.3. Selected Results
While results will be discussed in detail later, this section o ers a glimpse of the main results.
In this advanced emerging market economy, the network comprised twenty five banks, and
any two banks were pairwise connected if there were counterparty exposures between them.
These exposures could be related to any of twenty seven di erent asset classes (see Table 2.1.2),
di erentiated by type of contract, currency of denomination, and maturity. In the analysis, we
used counterparty exposure data as of end-September 2010.
From the microprudential perspectives, we have examined several properties of this interbank
network:
1. Network topology reveals a semi-complete network exhibiting high network density (for-
mally introduced in section 2), which is defined by the number of edges currently exisit
in the network, divided by the maximum number of possible edges (Chinazzi et al., 2013
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(24)). Higher network density echos completeness, or full interconnectedness, and can be a
double-edged sword: Allen and Gale (2000) (3) argue that completeness makes the finan-
cial network more resilient by creating multi-dimensional connections among firms, and
hence more credit channels; at the same time, this property creates additional transmis-
sion channels for shocks during adverse market condition, with one firm’s default a ecting
several firms at the same time. On the other hand, high interconnectedness makes adverse
shocks to dissipate quicker. This theory has been realized by Chinazzi et al. (2013) (24),
using a multi-layered (disaggregate across assets) international financial network (IFN)
data on roughly 70 countries’ complete bilateral data during 2001-2010.
2. Compared to other financial networks, banks in this economy tend to cluster closely to-
gether, exhibiting the small world property. The global clustering coe cient of this net-
work, which measures the number of groups of three banks connected to each other, is
around≥0.53, well above what has been found for Austria (≥0.12) (Boss et al, 2004 (16)).
Boss et al. (2004) (16) also points out that the Austrian network is a small-world network,
with three degrees of separation, meaning the path lengths among the nodes are smaller
than three. Originally described by Watts and Strogatz (1998) (68), a small-world network
can be created by randomly rewiring several links among the nodes of a regular ring lattice
graph; these links become the short-cuts among the originally distant nodes, which creates
a short average path length (formally defined in section 2) of the network. Compared to
the Austrian interbank network, another emerging market economy, Brazil, described in
Cont et al. (2012) (27), presents decaying local clustering coe cient, across nodes with
increasing degrees of connection. Cont et al (2012) (27) argue that, a small diameter (path
length) is not su cient to characterize the small-world property. Indeed, the Brazilian fi-
nancial network does not enjoy the small-world property since the distribution of the local
clustering coe cients across all nodes is not bounded away from zero. In comparison,
our network can be characerized as a small-world netowrk: it has a significantly higher
local clustering coe cient (see Table 2.2.2), only slightly larger path length than that of
its random graph counterpart, and two degrees of separation, meaning every bank in this
network connects to its neighbour through one other bank at most.
3. The financial network exhibits (double) heavy-tailedness (or scale-free property): The
interbank network can be naturally separated into a core, comprising a reduced number
of institutions, and a periphery, comprising the rest, which suggests a multi-money centre
structure as described in the early theoretical work by Allen and Gale (2000) (3), and later
examined in real world overnight money market network (Fricke et al., 2015 (39)). This is
a natural outcome for a network that exhibits a two-sided heavy-tailed distribution, where
the degree measures the number of connections a bank has. The left tail comprises banks
with a small number of connections and distant from the core, and mainly groups foreign
bank branches. The right tail comprises banks with a large number of connections, and
mainly comprises domestic banks. Within the banking system, the right tail banks are
the most important (systemic) ones from an economic viewpoint. Two-sided heavy tail
distributions also support the existence of a preferential attachment e ect in the network, or
in other words, highly connected notes tend to get more connected as the network expands
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(Barabasi and Albert, 1997(7)), although later Guido et al. (2002) (43) augue that for some
network systems the scale-free behaviour has no direct relationship with the preferential
attachment when the information of degree connection of nodes is missing. Our network
connectivity and exposure distributions are similar to those of Austrian network (Boss
et al. (2004) (16)), which also have double heavy-tailedness. In comparison, Brazilian
interbank network connectivity and exposure distributions seem to have significant right
tail only (Cont et al., 2012) (27). In comparison, German interbank network connectivity
and exposure distributions, do not exhibit significant heavy-tailedness (Roukny et al.,
2014 (62)). On the other hand, Our study can be compared to Roukny et al (2013),
which examines optimal network architecture, by analyzing interplay of several factors
such as network topology, capital ratios and market illiquidity, using Italian interbank
money market data from 1999-2011. It shows topology matters when market is illiquid,
and scale-free network (discussed below in point 3 in section 1.2.3; formerly defined in
section 2.3.2) makes the network both more robust and fragile than homogeneous ones.
4. Capital ratio: Using capital ratio requirement proposed by Basel III, all banks in this
network seem to have adequate bu er. However, when applying relative exposure measures
described in Cont et al. (2012) (27), we identify several institutes at the borderline of
capital adequacy. Centrality measures also capture the SIFIs in the network in the debt
and credit dimensions; in other words, the important debtors and creditors in the banking
system. Alter et al (2015) also used centrality based measure to analyze capital allocation.
5. Size and Centrality are positively correlated in our network. Size as a single predictor
have over 60% explanatory power to Centrality, and the result is statistically significant.
However, there are several small peripheral (non money center) banks that also have
high centrality values, possibly due to the large bilateral exposures, which makes them
systemically important in our system. This phenomenon is comparable to the finding of
Chinazzi et al. (2013) (24). In their IFN, a node that does not belong to a “rich club”,
however being central in the system, poses adverse threats in times of crisis.
The microprudential analysis identifies a set of core banks and several peripheral ones systemi-
cally more important than others based on their counterparty exposures. The macroprudential
analysis then allows us to evaluate whether the failure of a systemic bank could impair the
banking system. The sequential default analysis, based on numerical simulations, suggests that
despite the core-periphery structure and the incompleteness of the network, bank defaults are
likely to remain isolated events and would not trigger a cascade of failures, due to credit risk
alone. This result follows from the structure of the banking system, where banks’ counterparty
exposures are small relative to the assets in their balance sheet, and their capital bu ers. Credit
losses, or primary e ects, do not seem to be the main source of losses to banks, but rather
the losses associated with the secondary e ects, or fire sale of assets when firms face liquidity
shortages. This finding appears consistent with empirical evidence, albeit yet scant, that fire
sale of assets tend to drive losses during crises (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2010 (55); Merrill et al,
2013 (37)), and supports the lender of last resort role played by the central bank. In compari-
son, it is worth mentioning that Upper and Worm (2004) (66) estimate the bilateral exposure
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in the German banking system, using balance sheet information, and measure the credit risk
due to bilateral counterparty exposure. Their results show despite the safety net of institutional
guarantees for saving banks and cooperative banks, which reduces contagion risks significantly,
one single bank default can cause as much as 15% assets destroyed in the entire banking system.
Chapter 2
Banking Network Topology
2.1. Data
Before delving into details, let’s formally define a bank’s stylized balance sheet properties as
in figure 2.1.1. From perspectives of commercial banks, assets include physical assets and fi-
nancial assets such as reserves, loans, investment securities, government and corporate bonds,
etc. Banks’ assets also include interbank assets, which are their claims on their counterparties.
These generate interest revennues for banks. Liabilities of banks include other entities’ claims
on banks, such as deposits from savings account, and certificate of deposites, as well as central
bank loans and interbank liabilities which are their financial liabilities to their counterparties.
In this paper, we focus on systemic risk stems from interbank exposures. One bank’s interbank
asset is the other’s interbank liability.
The interbank data used in this paper is collected by Banco Central de Chile (Central Bank of
Chile) on a regular basis. The dataset comprises 25 financial institutions, including 12 domestic
banks (DBs) and 13 foreign bank branches (FBs) operating in the domestic market. Among the
DBs we included several globally operating foreign banks since the nature of their operations
resemble those of domestic banks. This choice was justified when later on, the analysis showed
their network properties were quite similar to those of domestic banks. Table (2.1.1)shows the
market share in the banking sector of domestic banks and foreign bank branches as of end-
September 2010. The choice of the time examined in the paper (end of Sep 2010) is due to its
resemblance to the financial environment during the crisis period.
Table 2.1.1.: Assets by di erent types of institutions, end-September 2010
Sep 2010 in local currency Million (MM) %
Domestic Banks 95,255,691 81.16%
Foreign bank branches 22,106,349 18.84%
Total Banking system 117,362,039 100%
For these banks there was detailed information on interbank exposures disaggregated into 27
di erent asset classes as of end September 2010, as shown in Table 2.1.2. The di erent asset
categories distinguish between:
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Figure 2.1.1.: Stylized Bank Balance Sheet
Assets
• Reserves
• Government	Bonds
• Securities
• Loans
• Interbank	Assets	[what	other	banks	owe	
the	subject	bank]
Liabilities
• Deposits
• Interbank	Liabilities	[what	the	subject	bank	
owes	all	of	its	counterparties]
Capital
• Common	shareholders’	capital	[Tier	1,	Tier	
2	]
• Etc.
• Overnight deposits (denominated in domestic and foreign currencies)
• Short-term deposits up to one year (denominated in domestic and foreign currencies)
• Repos (denominated in domestic and foreign currencies)
• Derivatives (denominated in domestic and foreign currencies)
• Interbank claims (denominated in domestic and foreign currencies)
Within these categories, there were additional subcategories corresponding to di erent maturi-
ties: overnight, less or equal to one year, or more than one year. The dataset, hence, consists
of a three-dimensional matrix with dimensions 25◊ 25◊ 27, which is similar to the multi-layerd
(disaggregate across assets) IFN on countries’ bilateral lending and borrowing relationships in
Chinazzi et al. (2013) (24). In addition, we have the capital levels and detailed balance sheet
structures of all the institutions in the network shown in Table 2.1.2. In analysis on network
connectivity and exposure distribution in Section 2.2, the two-dimensional matrix 25 ◊25 is
created by aggregating all 27 asset classes.
Figure 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, 2.1.6, 2.1.7, 2.1.8, 2.1.9 and 2.1.10 illustrate interbank networks
of disaggregate asset classes as described in Table 2.1.2. Figure 2.1.11 provides a graphical
visualization of the entire banking network of the country, aggregate across all asset classes
in Table 2.1.2. All these network figures are directed (shown by arrows) and weighted by the
volumes of transactions. A quick glance at Figure 2.1.11 highlights how closely this network
resembles a multi-money center network (Allen and Gale, 2000,(3)), that is, a network where a
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Table 2.1.2.: Asset classes, maturity and currency denomination
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Figure 2.1.2.: Network of Overnight Checking Account and Sight Deposits
(a) Overnight checking account and sight deposits [Asset type 1-3
in Table 2.1.2]
Key network stats
Average Degree 8.08
Network Diameter 4
Graph Density 0.337
Avg. Path Length 1.621
(b) Key network stats
few banks, i.e. banks B1, B3, B5, B7, B9 and B10, have a central role connecting all the banks in
the network. A couple of banks are just weakly connected to the network, i.e. B13 and B6, while
one bank is completely disconnected (B24). While we analyze it formally later, the graphical
evidence already suggests a network with a high degree of clustering and density. The node
colours indicate the sizes of the banks, with red being the largest banks, with risk-weighted
assets (RWA) over 10,000,000 MM, magenta being the ones with RWA over 1,000,000 MM,
orange being the ones with RWA over 100,000 MM, and grey are the smallest ones with RWA
under 100,000MM. The node sizes are ranked by In-degrees, which is the number of directed
links going into the nodes, or number of lenders in our case (formally defined in section 2.2).
Node sizes ranked by other criteria such as modularity and degrees (formerly defined in section
2) do not change the rankings significantly. Please also note that in Figure 2.1.5, Overnight Repo
exposure network, the links are not in existence; however, the sizes of the nodes are not the same.
This is because although there are links among the nodes, their weights are zeros. This may be
due to the dataset is a snapshot at a time, and some or all links may exist in historical time.
The zero-weighted links exist in other disaggregated and the aggregated network; however, the
numbers are not large and most measures we use here are weighted, hence these zero-weighted
links do not a ect our results. The key network statistics table beside each network figure
summarizes key properties for comparison. For formal definitions of these concepts, please refer
to section 2.2. All figures 1-10 are produced using software Gephi.
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Figure 2.1.3.: Network of Deposit with maturity < 1 yr
(a) Deposit with Maturity < 1 yr [Asset Type 4-6 in Table 2.1.2]
Key network statistics
Average Degree 12.4
Network Diameter 3
Graph Density 0.517
Avg. Path Length 1.41
(b) Key network stats
Figure 2.1.4.: Network of deposits with maturity > 1yr
(a) Deposits with maturity > 1 yr [Asset Type 7-9 in Table 2.1.2]
Key network statistics
Average Degree 6.4
Network Diameter 3
Graph Density 0.267
Avg. Path Length 1.361
(b) Key network stats
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Figure 2.1.5.: Network of Overnight Repo exposure
(a) Overnight Repo exposure [Asset type 10-12 in Table 2.1.2]
Key network statistics
Average Degree 8.08
Network Diameter 4
Graph Density 0.337
Avg. Path Length 1.621
(b) Key network stats. Please
note that the links in this net-
work all have weights zero. This
may mean the linkes exist in his-
torical times.
Table 2.1.3 shows the banks’ regulatory capital ratios, or equity to risk-weighted assets. All
banks in our network exceed the minimum regulatory requirement of 8 percent proposed by the
Basel Committee (whereas investors typically favour 10% minimum). Government bonds, which
carry a zero risk weight, comprise the larger share of assets held by the banks. Following Cont
et al (2012) (27) we also report other useful size and several relative exposure (RE) measures.
These measures include:
1. Total Capital (TCi )= Tier 1 + Tier 2 Capital for bank i. Ei is the total exposure of bank i ,
essentially the total interbank liabilities of bank i in the network. TC = Core Capital + Pro-
visions + Subordinated bonds + Minority Interest. Total Capital Ratio TCRi = TCi/RWAi .
RWAi is the risk-weighted Assets of bank i.
2. Tier 1 Capital Ratio T1CRi = T ier 1Capitali/RWAi. Prudential regulations stipulate that this ratio
exceeds the minimum regulatory capital requirement.
3. Basic Capital RatioBCRi = T ier 1Capitali/A(i) . A(i) is the un-weighted assets of bank i.
4. The Cont et al (2012)(27) measures of relative exposure are: (1).RE1i = TCi/Ei (2). RE2i =
T ier1Ci/maxEi,j. (3).RE3i = T ier1Ci/Ei+RWAi.
26 Banking Network Topology
Figure 2.1.6.: Network of Repo maturity > 1yr
(a) Repo Maturity > 1 yr [Asset type 13-15 in Table 2.1.2]
Key network statistics
Average Degree 12.4
Network Diameter 3
Graph Density 0.517
Avg. Path Length 1.41
(b) Key network stats
Figure 2.1.7.: Network of Derivative with maturity < 1 yr
(a) Derivatives with maturity < 1 yr [Asset type 16-18 in Table
2.1.2]
Key network statistics
Average Degree 12.4
Network Diameter 3
Graph Density 0.517
Avg. Path Length 1.41
(b) Key network stats
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Figure 2.1.8.: Network of Derivatives with maturity > 1 yr
(a) Derivatives with maturity > 1 yr [Asset type 19-21 in Table
2.1.2]
Key network statistics
Average Degree 6.4
Network Diameter 3
Graph Density 0.267
Avg. Path Length 1.361
(b) Key network stats
Figure 2.1.9.: Network of Interbank claims with maturity < 1yr
(a) Interbank claims with maturity < 1 yr [Asset type 22-24 in
Table 2.1.2]
Key network statistics
Average Degree 12.4
Network Diameter 3
Graph Density 0.517
Avg. Path Length 1.41
(b) Key network stats
28 Banking Network Topology
Figure 2.1.10.: Network of Interbank claims withmaturity > 1 year
(a) Interbank claims withmaturity > 1 year [Asset type 25-27 in
Table 2.1.2]
Key network statistics
Average Degree 6.4
Network Diameter 3
Graph Density 0.267
Avg. Path Length 1.361
(b) Key network stats
Figure 2.1.11.: Aggregate interbank asset exposure [Aggregate all assets in Table 2.1.2]
(a) Aggregate Network Visualization
Key network statistics
Average Degree 14.76
Network Diameter 2
Graph Density 0.583
Avg. Path Length 1.332
(b) Key Network Stats
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5. We calculate bank size as percent of assets in the whole banking network, as comparison. Please
note B24 has no interbank exposure.
Conflicting conclusions can be drawn from observations: B12, 13 and 14 have very large TCR, and T1CR
ratios. This is likely because they held large amount of government bonds as assets, which carried zero
or low risks. Non-targeted capital ratios adopted by regulators (TCR, T1CR and BCR) do not show
insu cient capital bu er in the banking network. However, relative exposure measure RE1 show B3, 9,
12, 14 and 18 have relatively thin capital (RE1<1), indicating the capital not enough to cover its total
exposure. Criteria (RE2 > 1) shows all banks have su cient capital to cover its largest counterparty
exposure. Using RE3 as an alternative capital ratio to target high concentration nodes, there are quite
a few nodes that have relatively thin capital ratio (RE3 < 10%), e.g., B1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 16, 20 and 25.
Among these nodes, B1, 3, 5, 10 are large in size (each of which with Size% > 10% of the total banking
system), and in total they account for almost 70% of the total assets.
2.2. Network Properties
2.2.1. Degrees of Connection
This section analyzes the topological characteristics of the interbank network. An interbank
network can be modeled as a weighted directed graph, defined as two dimensional variable
I = (V , E),where:
• V is a set of financial institutions, each is denoted by number n = 1, 2, 3, ...
• E denotes a 25 ◊ 25 matrix that represents a bilateral exposure data between each pair of
the counterparties. This matrix is created by aggregating all 27 asset classes in Table 2.1.2.
To be clear, the calculation of network properties in this section refer to this aggregated
interbank network matrix. Ei, j represents the exposure of bank i on bank j, in other
words, how much bank j owes bank i. It is the short term maximum loss of bank i caused
by an exogenous default of bank j. In interbank network studies, interbank asset of bank
i often refers to the total exposure of it, which is the total amount of all its counterparties
owe it; the total interbank liabilities of bank i often refers to the opposite, which is the
total amount of bank i owes all of its counterparties.
In a directed graph, the degree of a node is defined as the number of edges directed towards or
originated from a node. If the edge originates from a node it is counted as out≠ degree, Kout,
if the edge is directed towards the node, it is counted as in≠ degree, Kin. For i, j œ V ,
• Kin(i) = qjœV 1Eij>0 measures the number of institution i’s debtors.
• Kout(i) =qjœV 1Eji>0 measures the number of institution i’s creditors.
• The degree of connectivity is measured by Ki = Kin(i) +Kout(i).
• The total interbank assets for institution i is denoted as A(i) = qjœV Eij
• The total interbank liabilities for institution i is denoted as L(i) = qjœV Eji
The summary statistics are presented in the table below.
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Table 2.1.3.: Capital and Relative Exposure Measures, end-September 2010. Critical values are high-
lighted: Blue highlights mean su cient or large. Red highlights mean insu cient or small. We bold font
the Domestic Banks (DBs), most of which are the core (nodes that have large connectivity and exposure)
of the network shown in Figure 2.1.11. Here, for simplicity, we define money centre with connectivity of
75 percentile or above. We denote the core with a star (*). Please note that some foreign bank branches
that have strong presence in this economy also act like core, e.g. B4*. They are consistent in the paper,
in Table 2.2.2, Figure 3.2.1 and Figure 3.2.3.
TCR (%) T1CR(%) BCR (%) RE1i RE2i RE3i (%) Size(%)
B1* 13.64 8.79 6.72 5.6295 14.58 8.58 17.45
B2* 11.74 7.43 5.24 1.8454 6.39 6.99 0.75
B3* 11.85 8.01 4.8 0.9941 1.96 7.16 16.50
B4* 15.42 12.60 9.09 2.8797 10.02 11.96 4.73
B5* 13.64 9.38 7.01 4.4535 10.64 9.10 12.24
B6 59.21 58.95 54.18 19.8519 67.14 57.25 0.03
B7* 12.82 8.76 6.76 4.5874 14.58 8.52 6.46
B8 12.22 9.23 6.74 8.8715 24.03 9.11 2.77
B9 13.45 13.45 6.37 0.4977 2.52 10.59 1.25
B10* 14.52 10.50 7.2 5.2123 18.80 10.22 20.80
B11* 13.88 12.50 9.08 3.3736 6.38 12.01 3.23
B12 126.39 126.39 29.75 0.7344 3.41 46.45 0.47
B13 124.36 124.36 64.55 2.6744 5.46 84.89 0.02
B14 115.79 115.79 22.83 0.7847 4.32 46.77 0.08
B15 88.91 88.78 37.97 3.6271 11.65 71.30 0.29
B16* 12.96 8.77 6.22 2.2496 8.17 8.29 2.75
B17 19.37 14.08 10.27 1.9690 5.78 12.81 0.83
B18* 28.9 28.90 8.26 0.4861 2.98 18.12 0.86
B19 16.44 16.42 13.36 76.4129 86.48 16.38 0.21
B20 10.75 10.75 6.4 1.3462 3.18 9.96 0.51
B21 25.52 25.52 13.68 1.2815 3.14 21.28 0.33
B22 47.12 47.40 19.42 2.8666 9.16 40.67 0.22
B23 15.04 15.04 13.06 3.3545 13.06 14.40 0.17
B24 192.43 192.43 70.53 - - 192.43 0.16
B25* 13.13 8.57 6.26 3.3710 9.54 8.25 6.88
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Table 2.2.1.: Summary of connectivity measures
Summary kin(i) kout(i) k(i) A(i) MM$ L(i) MM$
Mean 14 14 28 171500.65 171500.65
Standard deviation 7 6 12 281567.60 242075.25
Minimum 0 0 0 0.00 0.00
10th percentile 3 5 8 846.36 185.82
30th percentile 10 11 22 28043.90 8811.81
50th percentile 17 16 33 70042.82 85702.52
75th percentile 18 19 36 219226.28 234782.75
Maximum 23 22 45 1374956.94 929915.91
2.2.2. Network characteristics
In this section, we defined a common framework for a network of size of n nodes (or vertices)
and m existing links. The maximum possible number of edges exist in this network is n(n≠ 1).
In this section onwards, all network characteristics calculation are defined on the network by
aggregating all assets (Figure 2.1.11).
Density: Density (defined as den) refers to the ratio of the number of existing links m to
the maximum number of possible edges n(n≠ 1) (Chinazzi et al., 2013 (24)). The connectivity
of a network, defined as den, is the unconditional probability that two nodes share one link.
den = mn(n≠1) . 0 Æ den Æ 1. At its smallest value, 0, the network is completely disconnected. At
its peak value, 1, the network is a complete network, meaning every node has interbank exposure
in both directions (in and out) to every other node in the network. For example, in the aggregated
network of all assets (shown in figure 2.1.11), n = 25, m = 350, den = mn(n≠1) =
350
25◊24 = 0.5833.
Reciprocity: Reciprocity (defined as r) refers to the probability of any out-going link is recipro-
cated. The weighted reciprocity (defined as wgt≠ r) is considered with the volume of transaction
(Chinazzi et al., 2013 (24)). In the aggreagated interbank network (shown in figure 2.1.11), bi-
nary reciprocity r = 89350 = 25.43%. This means about one quarter of the links are reciprocated.
Chinazzi et al. (2013) (24) considers reciprocity a measure of (a)symmetry: the lower the value
of r or wgt≠ r, the more asymmetric the network is, hence the more unbalance in the bilateral
relationship.
Distance Distance (defined as d) refers to the length of the shortest path between any two
nodes. For example, distance between node i and node j, defined as di,j , which is the length
of the shortest path between them. If there is a link directed from node i to node j, di,j = 1.
Table 3.3.1 shows the shortest paths between all pairwise combinations of banks. Since di,j for
most pair of banks is either 1 or 2, the banking network is well connected.
Eccentricity and Diameter: The eccentricity of node i represents the maximum distance
(d) to any other node in the network, is denoted as Ái = maxjdij . In other words, this is the
number of interim counterparties node i needs to connect to in order to connect to nodej. In our
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network, since bank 24 is not accessible for all the other banks in the network, the eccentricity of
any bank i becomes Œ. In this case, the conventional solution is to exclude the pair(s) of nodes
that are not connected in the calculation of APL (Newman (2003) (58) p181). From hereafter,
we calculate network characteristics excluding B24 where appropriate. Hence, if we consider a
sub-graph of our aggregated network (shown in figure 2.1.11) except for node 24, the eccentricity
of each bank i can be calculated (shown in Table 3.3.1). The diameter of a network is defined as
Dia = maxiÁij . Similarly to the case of eccentricity, since bank 24 is not accessible from other
banks, Dia is Œ. Hence, we consider a sub-graph of our aggregated network (shown in figure
2.1.11) except for node 24, Dia = 2. The results are presented in Table 2.2.2.
Shortest Path Length The shortest path length (SPL) of node i within the network is defined
as li = 1/(n≠1)
q
j ”=i di,j . In the aggregated banking network (shown in figure 2.1.11), the average
path length is Inf , as there is a disconnected bank, B24. Similar to the case of eccentricity and
Diameter, we form a sub network excluding B24, the average path length for each node i, li,
can be calculated, as shown in Table 2.2.2. The average shortest path length (APL) for all
nodes in this connected sub-network (excluding B24), defined as L¯ = 1n
q
li, is 1.3659. This
is slightly larger than its random graph counterpart (a random graph with the same number
of nodes) Lrandom,n=24,k=14 =1.2042. Please note that this is only descriptive, not statistically
significance. This is not strictly defined in previous academic literature.
2.2.3. Clustering Coefficient
Classic graph theory refers clustering coe cient to the degree to which vertices in a graph cluster
together, that is to concentrate in groups with a high density of links. Empirical research show
that in most real-world complex networks such as genetic networks, social networks and internet,
vertices tend to have higher clustering coe cients than in the random network of Erd s and
Rényi (1959), or ER network(36) (Watts and Strogatz, 1998 (68)). There are several di erent
measures of clustering coe cients:
Global Clustering Coe cient It measures the overall clustering e ect in the network (see
Luce and Perry (1949) (53) and Wasserman and Faust (1994) (67)). It is calculated as follows:
Cglobal =
3◊number of triangles
number of connected triplets of vertices =
number of closed triplets
number of connected triplets of vertices
The global clustering coe cient result for our network (excluding node 24) is 0.5279. This
shows our network is higher clustered compared to the Austrian network analyzed by Boss et al.
(2004) (16), which has Cglobal = 0.12± 0.01 (mean and standard deviation across 10 datasets).
Local Clustering Coe cient (LC1) It is a local version of the above global clustering coe -
cient measure (Newman, 2003 (58)) and defined as follows: LC1i = number of triangles connected to vertex inumber of triples centered on vertex i
Then the average LC1 is ¯LC1 = 1n
qn
i=1 LC1i . Results are presented in Table 2.2.2 (LC1).
Local Clustering Coe cient (LC2) This is another measures of local clustering coe cient
developed by Watts and Strogatz (1998) (68), which is calculated as follows: Suppose that
a vertex i has ki neighbours; then at most ki(ki≠1)/2 edges can exist between each pair of
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two neighbours in the network. In other words, that is when every neighbour of vertex i is
connected to every other neighbour of vertex i. Let LC2i denote the fraction of these maximum
possible edges that actually exist, LC2i = mki◊(ki≠1)/2 , and average local clustering coe cient,
¯LC2 = 1n
qn
i=1 LC2i
Please note that B24 is not accessible at all, hence LC224 does not exist.
Table 2.2.2 (LC2) presents the results for the local clustering coe cients. The average local
clustering coe cient of our network is 0.8267 (except for bank 24). Including Bank 24, the
average local clustering coe cient is 0.7936. This is significantly higher than if the graph
is a random graph of the same vertex set as LC2random ¥ kn . LC2random,n=25,k=14 = 0.56,
LC2random,n=24,k=14 = 0.5833. A network of n nodes and k links is a small-world network if it
has approximately the same APL, and significantly higher local clustering coe cient as defined
by ¯LC2 above, which can be expressed as L¯n,k & L¯random,nk, and ¯LC2n, k > ¯LC2randomnk.
Weighted Clustering Coe cient Previous three clustering coe cient measures (Cglobal, LC1
and LC2) are so far unweighted measures, analyzed using binary adjacency matrix of the ag-
gregated interbank network data. Defined by Barrat et al. (2004) (8) and Giorgio (2007) (42),
weighted (local) clustering coe cient for node i is defined as: lcwi = 1si(ki≠1)
q
j,h
(wij+wih)
2 aijaihajh
where si =
qN
j=1 aijwij which measures node strength by extending the degrees of node i(Ki)
aij is the adjacency matrix of the network, whose elements are binary, with 1 means connection
exists from node i to j, and 0 otherwise.
wij is the actual volume from node i to j.
The normalization factor 1si(ki≠1) calculates the fraction of maximum possible triplets the weighted
edge may participate, and hence ensures 0 < lcwi < 1. Results are shown in 2.2.2. Please note
that in our case, average weighted local clustering coe cient, l¯c = 1n
qn
i=1 lc
w
i = 0.3806 , which
is larger than the unweighted local clustering coe cient defined as ¯LC1, 0.1775. According to
Barrat et al (2004) (8), in very large random (uncorrelated) network, ¯LC1 t l¯c . In our case,
weighted coe cient is larger than the unweighted one, l¯c > ¯LC1. This means the clustering ef-
fects (intercoonected triplets) are more likely to be formed by higher weighted edges, vice versa.
This reflects the high heterogeneity in weights of edges (Exposures) which will be discussed in
section 2.3.2 in details.
2.2.4. Assortativity
Assortativity mixing or homophily (ﬂ, and in some previous literature called pearson coe cient)
in a network with n nodes and m edges is defined as follows in Newman (2002) (57) as follows:
ﬂ =
m≠1
q
i
jiki≠[m≠1
q
i
1
2 (ji+ki)]
2
m≠1
q
i
1
2 (j
2
i +k
2
i )≠[m≠1
q
i
1
2 (ji+ki)]
2
where ji, ki are the degrees of vertices at the ends of the ith edge, with i = 1, ...m. In the
aggregated network shown in fugure 2.1.11, ﬂ = ≠0.1607. A negative ﬂ implies dis-assortative
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mixing, or disassortivity, which is a phenomenon that high-degree nodes tend to connect to low-
degree ones. Disassortativity is known in technology and biological networks, whereas assortative
mixing, meaning highly connected nodes tend to connected to highly connected ones, exists in
social networks (Newman, 2002 (57)). It is worth mentioning that our result (disassortativity)
is similar to the German credit and derivative network presented in Roukny et al (2014) (62).
A weighted version of this coe cient, defined by Leung and Chau (2006) (23) as belows:
ﬂw =
H≠1
q
i
wi ji ki≠[H≠1
q
i
1
2wi (ji+ki)]
2
H≠1
q
i
1
2wi (ji+k
2
i )≠[H≠1
q
i
1
2wi (ji+ki)]
2
0 < ﬂw < 1. wi is the volumn of ith link, H is the total weight of all links in the network. If ﬂw
is positive, then the network is weighted assortative, which means nodes with similar weighted
links tend to be connected to each other. If ﬂw is negative, the network is disassortative. In
the aggregated network, ﬂw = 0.1805. This is consistent with the findings in Leung and Chau
(2006) (23) that although unweighted assortativity can be positive and negative for di erent
types of network, all networks are tend to be weighted assortative, that is ﬂw > 0 for most
networks discovered. Moreover, if ﬂw > ﬂ, a high weighted link tend to connect to two similar
degree nodes together. This is the so-called “coarse-graining” network, resembling a structure
with several core nodes (money centers) connected by high weighted links, while each of the
money center connects to multiple pheripheral nodes with only light weighted links.
2.2.5. Centrality
Eigenvector centrality is measured as follows:
Consider a graph defined in section 2.2.1, I = (V ,E) with n number of nodes or vertices, where
Ei, j is exposure of bank i on bank j, or how much bank j owes bank i. Let A = (ai,j) be the
adjacency matrix. If ai,j = 1, vertex i is linked to vertex j, and ai,j = 0 otherwise. The weighted
adjacency matrix represent cashflows between each pair of the vertex, e.g.
Suppose that a vertex i has ki neighbours . The centrality score of vertex i can be defined as:
xi = 1⁄
q
jœk(i) xj = 1⁄
q
tœG ai,jxj where k(i) is a set of the neighbors of i and ⁄ is a constant.
This can be rearranged and rewritten in vector notation as the eigenvector equation Ax = ⁄x.
Centrality measures the relative importance of nodes within a network.
We calculate several centrality measures as follows (all are shown in Table 2.2.2):
(1) Eigenvector Centrality of un-weighted and un-directed graph C1undir/w: This centrality mea-
sure assesses each of the banks’ importance score using the un-directed, un-weighted adjacency
matrix. It is symmetric and square and where there is a link between vertex i and vertex j,
ai, j = 1, otherwise, 0. However, this measure is not sensitive to weights,
(2) Eigenvector Centrality of gross bilateral exposure matrix C2g : This centrality measure assesses
each of the banks’ importance score using the weighted adjacency matrix of gross exposure, each
of whose element is the total interbank asset and liability of each vertex i: ai, j = Ei, j +Ej, i.
This matrix is symmetric and square. However, this measures does not reveal the net exposure
information.
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(3) Eigenvector Centrality of net bilateral exposure matrix C3n: This centrality measure assesses
each of the banks’ importance score using the weighted adjacency matrix of net exposure, each
of whose element is the net interbank asset or liability of each vertex i: ai, j =| Ei, j ≠Ej, i |.
This matrix is symmetric and square. However, this measures reports the bank’s importance
within the network in the debtor and creditor space, as long as it has a net exposure, either it
is debt or credit.
(4) - (7) Binary Authority and Hub (defined as C4b,aut and C5b,hub) scores, and their weighted
versions (defined as C6w,aut and C7w,hub), defined as belows:
Ideally our goal is to analyze the banks’ importance in the debtor and creditor space separately.
However, for asymmetric matrices resembling directed network, eigenvector centrality is known
to give inaccurate results. HITS (hyperlink-Induced Topic Search) algorithm developed by
Kleinberg in 1990s (51) can be employed as folows:
Hubs in our interbank network are the banks lend out to many good authority banks. In other
words, important creditors. Authorities (authority banks) in our interbank network are those
who receive funds from good hubs. In other words, the important debtors. Each node i in
our directed network is assigned an Authority weights , defined as xi, and a Hub weight,
defined as yi, both of which have initial arbitray non-zero values. Then weights are updated as
follows:
x
(k)
i =
q
j:(j, i)œE y
(k≠1)
i and y
(k)
i =
q
j:(i, j) x
(k)
j for k = 1, 2, 3 ... . Please note that k is the
iterative round.
Weights are normalized asqj(x(k)j )2 = 1 andqj(y(k)j )2 = 1. Both vectors x(k) and y(k) converge
as k ≠æ Œ. In summary, HITS calculates the largest nonnegative eigenvectors of the matrices
of ATA (authority matrix) and AAT (hub matrix).
According to Benzi et al. (2013) (13), a reformulation can improve the HITS estimates as
follows: Let A =
Qa 0 A
AT 0
Rb. NoteA is symmetric and square,AT = A. ATA = AAT T.
AAT = A2. and A œ R2n◊2n.
A2 =
Qa AAT 0
0 ATA
Rb,A3 =
Qa 0 AATA
ATAAT 0
Rb.,..., A2k =
Qa AAT 0
0 ATA
Rb; A2k+1 =Qa 0 A(ATA)k
(ATA)kAT 0
Rb.
Appling HITS to A, the dominant eigenvector (defined as u(k) =
1 y(k)
x(k)
2
for k = 1, 2, 3 ...).
Each of the vector y(k) and x(k) are of size n◊ 1. y(n), the first n entries of u(k) is the hub scores
of each node i, and x(k), the last n entries of u(k) is the authority scores of each node i.
The weighted version results are obtained from applying this method to weighted adjacency
matrix.
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Table 2.2.2.: Network Property Summary Table. Significant values are highlighted in red. Ec-
centricity (Ecc). Average Path Length (APL): Core money centres of the network (APL<1.20)
include B1, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 25. The rest are peripheral nodes. Local clustering coe cients
(LC1 and LC2). Centrality measures C1 ≠C7 : importance rankings of banks in creditor and
debit space, using gross and net weighted, and binary and weighted adjacency matrices. Most
significant ones are highlighted in red, and secondary importance are highlighted in blue.
Ecc. APL LC1 LC2 lcwi C
1
undir/w C
2
g C
3
n C
4
b,aut C
5
b,hub C
6
w,aut C
7
w,hub
B1* 2 1.0435 0.1696 0.8211 0.2747 0.2524 0.2014 0.1258 0.1832 0.1796 0.0413 0.1050
B2* 2 1.2174 0.205 0.9265 0.4539 0.2259 0.0154 0.0033 0.1661 0.1628 0.0047 0.0061
B3* 1 1 0.154 0.7100 0.1753 0.2524 0.6012 0.6779 0.1877 0.1787 0.0365 0.6737
B4* 2 1.1739 0.2112 0.9000 0.3107 0.2165 0.0996 0.0957 0.1638 0.1521 0.0315 0.0799
B5* 2 1.1304 0.1795 0.7895 0.6487 0.2483 0.4513 0.5206 0.1775 0.1759 0.4837 0.0897
B6 2 1.8261 0.0972 1.0000 0.3235 0.0785 0.0004 0.0003 0.0287 0.0535 0.0001 0.0001
B7* 2 1.2609 0.1857 0.8480 0.5468 0.2355 0.1484 0.0729 0.1639 0.1731 0.0730 0.0513
B8 2 1.1304 0.2472 0.9619 0.6792 0.2232 0.0417 0.0416 0.1705 0.1515 0.0345 0.0090
B9 2 1.2174 0.2268 0.9167 0.5346 0.2136 0.1229 0.0239 0.1577 0.1572 0.0499 0.0441
B10* 2 1.1304 0.1776 0.8211 0.6137 0.2421 0.4885 0.4468 0.1765 0.1800 0.4640 0.0788
B11* 2 1.1739 0.2095 0.8382 0.4456 0.2334 0.0695 0.0703 0.1745 0.1579 0.0381 0.0427
B12 2 1.2609 0.2379 0.9619 0.5088 0.2129 0.1577 0.0596 0.1637 0.1519 0.0367 0.0585
B13 2 1.913 0.0238 0.8000 0.0001 0.0732 0.0008 0.0007 0.0214 0.0449 0.0000 0.0008
B14 2 1.8696 0.0321 0.8444 0.0088 0.1212 0.0048 0.0059 0.0276 0.0935 0.0000 0.0040
B15 2 1.4348 0.2482 0.9273 0.3965 0.1649 0.0159 0.0109 0.1272 0.1067 0.0043 0.0113
B16* 2 1.2609 0.1849 0.8480 0.4120 0.2297 0.0681 0.0445 0.1640 0.1723 0.0379 0.0258
B17 2 1.4348 0.129 0.8596 0.0861 0.2308 0.0159 0.0137 0.1180 0.1786 0.0034 0.0076
B18* 2 1.2174 0.2317 0.9667 0.5420 0.2228 0.1147 0.0359 0.1701 0.1586 0.0555 0.0403
B19 2 1.6087 0.3516 1.0000 0.8859 0.1422 0.0003 0.0002 0.0877 0.0454 0.0001 0.0000
B20 2 1.6522 0.1333 1.0000 0.2310 0.1330 0.0172 0.0151 0.0818 0.0747 0.0034 0.0100
B21 2 1.5652 0.1759 1.0000 0.2517 0.1725 0.0195 0.0129 0.1046 0.1319 0.0070 0.0035
B22 2 1.3043 0.1989 0.8750 0.4872 0.2220 0.0098 0.0051 0.1542 0.1616 0.0039 0.0047
B23 1 1 0.2316 0.9286 0.1011 0.1405 0.0011 0.0014 0.0861 0.0740 0.0000 0.0013
B24 Inf - 0 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
B25* 2 1.1304 0.1956 0.8954 0.5969 0.2408 0.2407 0.1570 0.1778 0.1698 0.1741 0.0429
mean(ex. B24) 1.9167 1.3315 0.1849 0.8576 - - - -
mean (inc. B24) Inf - 0.1775 - 0.3806 - - -
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2.3. Distribution of connectivity and size measures
2.3.1. Parametric distribution fitting
Analyzing the distribution of connectivity and exposure further our understanding on inter-
bank network structure. For Kin ,Kout , K and Exposure A we fit the following parametric
distributions:
A. Lognormal distribution with mean µand standard deviation ‡
pdf: y = f(x|µ, ‡) = 1
x‡
Ô
2ﬁe
≠(ln x≠µ)2
2‡2
B. Extreme Value (EV) Distribution: location parameter µ and scale parameter ‡;
pdf 1: y = f(x|µ, ‡) = ‡≠1 exp(x≠µ‡ ) exp(≠exp(x≠µ‡ ))
C. Weibull Distribution: location parameter a and scale parameter b. Please note that if T has
a Weibull distribution with parameters a and b, then log(T ) has an extreme value distribution
with parameters µ = log(a) and ‡ = 1/b.
pdf: y = f(x|a, b) = ba (xa )b≠1e≠(x/a)
b
D. Truncated Pareto distribution fitting, which is a semi-parametric fitting process, discussed
in detail in the section 2.3.2
E. Normal-Laplace (N-L) and Double Pareto Lognormal (dPlN) Distributions, discussed in detail
in the Appendix.
Figure 2.3.1 shows the fitted distributions with the empirical pdf, while the estimated parameters
are presented in Table 2.3.1. The data suggests, as demonstrated by the titling point in the
plots reported in Figure 2.3.2 that the dPlN distribution best fit the data. This distribution
falls somewhere in between lognormal and Pareto distribution (see Reed and Jorgensen, 2004,
(101) and the statistical appendix). Our choice of the dPlN distribution is inspired by the core-
peripheral network structure displayed in Figure 2.1.11, suggesting possible two tail in both
ends of the connectivity and exposure distributions. This distribution was first discovered by
Mitzenmacher (2001) that “have a lognormal body and Pareto tail” (Reed and Jorgensen, 2004)
(101).
Equation 3.3.24 and Equation3.3.25 show the limiting cases for the paretian tail indices when
the distribution approaches right (Œ) and left (0), respectively. The results of our network
distribution are presented in Table 2.3.2d. We can view these results as the paretian tail index
estimates in the limiting cases (should the network expands), and they are comparable to the
results presented in the truncated Pareto case in Section 2.3.2. This is an evidence of possible
community structure and hierarchy within our network.
1This form of EV distribution is suitable to measure the minimum values of a distribution whose tail decays
exponentially fast, such as normal distribution. To model the largest values, one may use the negative of the
original values.
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Figure 2.3.1.: Fitted lognormal v.s. empirical pdf of kin(i),kout(i), k(i) and Exposure A
(in 1010 local currency)
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Table 2.3.1.: Distribution parameter estimates of Kin, Kout, K and exposure Ai (úin 1010 of
domestic currency). CI refers to confidence intervals. nll refers to negative log-likelihood. The
returned value of ADh = 0 is the hypothesis test result, which indicates that Anderson-Darling
test fails to reject the null hypothesis of the respective assumption of distributions at the default
5% significance level, and vice versa. cv refers to AD critical values.
µ CI–=5% ‡ CI–=5% nll AD h pAD, 5% AD statistics cv
Kin 2.7298 [2.5894, 2.8702] 0.3084 [0.2360, 0.4453] 61.9218 1 0.009 1.0073 0.7553
Kout 2.5354 [2.2622, 2.8085] 0.6469 [0.5028, 0.9075] 83.9508 1 0.0092 1.0131 0.7273
K 3.2712 [3.0547, 3.4879] 0.5129 [0.3986, 0.7195] 96.0405 1 0.0037 1.1668 0.7262
A 24.7964 [23.9938, 25.599] 1.9007 [1.4772, 2.6662] 644.0808 1 0.0000 2.8928 0.7262
(a) Log-normal distribution fitting: As expected at 5% significant level, A-D test reject the hypothesis of
lognormal distribution for Kin , Kout , K and A.
a CI–=5% b CI–=5% nll AD h pAD, 5% AD stat cv
Kin 17.4285 [15.9514, 19.0424] 5.0391 [3.5145, 7.2250] 57.9402 1 0.0026 1.2296 0.7387
Kout 16.2917 [13.9821, 18.9827] 2.71171 [1.9056, 3.8589] 77.5211 1 0.0013 1.3490 0.7393
K 32.6124 [28.5729, 37.2229] 3.1478 [2.2181, 4.4671] 91.1131 1 0.0000 1.4109 0.7387
A 13.6895ú [7.3731ú, 25.4171ú] 0.6807 [0.4989, 0.9288] 642.1669 0 0.7832 0.2440 0.7387
(b) Weibull distribution fitting: The A-D test shows strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis of Weibull
distribution in the case of Kin , Kout , K. However, fail to reject the hypothesis of Weibull distribution in
the case of Exposure A. We further tests goodness-of-fit of the extreme value distribution to the distribution
of log(A) in tab 2.3.2c.
µ CI–=5% ‡ CI–=5% nll AD h pAD, 5% AD stat cv
Kin 16.662 [14.883 18.441] 4.3245 [3.1260 5.9827] 76.9965 0 0.1163 0.5984 0.7393
Kout 16.9521 [14.9619, 18.9422] 4.8353 [3.5034, 6.6735] 79.6616 0 0.1172 0.5972 0.7393
K 33.4891 [29.8050, 37.1733] 8.9545 [6.4834, 12.3676] 95.1290 0 0.0511 0.7358 0.7393
A 34.3361ú [15.2187ú, 53.4534ú] 45.6317ú [35.9967ú, 57.8456ú] 705.5769 1 0.0000 4.8015 0.7393
log(A) 25.6425 [25.0237, 26.2613] 1.4691 [1.0767, 2.0044] 47.0536 0 0.7832 0.2440 0.7387
(c) Extreme value distribution fitting: The A-D test does not reject the null hypothesis of extreme value dis-
tribution with moderate evidence (p-value at 5%) in the cases of Kin , Kout , K, whereas, it rejects the null
hypothesis in the case of Exposure A, with strong evidence. For the distribution of log(A), A-D test shows no
evidence of rejection. Together with evidence shown in sub-table 2.3.2b, it is intuitive that this specific class of
extreme value distribution fits well with the logarithmic form of the exposure distribution, and the distributions
of in and out-degree and connectivity.
– — ‹ · nlog-likelihood
Kin (NL) 3.9189 0.1604 20.1082 1.3260 457.3975
Kout (NL) 2.9628 0.1604 20.4802 1.7901 273.0211
K (NL) 1.1735 0.0887 39.5836 3.3891 235.0851
A (dPlN) 1.8732 0.5210 26.1820 0.1651 1.6204e+03
(d) N-L and dPlN distributions fitting using MLE. Please note
that, as we understand, and evidences shown in sub-table
2.3.2b and 2.3.2c, we are fitting distribuiton of in and out-
degree and connectivity to Normal-Laplace distribution, and
we are fitting Exposure to Double Pareto Lognormal distribu-
tion. Please note that dPlN is the exponential form of the N-L
distribution.
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2.3.2. Semi-parametric heavy-tail distribution fitting
The failure to fit a lognormal distribution to the connectivity measures steers the analysis
towards the detection of heavy tails, or the so-called scale-free property, which can be assessed
from an analysis of log-log plots of the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF),
which is simply given by P(Kout Ø k), P(Kin Ø k), P(K Ø k) and P(A Ø a) for the out-
degree, in-degree, degrees of connectivity and exposure respectively. It shows the scale-free
property occurs quite often in nature, i.e. earthquake intensity, and man-made phenomena,
i.e. city population, income distribution, etc. Many known large complex networks such as
internet, actors collaboration, genetic networks, exhibit scale-free, or power-law distribution in
their connectivity. This is due to two generic characteristics: (i) networks expand continuously
as new vertices enter the system, and (ii) new vertices have preferential attachments (7)). In
interbank networks the scale-free property is present in the Austrian and Brazilian networks
(see Boss et al. (2004) (16) and Cont et al. (2012) (27)). Preferential attachments, if shown
in presence in historical time, in interbank network refers to the phenomenon that new banks
entering the network tend to connect to banks that already have more links to other neighbours.
Guido et al. (2012) argue that preferential attachment is not related to scale-free properties
by origin, strictly speaking. They proposed a mechanism by firstly assigning each node an
importance rank, accounting for its intrinsic fitness, which is defined by some characters such as
influence, or degree connectivity, then simulate network formation process by various network
systems such as BA or ER models. These lead to the result that even non-scale-free fitness
distribution network can generate scale-free networks. This mechanism is particularly useful
when the degree connectivity is not publicly available. While this is not the focus of our paper,
we would like to conduct future work when the historical data becomes available.
In a scale-free network, the first two moments of the distribution, the mean and standard de-
viation, are not enough to represent the empirical distribution of the data since the density of
the distribution is heavily weighed in the right tail, as implied by the power-law distribution:
p(x) s x≠–, where – is the exponent or scaling parameter. Normally, 2 < – < 3, with some
exceptions. The analysis of empirical datasets finds that above a minimum threshold value,
xmin, the tail of the distribution follows a power-law (Choromanski et al., 2013 (25); Onnela et
al., 2007(59)).
Detecting heavy tails and estimating the parameters of a power law distribution is relatively
di cult. Traditional least squared fitting, developed by Pareto’s work in 19th century (Arnold,
1983 (6)), can produce inaccurate results. Clauset et al (2009) (26) have suggested combining
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with goodness-of-fit tests such as Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(K-S) statistic and likelihood ratios.
We follow Clauset et al. (2009) (26) in our analysis, and use MLS with K-S Statistics, with
adjustment to finite sample. Table 2.3.2 shows the key statistics, and Figure 2.3.2 shows the
log-log plots of the CCDF of Kin,Kout,K and exposuresA, and the corresponding fitted power
law distribution. According to Clauset et al. (2009) (26), when the sample size n . 100, and
p-values for the tested distributions are above our threshold of 0.1, the power-law hypothesis
cannot be ruled out. Our sample size, however, is very small which makes di cult for the
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Table 2.3.2.: Key Statistics of MLE and K-S for Kin(i),Kout(i), K(i) andA(i) (**in 108 local
currency). This table is accompanying Figure 2.3.2. kin,min, kout,min, kmin are selected by the
fitted distributions that have the minimum of K-S goodness-of-fit statistics (D). We use the
hatted parameters for estimation of the (unhatted) true (unobserved) variables; subscript 1
and 2 denote left and right tail statistics respectively: –ˆ1 and –ˆ2 are the estimated left and
right tail indices, ‡ˆ(–ˆ1) and –ˆ2 are the estimated standard deviation of –ˆ1 and –ˆ2. This is
equivalent to the Hill (1975) (46) estimator. Limit1 is the upper limit of the data analysed as
this is a truncated Pareto distribution (selected based on observation of Figure 2.3.2 ), and it is
only defined for the left tail in this test. The right tail is the natural upper limit of the entire
distribution. L1 and L2 are the log-likelihood estimates for left tail and right tail distribution.
p1 and p2 are the p-values of K-S test (when larger than 0.1 - significant*). Large –ˆ and ‡ˆ(–ˆ)
may be caused by the small sample bias.
Left tail statistics
kin(i) kout(i) k(i) Aúúi
–ˆ1 1.4792 1.1917 1.2875 1.1949
‡ˆ(–ˆ1) 0.3038 0.6825 0.6685 1.1554
kˆin,min 1 5 2 7 4**
Limit1 12 15 30 1630.1722**
L1 -92.2793 -110.2908 -110.5894 -215.2695
p1 0.7430* 0.2150* 0.3030* 0.0000
D1 0.4479 0.5791 0.3189 0.3646
Right tail statistics
kin(i) kout(i) k(i) Aúúi
–ˆ2 4.7500 4.7333 4.7500 2.5421
‡ˆ(–ˆ2) 0.6787 0.6542 0.6744 1.1813
kˆin,min 2 15 16 32 1630.1722
Limit2 - - - -
L2 -58.4769 -45.9618 -44.0562 -61.4525
p2 0.002 0.007 0.0660 0.9430*
D2 0.1882 0.1940 0.2423 0.1005
test to single out the true power-law distribution from others, e.g. exponential, lognormal etc.
This problem disappears as the sample size increases since the p-values for the non-power-law
distributions drop o . Hence, even if the dataset is sampled from a power law distribution,
the small data sample prevents a good fit, which is evident by the large standard deviations of
the parameter estimates in Table 2.3.2. Nonetheless, the clear and distinct double tail features
shown in Figure 2.3.2, exhibit two regions in connectivity and exposure measures that could
be fitted with power. Overall, the tail indices in our interbank network where prominent with
statistical significance (K-S test p value > 0.1*).
In addition to connectivity and exposures, we also analyze size e ect. It appears to have a single
right tail only. Result is shown in Figure 2.3.3. The Pareto index for size is around 1.4267, with
a K-S p value = 0.1741, which is statistically significant.
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Figure 2.3.2.: Log log plot of ccdf of in-degree, out-degree and degree of connectivity and exposure
in Sep 2010
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2.4. Size and Centrality
Some previous papers argue centrality to be a better measure of systemic risk than size: TICTF
is more appropriate than TBTF. We found empirical evidence of strong correlation between size
and centrality. In this section, we analyze the correlation between bank size (as shown in Table
2.1.3), weighted Authority and Hub scores, C6w in Table 2.2.2). Size is correlated with authority
and hub ranking scores, with statistical significance. The important message here is that the
banks in the northwest corner of the sub-figures below (for example, B9, B12 and B18), are
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Figure 2.3.3.: Pareto Analysis of Bank Size (% of assets). Numbers in brackets are standard
deviations of the estimated parameters.
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α = 1.4267(1.6122)
size
min = 0.16(2.3218)
ntail = 19.6(5.0948)
K-S = 0.1741
nloglh = -48.6341
smaller but central - important debtors and creditors.
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Figure 2.4.1.: Size and Debtor and Creditor Importance Ranking
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Chapter 3
Systemic Risk Analysis in a Balance-Sheet Framework
While an examination of the topological properties of the interbank network is useful to deter-
mine the degree of interconnectedness among banks, and to make qualitative inferences about
systemic risk, it is not enough to quantify systemic risk. Henceforth, we shift the focus to the
analysis of systemic risk within a balance-sheet network framework, which can capture how
connectivity and exposure a ect the transmission of fundamental defaults within the network.
3.1. Default mechanism
A default event occurs when a bank is unable to fulfill its financial obligation, i.e. failure to
repay principal or interests on contractual obligations, or inability to provide a scheduled loan
as agreed with a counterparty. In theory, a institution fails when it becomes insolvent, i.e. its
capital bu er is wiped out by credit and/or market losses. These losses can be triggered by
exogenous events or macroeconomic shocks a ecting the institution’s earnings.
However, corrective action frameworks and central bank intervention may prevent insolvency,
while still triggering contagion (Chan-Lau and Sy, 2007 (22)). This suggests that for practical
purposes, a default event is better defined as the point when the capital reserves of a bank fall
below a minimum requirement established by the regulatory authority. In our model, default is
defined as failure to meet an regulatory minimum capital requirement of 7 percent.
Related Literature: It worths to mention that there are mainly three methods to model
default dependence structure: (1) Conditionally independent defaults (CID) approach, which
generates credit risk dependence among firms through the dependence of the firms’ intensity
processes, use a common set of state variables. Its drawback is that its generated default
rate is lower than empirical one. Extensions of CID models by Du e and Singleton (1999b)
incorporate joint jump di usion into default dependencies. However, this approach makes the
model hard to calibrate. (2) The second approach is the contagion models extending the CID
model to incorporate empirical default clustering experiences. The intuition behind this is that
there are period of time when there are default clustering events taking place, possibly due to
their financial interconnectedness (Jarrow and Yu 2001), or generally economy states deterioate
(Davis and Lo 1999). (3) Copula approach: Copula approach Rogge and Schonbucher takes a
marginal default probabilities of a group of companies as default dependence structure.
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Figure 3.1.1.: Default contagion mechanism. CRRW (Capital ratio risk weighted)
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these periods of default clustering is the existence of credit risk contagion mechanisms between
firms, either because of their commercial or financial relationships (Jarrow and Yu 2001) or
simply because the general level of default risk in the economy has increased (Davis and Lo
1999). Contagion models try to include, on the specification of default intensities, the existence
of such sources of contagion.
The balance-sheet network analysis presented here follows Jo (2012) (48), which expands on
Chan-Lau (2010) (20). The key di erences between Jo (2012) and our work here are as follows:
(1) Jo (2012) analyzed intrasectoral default contagion e ects among sectors (domestic banks,
foreign banks, credit agencies and insurance companies, etc.), while our analysis uses interbank
exposure data collected by central bank without estimation. (2) Jo (2012) assumes recovery rate
is 0 due to slow bankcruptcy procedure as suggested by Cont et al (2012). In our future work,
we may relax this assumption by varying the degree of the recovery rate in our future work.
We may also consider di erent degrees of market illiquidity by varying the estimations of fund
replacement coe cient(“ in step 5 below) and incremental funding cost coe cient (µ, defined
in step 6 below).
The default simulation, illustrated in Figure 3.1.1 runs as follows. We follow notations in Jo
(2012) and present only key equations for readers’ convenience. For details, please refer to
section 2.2 on page 6-12 of Jo (2012)):
• A set of fundamentally defaulted institution D = {i : Ci ≠Li < Cri (1+ bi)}. Ci - capital
held by the institution i; Li - the institution’s loss; Cri - minimum regulatory required
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capital for i, and bi - additional capital bu er.
• Credit loss of institute i is CLi, which arises with counterparty defaults: CLi = qhœD Eih”),
where the loss given default (LGD), ” is computed through exogenous default mechanism
by Chan-Lau (2010) (20), later this assumptions is relaxed and we compute other scenar-
ios when LGD equals 0, as suggested by Cont et al (2012) (27) due to slow bankruptcy
procedure.
• Funding losses FLi: To repay claims from defaulted (creditor) institutions, debtor insti-
tutions may be able to refinance mainly through two sources: (1) sell part of its assets,
or (2) get fundings from other alternative creditors. It makes a di erence when switching
market regimes: Normal market conditions assumes debtors refinance easily. However,
stress scenarios complicate re-financing process due to additional funding cost. The FLi
is computed as follows:
1. After initial fundamental defaults, from defaulted set defined by D, institution i would
collect qhœD Ehi from D (assumed withdrawn completely).
2. Institute i replaces cash outflow partially by “qhœD Ehi (0 Æ “ Æ 1), where “ is the
replacement rate.
3. Fire-sale events happen when the sale prices are significantly lower than the assets’ book
values. Let q denote fire-sale loss rate for liquid assets, and z define loss rate for illiquid
assets1. Cash generated from fire-sales of liquid assets aqi is a
q
i (1≠ q).
If the cash outflow cannot be recovered by selling liquid assets: (1≠ “)qhœD Ehi > aqi (1≠
q), then institution i has to sell illiquid assets2Equation (1) on page 9 on Jo (2012) states
the following:
FSLi = Min
5
(1≠ “)
ÿ
hœD
Ehi, aqi (1≠ q)
6
· q1≠ q +Max
5
(1≠ “)
ÿ
hœD
Ehi ≠ aqi (1≠ q), 0
6
· z1≠ z (3.1.1)
4. Funding cost loss (FCL): Jo (2012) (48) assumes that short-term debts are from two
sources: (1) from defaulted set D, calculated as “qhœD Ehi; (2) from the non-defaulted
institutes, as qk/œD ESki. Liquidity risks surge for the institutes that rely on short-term
loans. Equation (2) on page 9 of Jo (2012) states the following:
FCLi =
ÿ
hœD
Ehi“µ+
ÿ
k/œD
ESkiµ (3.1.2)
5. Calibration of the replacement rate “: Jo (2012) assumes there exists a normal capital
ratio, ⁄0, at which an institution can completely rollover or find alternative creditors
(during normal market conditions). Fund replacement becomes exceedingly di cult as
capital ratio falls between ⁄0 and the minimum regulatory requirement, ⁄¯. Below ⁄¯,
refinancing is not possible. Equation 3 on page 10 of Jo (2012) states the following:
“(⁄) =
I 1 if ⁄0 < ⁄
1≠ (⁄0≠⁄)2
(⁄0≠⁄¯)2 if
0 otherwise
⁄¯ < ⁄ Æ ⁄0 (3.1.3)
1It is reasonable to assume q < z
2It is reasonable to assume that illiquid assets should be sold only after all liquid assets are sold.
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We use historical balance sheet data to construct the normal capital ratios for each institute
in our network and calibrate this relationship accordingly. For details please refer to
Appendix section 3.3.4.
6. Calibration of funding cost loss ratio µ: The results by Jo(2012) (48) for Korea suggest
that the credit spread is proportional to the third power of a decline in the capital ratio3.
This relationship is shown by equation (4) on page 11 of Jo (2012):
µ =
I
0 if ⁄0 < ⁄
a · (⁄0 ≠ ⁄)3 if ⁄¯ < ⁄ Æ ⁄0 (3.1.4)
where a is the proportional constant obtained by the regression. In this economy, this is
relatively small, less than 1%. For details please refer to Appendix section 3.3.4.
7. By combining Equations 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, and 3.1.4, the total funding loss can be ex-
pressed as below (first equation on page 12 of Jo (2012)):
FLi = FSLi + FCLi
= Min
C
(1≠ “(⁄))
ÿ
hœD
Ehi, aqi (1≠ q)
D
q
1≠ q +Max
C
(1≠ “(⁄))
ÿ
hœD
Ehi ≠ aqi (1≠ q), 0
D
z
1≠ z
+
ÿ
hœD
Ehi“(⁄)µ(⁄) +
ÿ
h/œD
ESkiµ(⁄) (3.1.5)
3.2. Default simulation results (exogenous case)
For parameter calibrations of µ, aand ⁄, as in Equations 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, please see Appendix
3.3.4. The estimation of funding cost loss ratio in our economy is µ =
Y][ 0 if ⁄0 < ⁄0.0006495◊ (⁄0 ≠ ⁄)3 if ⁄¯ < ⁄ Æ ⁄0 .
We also make the following assumptions, which are suggested by previous literature (Jo (2012)
(48) and several others).
• The the fire sale loss rate for liquid assets:q = 0.2
• The fire sale loss rate for illiquid assets: z = 0.7
• Fair Value loss rate FV LR = 0.2.
Discussion: The results of the default simulations are summarized in Table 3.2.1 and Figure
3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
1. Using simulation analysis, any one single bank’s default does not cause contagion due to
direct counterparty exposure in the first round of the simulation. Majority of the damage
is caused by fire-sales of assets and liquidity shortage. These in turn, would trigger second
round default of several institutes with thin capital bu ers, and so on and so forth. We
assume multiple rounds of default simulations take place simultaneously.
3This can be re-calibrated to fit each country’s specific market characteristics.
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Figure 3.2.1.: Asset Destroyed% by Direct Counter Party Exposure (Credit Shock). Due to the
high capital level of the institutes within the network, defaults caused by credit risk is not high,
only less than 5% assets are destroyed due to credit risk.
Time=0 Default Rd1 Rd2 Rd3
simultaneous Default rounds
0
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
As
se
t D
es
tro
ye
d 
by
 %
Asset Destroyed by CS
B4
rest
B7, 11, 12, 14
2. Small banks (Table 2.1.3) default may cause domino e ects as much as larger banks’
defaults, due to fire-sale of assets and liquidity shortage in the stress scenario, especially
if these small banks have large interbank exposures (see point 5).
3. By examining capital adequacy regarding bilateral exposures, relative exposure RE3 in
Table 2.1.3 shows that B1, 2, 3, 4* 5, 7, 8, 9* 10*, 11*, 16, 17* 20, 25 (*banks at borderlines)
are the ones with the thin capital bu er (RE3 < 10%).
4. Results from the default simulation (Table 3.2.1 and Figure 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3) show
similar results to the relative exposure measure above: The first round defaults due to
secondary e ects (fire-sale and funding loss in stress market conditions) are consistent:
Bank 2, 3, 8, 9, 16, 18, 20, 21, and 25. The second round defaulted banks due to secondary
e ects are also consistent: 1, 5, 7, 10, 11, 22, with occassionally 4 or 14 also defaulted in
this round. The third round, defaults due to credit loss are 4 and 14, with bank 17 only
defaulted once, triggered by initial default of bank 4.
5. After examination (Table 2.1.3), we found the relative exposure of Bank 9, 12, 14, 18, 20
and 21, RE1i ∞ 1, which means their total Tier 1 capital is just enough to cover its total
interbank exposure. At the same time, their sizes are small (sizei ∞ 1% of the total banking
sector assets). In addition, bank 22 shares similar characteristics, with RE122 = 2.87 and
sizei ∞ 1%. These all make the above mentioned nodes vulnerable in the network. Hence,
the micro and macro analysis have identified the same group of vulnerable nodes in this
banking network.
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Table 3.2.1.: Default simulation result (exogenous case). Credit Shock (CS), Funding Shock
(FS). Results show Direct counterparty exposure do not cause as much damage as Funding
(liquidity) shock.
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Figure 3.2.2.: Asset Destroyed% by Funding (Liquidity) Shock. DB-Domestic Banks, FB -
Foreign Bank Branches
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Figure 3.2.3.: Comprehensive Default Simulation Illustration (CS + FS)
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3.3. Conclusions
We used two complementary approaches to analyze systemic risk in a banking sector in an
advanced emerging economy. The first, the model-free approach, focuses on the topological
properties of the network by examining interbank connectivity and exposure using network
theory, which does not rely on granular balance sheet information or the funding cost structure
faced by the banks. There exist two tails in the connectivity and exposure distribution, which
indicates two groups of banks within the network: the well connected money centre banks, and
the distant peripheral banks. By the non-targeted, homogeneous capital ratio currently pledged
by Basel Committee and implemented by Central banks, banks in our network are solvent and
well capitalized. However, using relative exposure, a measure developed by Cont et al (2012)
(27) to target exposure concentrated banks (SIFIs), a few banks are identified as vulnerable
nodes in the network. Also, centrality measures shows the important debtors and creditors in
the network. Size is highly correlated with centrality, with some exceptions - small banks (B9,
12 and 18) with high bilateral exposures can be central nodes, too. These small but central
banks cause at least as much as credit and market loss (in nominal monetary terms) to their
counterparties when they default. In relative terms, even higher, as shown in Table 3.2.1, 3.2.2
and 3.2.3.
While topological analysis is useful for identifying core and peripheral banks, qualitative mea-
sures such as relative exposure and centrality, systemic risk assessment also requires quantifying
the risk. This was accomplished by the model-based approach, employing a balance-sheet net-
work framework, to define a specific default mechanism. In this emerging economy, counterparty
credit risk, or the primary e ect, in the interbank market is relatively small, and the default of a
single bank does not lead to successive defaults. However, counterparty credit risk is just one of
many risk factors driving systemic risk. Results indicate that secondary e ects such as fire-sale
losses, fair value market losses, funding losses and liquidity shortages could lead to widespread
failures in the banking network, inducing further defaults by the domino e ect.
The two complementary approaches single out the same group of SIFIs. This finding suggests
that a network topology approach could be used when granular public information on balance
sheet, securities prices, and credit ratings is missing. In the case that this information is avail-
able, the balance-sheet network approach and default simulations could provide complementary
insights on systemic risk. Finally, the analysis highlights the importance of heterogeneous in-
terconnectedness in the banking system as a driver of systemic risk, supporting policy e orts
towards incorporating the interconnectedness dimension in the regulatory framework.
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Appendix I Figures and Tables
Table 3.3.1.: Shortest path length of the banking network, end-September 2010. The number in
cell (i, j) in the table refers to the shortest path length between bank i and bank j. If it is Œ,
it means bank i has no access to bank j.
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Appendix II Statistical Methodology
3.3.1. Normal Laplace distribution and double pareto-lognormal distribution
The dPlN distribution has four parameters, similar to log-hyperbolic disbution, both of which exhibit power-
law behavior in both tails. These two distributions are derived from mixture of lognormal distributions. The
di erence between the two is that dPlN arises from the distribution of a final state of a Geometric Brownian
Motion (GBM) with a constant killing rate, while the hyperbolic distribution has a more complicated killing rate
functions. Consider a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) defined by Itoˆ stochastic di erential equation (SDE)
as follows:
dX = µXdt+ ‡Xdw (3.3.1)
It has an initial state X(0) = X0 distributed lognormally, logX0 s N(‚, ‡2). After T units of time, X(T ) will
have a lognormal distribution as follows:
logX(T ) ≥ N(‚ + (µ≠ ‡2/2)T , ·2 + ‡2T ) (3.3.2)
Supposedly at time T , the GBM process is observed has an exponentially distributed random variable with
density fT (t) = ⁄e≠⁄t, t > 0. ⁄ is refereed as the “killed” rate rate, and k(X) © ⁄. The distribution of the state
Xˆ at the time of the observation of the “killing”, is a mixture of lognormal random variables 3.3.1with mixing
parameter T .
Taking logarithmic of X, Yˆ = log(Xˆ) so that Yˆ is the state of an ordinary Brownian motion after an exponentially
distributed time. Y is the sum of independent variables W and Z . Z ≥ N(‚, ·2); W is a skewed Laplace
distribution as described by , with a pdf as follows:
fw(Ê) =
I
–—
–+— e
—Ê, for Ê Æ 0
–—
–+— e
≠–Ê, for Ê Ø 0 (3.3.3)
where – and — are roots of characteristic function
‡2
2 z
2 + (µ≠ ‡
2
2 )z ≠ ⁄ = 0 (3.3.4)
Hence, the distribution of Yˆ is a convolution of Laplace and normal distributions. We introduce the concept of
Mill’s ratio for convenience as follows:
R(z) =
Fc(z)
„(z)
(3.3.5)
where Fc(z) is the complementary cumulative density function of normal distribution, and „(z) is the normal
pdf. We can then express the density function of Yˆ as follows:
g(y) =
–—
–+ —
„(
y≠ ‚
·
)[R(–· ≠ (y≠ ‚)/· ) +R(—· + (y≠ ‚)/· )] (3.3.6)
This is a Normal-Laplace (N-L) distribution. In other words, Y ≥ NL(–,—, ‹, ·2).
Since a Laplace random variable can be expressed as the di erence between two exponentially distributed variates,
we can rewrite Y as follows:
Y
.
= ‹ + ·Z + E1/–≠ E2/— (3.3.7)
where E1 and E2 are standard independent exponentiate deviates, and Z is a standard normal deviate, which is
independent of E1 and E2. One can use this equation to generate pseudo-numbers from N-L distribution.
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We then deduce the pdf of Xˆ as follows:
f(x) =
1
x
g(log(x)) (3.3.8)
That is, in the form of ccdf „cand pdf „ of standard normal distribution N(0, 1) as follows:
f(x) =
–—
–+ —
[A(–, ‚, · )x≠–≠1F( logx≠ ‚≠ –·
2
·
) + x—≠1A(≠—, ‚, · )Fc( logx≠ ‚ + —·
2
·
)] (3.3.9)
where
A(◊, ‚, · ) = exp(◊‚ + –2·2/2) (3.3.10)
This is a double Pareto lognormal distribution. In other words, X s dP lN(–,—, ‚, ·2). From 3.3.1, we can
express X as follows:
X
.
= UV1/V2 (3.3.11)
Where U follows a lognormal distribution that log(U) s N(‚, ·2, and V1and V2 are Pareto distributed and with
a pdf as follows:
f(‚) = ◊‚≠◊≠1, ‚ > 1 (3.3.12)
with ◊ = – and ◊ = — for V1and V2, respectively. We can rewrite the expression for X as
X
.
= UQ (3.3.13)
where Q = V1V2 , and has pdf as follows:
f(q) =
I
–—
–+— q
—≠1
–—
–+— q
≠–≠1
for 0 < q < 1
for q < 1
(3.3.14)
This is referred to as the double pareto-lognfrmal (dPlN) distribution. One can generate pseudo-numbers from
dPlN distribution by exponentiating the N-L pseudo-numbers generated using 3.3.1.
3.3.2. Properties of N-L distribution
There are two special cases of the N-L distribution:
1. When – =Œ. This corresponds to the case of N-L distribution is the di erence between the independent
normal and exponential components. It exhibits extra normal behavior in the lower tail. It is also referred
to as the right-handed normal-exponential distribution, and is expressed as Y ≥ NEr(—, ‚, ·2) . Its pdf is
reduced from the original 3.3.1:
g1(y) = —„(
y≠ ‚
·
)R(—· + (y≠ ‚)/· ) (3.3.15)
2. When — = Œ. This corresponds to the case of N-L distribution is the sum of the independent normal
and exponential components. It exhibits extra normal behavior in the upper tail. It is often referred to as
left-handed normal-exponential distribution, and is expressed as Y ≥ NEl(–, ‚, ·2) . Its pdf is
g2(y) = –„(
y≠ ‚
·
)R(–· + (y≠ ‚)/· ) (3.3.16)
The N ≠L(–, —, , ‚ , ·2) distribution can be represented as a mixture of the right-handed and left-handed
normal-exponential distributions, and its pdf can be written as follows:
g(y) =
—
–+ —
g1(y) +
—
–+ —
g2(y) (3.3.17)
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The cumulative density function (cdf) of the N ≠L(–, —, , ‚ , ·2) can be expressed as follows:
G(y) = F(
y≠ ‚
·
)≠ „(y≠ ‚
·
)
—R(–· ≠ (y≠ ‚)/· ) + –R(—· + (y≠ ‚)/· )
–+ —
(3.3.18)
The moment generating function (mgf) of the N ≠L(–, —, , ‚ , ·2) is the product of the mgf normal and
exponential components, and can be expressed as follows:
MY (s) =
–— exp(‚s+ ·2s2/2)
(–≠ s)(— + s) (3.3.19)
3.3.3. The properties of dPlN distribution
Corresponding to the two cases (right-handed and left-handed) of the N-L distribution described as above, we
deduce the right-handed and left-handed dPlN distribution pdf as follows:
1. When – = Œ. This limiting single Pareto-lognormal distribution only exhibits heavy tail behavior in the
lower tail.
f1(x) = —x
—≠1A(—, ‚, · )F( log x≠ ‚ + —·
2
·
) (3.3.20)
2. When — = Œ. This limiting single Pareto-lognormal distribution only exhibits heavy tail behavior in the
upper tail.
f2(x) = –x
≠–≠1A(–, ‚, · )F( log x≠ ‚≠ –·
2
·
) (3.3.21)
where A(◊, ‚, · ) = exp(◊‚ + –2·2/2) as in the case of N-L distribution.
3. The dPlN distribution pdf can be represented as a mixture of right-handed and left-handed pareto-lognfrmal
distributions:
f(x) =
—
–+ —
f1(x) +
–
–+ —
f2(x) (3.3.22)
The cdf of the dPlN distributions can be written as F (x) = G(exp(x)), where G is equal to 3.3.18, or it
can be expanded in the forms of „ and Fc as follows:
F (x) = F(
logx≠ ‚
·
)≠ 1
–+ —
[—x≠–A(–, ‚, · )F( logx≠ ‚≠ –·
2
·
) + –x—A(≠—, ‚, · )Fc( logx≠ ‚≠ —·
2
·
)]
(3.3.23)
The dP lN(–, —, ‚, ·2) exhibits heavy tail behavior at both tails in the sense that
f(x) ≥ k1x≠–≠1(xæŒ) (3.3.24)
and
f(x) ≥ k2x—≠1(xæ 0) (3.3.25)
where
k1 = –A(–, ‚, · ) (3.3.26)
and
k2 = –A(—, ‚, · ) (3.3.27)
The maximum likelihood function of dPlN and the N-L distributions are the same, in the sense that if the dataset
(x1, x2, x3, ... xn) is assumed to follow a dPlN , then its logarithmic form (y1, y2, , ... , yn) is assumed to follow a
N-L distribution. The log likelihood function is as follows:
l(–, —, · ) = nlog– + nlog— ≠ nlog(–+ —) +
nÿ
i=1
log[R(–· ≠ yi ≠ y¯ + 1/–+ 1/—
·
) +R(—· +
yi ≠ y¯ + 1/–+ 1/—
·
)]
(3.3.28)
and v can be solved analytically as ‚ˆ = y¯≠ 1/–+ 1/—.
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3.3.4. Parameter Calibration
The funding cost loss function needs to be calibrated according to each economy’s funding
characteristics. In Jo (2012) (48), the calibration results are based on data before Lehman
bankruptcy (2007Q3 to 2010 Q3), and the regression is fitted as follows:
spreadt = 0.04◊ (14.62≠Basel ratiot)3 + 0.5 (3.3.29)
The incremental funding cost function is estimated as µ(⁄) = 0.04(14.62≠ ⁄)3.
For our network here, there is limited data for calibrating the incremental funding cost function.
We estimated a panel regression using July 2013 data of option-adjusted spreads (OAS) for eight
institutions and the government yield curve as the risk-free rate to estimate the equation:
µ =
I
0 if ⁄0 < ⁄
a · (⁄0 ≠ ⁄)r if ⁄¯ < ⁄ Æ ⁄0
where ⁄0, i is calculated as the historical average capital ratio before the crisis for each in-
stitution i. We found the following incremental funding cost loss equation in our market is
µ = 0.0006495◊ (⁄0 ≠ ⁄)3, which was used in the analysis of default contagion. Although the
government yield curve is not strictly risk-free, it is the best estimate in this exercise. It may not
be appropriate to use a safer assets such as US or UK government bonds as the base rate in this
case, due to the di erent market environments. In future research work, we may consider using
di erent parameters of the equations to simulate di erent liquidity environements in distress
time.
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Part II.
Household Income Inequality and
Elasticity of Spending Across the
Recession: A Case Study of Spain
63
Chapter 4
Introduction
4.1. Background
Generally speaking, the income distribution in a nation represents how the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is distributed among the citizens and residents living in the country at a certain
time period. Income and its distribution have always been a central topic in the economic
theory and policy making arena, mainly because it has an intimate relationship with economic
development in the long run. Earlier seminal work to measure income distribution such as
Lorenze Curve in Lorenze (1905) (92) as well as Gini index (Gini (1909) (84) and Gastwirth
(1972) (83)) have been cited greatly. In short, Lorenze Curve is s graphical illustration of
inequality, most notably in income and wealth. The curve is a graph showing the proportion of
overall income or wealth assumed by the bottom x% of the population, loosely speaking without
discrimination of a finite sample size. Please see figure 4.1.2a for an illustration of a typical
Lorenz Curve and figure 4.1.2b for an application to income inequality in various countries.
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Figure 4.1.1.: Example of Lorenze Curve
(a) A Typical Lorenz Curve (b) A Lorenz Curve Application to Income Inequality Among
Countries [Source: World Bank Dataset]
In Figure 4.1.2a, the Gini coe cient or Gini index can then be expressed as the ratio of the
area that lies between the line of equality and the Lorenz curve (marked A in the figure) over
the total area under the line of equality (marked A and B in the figure); i.e., G = A / (A +
B). Generally speaking, the higher the gini index or coe cient, the more unequal the income
(or other variables in research) is. As shown in Figure 4.1.2b, Hungary in 2002 and Denmark in
1997 are more or less similar in their income distribution among its citizens and residents [please
note that overlapping of Hungary and Denmark in the figure], where almost 63-64% total income
are earned by the 80% of citizens and residents in these two countries. Hungary and Denmark
are more equal than Namibia, in terms of income distribution. In the latter, only 21.3% of total
income are earned by 80% of its citizens and residents in 2003.
Among OECD countries, in the late 20th century, considering the e ect of taxes and trans-
fer payments through social security programs and assistance from other family members, the
income Gini coe cient ranged between 0.24 and 0.49, with Slovenia (and in general Eastern Eu-
ropean and Scandinavian countries) being the lowest, and Chile (and in general Latin America
and Africa) the highest. African countries had the highest pre-tax Gini coe cients in 2008–2009,
with South Africa the world’s highest, variously estimated to be 0.63 to 0.7,[7][8] These figures
drop to ~0.52 after transfers are taken into account, and drops again to 0.47 after taxation.[9]
. The global income Gini coe cient in 2005 has been estimated to be between 0.61 and 0.68
by various organizations such as World Bank and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)1. In this
paper, I analyze the household incomes before and after social transfers and several key con-
sumption (spending) variables. Results on Gini indices can be found in Table 5.2.1. However,
1Please refer to the World Fact Book published by CIA at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html
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due to limitation of data, the before and after tax information is not available (or convenient to
obtain for the country of Spain at time of writing), I have to leave this question for my future
research agenda. Gini index or coe cient is a snapshot of the income or wealth distribution at
a point in time, hence has the drawback not being able to capture the changes of demographic
structure within the population over time. Factors such as population age and mobility within
income class are not reflected in Gini index. An economy with high Gini index at a point in
time, may be due to a higher percentage of younger population, who have lower income and
wealth than the older population. However, if the life-span earnings of citizens and residents in
this economy is taken into account for income and wealth inequality, this economy may not be
as unequal as it seems measured by Gini index. Another example is population structural and
living condition changes. For example, families may split into smaller units when children grow
up, and when the elderly move into nursing houses and long-term cares.
The academia and economic policy makers have seen a resurgence of interests on global income
and wealth inequality since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) rooted from the US Subprime
Mortgage Crisis that started in late 2007. There are several main reasons. Firstly, The income
gap between the top docile and bottom one is the widest in developed countries in decades,
whereas income inequality trend has sent mixed signals in emerging and developing countries
(EMDCs). However, in some cases of EMDCs, although income inequalities are shrinking over
decades, the rights to access to social security, education and resources for development diverge
for di erent income groups. This has contributed to the slow economic growth as well as the
sustainability of the recovery after the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) rooted from the 2007-2008
US Subprime Mortgage Crisis (IMF, 2015 (91)). So far, majority of the inequality studies have
been focused on the high income groups, rather than the middle and lower income groups.
However, according to IMF (2015) (91), within the countries in their research sample, there
is a negative correlation between the growth of the top 20% income docile and the growth of
GDP; at the same time, there is a positive relationship between the growth of the bottom 20%
income docile and the GDP growth. These relationships suggest the middle and lower income
groups are the drivers of the economic development. Allison et al (2014) (73) have come to
similar conclusion to IMF (2015) (91), on the income inequality trends in developed countries
and EMDCs over the past decades. The paper also summarizes the key trends and drivers of
income inequality across the globe and over time. While the income inequality measured by per
capita income gap has decreased between countries over the past decades, which is the first time
in centuries, income inequality has increased within countries in most developed countries and
some EMDCs. In the future, it is expected the economic development measured by income per
capita is driven by income inequality within countries. Global income inequality may decrease if
economy grows faster, while it may increase if within country income inequality increases. These
all points to the importance of the topic in research here - income distribution and inequality.
Dataset In this paper I investigate the income inequality and its impacts on income elasticity
of spending (consumption) on goods for households in the European countries across the crisis
period, which sheds lights on income inequality of demands of various goods. In the current
version of this paper, I use the household income and wealth, consumption on various goods
and savings in the country of Spain. This survey is conducted by Bank of Spain, the dataset
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is called EFF from hereafter. These income and wealth survey data in European countries
are collected by their respective central banks or university research institutes. Since they are
done by research organizations independent of each other, they have di erent research horizon,
frequencies, features and focuses, according to each country’s characteristics. Sometimes it
is di cult to do cross-country or panel analysis. The recent e ort by European Central Bank
(ECB) of Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) is to consolidate these individual
country surveys to a standardized form, which aims to provide a comparison to the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CES) in the US.
Research Motivation So far most previous literature have been focused on the upper tail of the
income inequality, rather than lower tail. However, significance of the lower tail has been found in
many populations. Seminal work have argue whether consumption inequality has indeed tracked
income inequality. Most work have been done using data of US Consumption Expenditure Survey
(CES). This paper provides a comparison using a case study of Spain. Secondly, The income
inequality within population may have heterogeneous impacts on consumptions on various
goods, across the GFC period. In other words, this translates into the asymmetric reflections
on households’ spending behaviours, on essential household goods, such as food, vehicles and
other durable and non-durable goods. At the time of writing, there has not been significant work
to address this question. To elaborate further on the concept of asymmetric impacts, I mean
the unequal impacts of households in di erent income brackets may make di erent decisions
in spending on necessities and durable goods (non-food related). For example, a richer family
may reduce food spending less than a poorer family. However, both rich and poor family may
not di er in their spending on vehicles prior or post crisis. This may be because cars have
longer useful lives and are necessities. The results of this paper may shed light on how fast
and sustainable is the recovery post GFC, and whether households are a ected through their
spending on the main categories of goods. In this paper, I use Spain as a case study. This
framework can be used in other countries to do further cross-country comparison analysis with
a longer history.
Methodology Firstly, I analyze the upper and lower tail indices and lognormal properties (mean
and standard deviation) of the household income (before and after transfers due to social security
and relatives from other households) and wealth distribution, as well as spending (consumption)
on various goods, taking into account population sample weights. The distribution I adopt
to measure these variables is the Double Pareto Lognormal distribution (dPlN from hereafter)
described in Reed (2003) (94) which is discussed in more details in the related literature and
section 5.1 I also analyze Gini index of all the income, wealth and spending (consumption)
variables. Secondly, I analyze di erent income percentiles’ elasticity of spending (consumption)
on various goods, including [1] food, [2] other non-durable goods, [3] vehicles and [4] other
durable goods. These variables are analyzed all across the period from 2001-2011, which is an
interesting time reflecting before, during and after the GFC. This will provide insights on how
households make spending and consumption decisions on various goods, taking e ects of various
factors such as their income and wealth, social security, etc. These result would also provide
insights on how the post-GFC economic recovery on household level, from the consumption’s
perspective. I use the fixed-e ect (fe) and random-e ect (re) regressions described in details in
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section 6.1.
Layout of the rest of this paper The next section provides an overview of related literature
and how this research contributes to the current understanding of this topic. Chapter 5 discusses
the dataset in more details, and provides a preliminary statistical analysis on properties of the
key variables such as income, wealth and spending (consumption) on various goods. It estimates
all the parameters of dPlN of these variables and Gini index too. Chapter 6 quantifies the
relationship between household income and consumption expenditure on various goods, using
fixed e ect (fe) and random e ect (re) models (explained in the relevant chapter in more details).
Chapter 7 concludes and summarizes key findings.
4.2. Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of academic literature. Firstly, it is related to extreme
value theory applied to measurement of income and wealth inequality. Earlier seminal work by
Neal and Rosen (2000) (123) argues that the labour income depends on occupation, education,
experience and other observed traits. They found labour income has long right tails and typically
the mean exceeds median. It provides a theoretical framework to explain how earnings diverge
due to various factors such as endowment, significant skill investment (human capital develop-
ment). They do not mention lower tail significance in labour incomes. It worths to mention that
Kleiber and Kotz (2003) (118) provides a first complete overview of all parametric statistical
models developed over the past century, on income, wealth and other similar variables, and
systematically investigate each of their advantages and disadvantages. Chotikapanich (2008)
(110) is another comprehensive review on modeling income distributions and the goodness-of-fit
properties.
Until lately, most of previous papers only examine the upper tail of the distribution. Reed
(2003) (94) and Reed and Jorgensen (2004) (94), discover the lower tail of income distribution
is also prominent in several countries, such as Canada personal earnings in 1996, US Household
income 1997, and Sri Lanka Household income 1981 and Bohemia Personal Income 1993. Their
work provides an overview of dPlN model, which provides an estimate of both lower and upper
tail indices and the lognormal body parameters. This is particularly useful because of the
convenience to analyze tail index changes to capture inequality at extreme values, and economic
mobility over time in a society. Latest paper by Toda (2012) (131) also supports the evidence
of dPlN fit to personal labour income using US data (2000 to 2009 of the Current Population
Survey), with further proof on goodness-of-fit criteria.
Some literature have used percentiles and quantiles to measure incomes, which is a relative
primitive measure, assuming there is no di erence within the income quantiles. This is in con-
tradiction to real world observations. Vermeulen (2015) (100) has discovered tail behaviour even
among the wealthiest. This is why we use a dPlN distribution analysis to measure inequality
within population (households in this paper). When there are tail index movements, upper
and/or lower tails, one can easily see the changes of inequality within the household popula-
tion. If inequality within population increases, it shows social mobility possibility, but in both
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directions: poor can become poorer, rich can become richer. If inequality within household
population decrease, it shows stability of social-economic classes. This may provide evidence to
IMF (2015) (91) and Allison (2014) (73)’s argument on income inequality and economic develop-
ment, if further incorporating the country’s economic recovery from GFC and future economic
development into the research.
This paper is also related to theory papers, Ibragimov and Ibragimov (2007) (86) and Ibragimov
et al. (current) (87), on income inequality and demand elasticity of goods. In this paper,
the research question is on income elasticity of spending (consumption) on various household
essential goods. This is due to the unavailability of demand data of these goods. However,
spending can be viewed a a proxy of demand.
There is another strand of literature on relationship between consumption inequality and income
inequality. This is due to the belief that consumption represent a permanent income hypothesis. Slesnick
(2001) (96) (on US) and Cutler and Katz (1992) (81) (on UK) are among the first to analyze the
consumption and income trends. An earlier influential work by Krueger and Perri (2006) (89), which is
built upon Slesnick (2001) (96), use the CES data and argue that consumption inequality has not kept
up pace with income inequality. The latest paper by Aguiar and Bils (2015) (72) suggest the opposite
to Krueger and Perri (2006) (89), arguing consumption inequality among households have indeed tracked
income inequality more closely than previously believed, using an innovative methodology called the
double di erencing method, which corrects the measurement errors that can vary over time by good and
income when using CES. Last but not least, Fisher et al. (2013) (88) provides an overview of consumption
and income inequality development up to most recently.
This paper, although uses a shorter history of consumption expenditure on various goods, sheds
light on how income inequality and elasticity of consumption expenditure on various goods
changes across the GFC period in Spain, as a case study of Europe. Compared to the conservative
measurement of income inequality in the papers by Aguiar and Bils (2015) (72) and others, I use the
latest discovered dPlN distribution which exhibites goodness-of-fit to income and wealth distributions
(Reed, 2003 (94) Toda (2012) (131) etc.). This provides a holistic understanding on the extremism of
income distribution on both tails, as well as the lognormal mean and standard deviation of the entire
income (wealth and spending) distribution. This paper also quantify the consumption changes in respect
to the changes in household incomes over the period of GFC. It is the first to provides such granular
analysis, and especially during the crisis period.
Chapter 5
Case Study: Spain
For Spain, I use the Spanish Survey of Household Finance (EFF) 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011
waves. This is an equivalent wealth survey to the United States Survey of Consumption and
Finance (SCF) and Italian wealth survey (SHIW), which will be used to do country comparison
analysis for future work. Bover (2008) (77) states the key motivation of EFF is debt information;
hence more attention is devoted to debt classification, similar to SCF. However, less detailed
asset categorization in EFF is more in line with SHIW. Spain and Italy share some similar family
characteristics; e.g. more extended family line living together. Hence, more questions on labour
status for each family member to account for complexed situation. Several important features
and special care need to be taken when using the EFF dataset due to its structure and designs.
I listed below for future research reference:
Imputation: Bover (2004) suggests EFF dataset provides five imputations for each of the
variables with “No Answer” or “Don’t know” replies from the interviewees. The multiple im-
putation (MI) method is described in Barcelo (2005). For simplicity, I only use one imputation
(implicate) for my analysis in this paper, as the methodologies can be applied to all five im-
putations easily. For a holistic unbiased use of multiple imputation data, one can combine five
imputations into one dataset and then calculate key statistics (mean, variance, tails etc) from
this complete dataset. However, care must be taken when calculating variance and tails. For a
detailed discussion, please see Appendix 7.2 on page 115.
5.1. Upper and lower tail estimates on income, wealth and spending
variables
For household income, I use the variable renthog (annual household gross income) in the EFF
dataset. For details on variables used in this analysis, please refer to Appendix Section 7.1.
There are several advantages of using an income distribution analysis of Double-pareto log-
normal (dPlN) which is described in Reed and Jorgensen (2004) (101). I only include the key
equations below for easy references. For details, please refer to Appendix section in Chapter 3.3.
The dPlN distribution has four parameters, and is a mixture of lognormal distributions, arised
from the final state of geometric Brownian motion (GBM), killed with a constant killing rate,
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or in other words, the state of the GBM after an exponentially distributed period of time. This
flexibility appears to be the reason of its perfect fit to many empirical data, such as income,
wealth, sizes, etc. From hereafter, I define this distribution as below:
X ≥ dP lN(–, —, ‹, ·2) (5.1.1)
Such distribution can also be written as X s UV1/V2, where U , V1, V2 are independent from
each other, and U is lognormally distributed as logU ≥ N (‹, ·2), with V1, and V2 are Pareto
distributions with parameters – and —. Their pdf can be written as
f(v) = ◊v≠◊≠1, v > 1 (5.1.2)
with ◊ = – and ◊ = — respectively. Alternatively we can write X s UQ, where Q = V1/V2,
and Q has pdf as
f(q) =
Y][
–—
–+— q
—≠1
–—
–+— q
≠–≠1
for 0 < q < 1
for q < 1
(5.1.3)
The right-hand limiting case and left-hand limiting cases of the dPlN distribution have the
following pdfs:
f2(x) = –x
≠–≠1A(–, ‚, · )F( log x≠ ‚≠ –·
2
·
) (5.1.4)
f1(x) = —x
—≠1A(—, ‚, · )F( log x≠ ‚ + —·
2
·
) (5.1.5)
Hence its tail behaviour can be described in the sense that f(x) ≥ k1x≠–≠1(x æ Œ); f(x) ≥
k2x—≠1(xæ 0).
Slopes: on log scale, dP lN(–, —, ‹, ·2) is similar to hyperbola, with the asymptotes of slope of
≠(–+ 1) and — ≠ 1.
This means when — > 1, dP lN(–, —, ‹, ·2) ’s pdf is unimodal; when 0 < — < 1, it is monoton-
ically decreasing.
In the following exercises, I calibrate the parameters of dP lN for the following variables (all
variables are described in more details in section 6.1.1) in all the years during the surveys were
conducted [2001/2002, 2004/2005, 2007/2008 and 2010/2011, 4 waves (observations) in total]:
(1) Labour income variable labinchhm Reported (pre-tax) income and post social security trans-
fer labour income, including salaries from employment and self-employment business incomes,
as well as social securities such as subsidies from government, and charity, scholarships, financial
assistance from relatives who belong to other households; excluding non-labour incomes such as
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incomes from holding financial securities and rental incomes, etc. In this analysis, labinchhm
can be compared to the total household income variable, renthog(explained below), to show
the di erence before and after social transfers as well as asset (capital) returns.
(2) Total labour and non-labour income renthog - total labour (salaries and family business
enterprise income) and non-labour (financial asset return and rental income) household annual
income. This is supposed pre-tax income, as in the survey code book or report by Bank of Spain,
it is not clear whether these figures are pre-tax or post-tax.
(3) Spending (consumption) on food alim.
(4) Spending on other non-durable goods nodur
(5) Spending on vehicles gimpvehic
(6) Spending on other durable goods p2_70
(7) Total net wealth (total real and financial net assets) riquezanet
(8) Net financial wealth (total financial net assets) actfinanc
I firstly examine the tail behaviours of the total distribution, taking sample weights into con-
sideration. However, some controversy on when weights should be used in regressions has been
discussed in Deaton (1997 , Chapter 2 (82)) Cameron and Trivedi (78) (2005, Chapter 24). For
a application discussion of weights used in STATA, please refer to STATA Manual (98).
Simply speaking, sample weights are estimated when survey is done on a selective subjects,
while the whole population is unobservable. In our case, the Bank of Spain (and several other
central banks in our broader research data pool) selected several thousands of household as
representatives of the whole household population, and conduct interviews on a low frequency
bases, every 2-3 years. Then they estimated how many families with similar household structure
(number of family members, level of social security, financial and non-financial wealth, etc.) and
most importantly, household income level that exist in the country. As the last step, researchers
assign the interviewee household with a estimated sample (population) weights. As a result,
in this paper, I estimate tail of the distribution by taking account of the population weights
explained just above. Please note that the un-weighted household population would inevitably
under or over estimate the tails, as unweighted household population would assume each of the
household in the sample is equivalently weighted in the country household population, and this
is incorrect. The weighted distribution tail estimate results are presented Table 5.1.1, 5.1.2 etc.
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Table 5.1.1.: Spanish Household Labour Income (post-transfers): Weighted Results Tail Indices
Estimates. p6_labinchhm in the code book in section 6.1.1.
– — ‹ ·
2002 0.4556 2.5959 4.0009 0.2950
2005 0.4561 1.9542 6.7515 0.4219
2008 0.4278 2.6189 12.8546 0.6797
2011 0.4038 2.5094 15.6271 0.7797
(a) Spanish Household Labour Income (post-
transfers): Weighted Results Tail Indices Estimates
≠(–+ 1) [right tail slope] — ≠ 1 [left tail slope]
2002 -1.4556 1.5959
2005 -1.4561 0.9542
2008 -1.4278 1.6189
2011 -1.4038 1.5094
(b) Spanish Household Labour Income (post-transfer) Tail Indices Es-
timate Slopes
Table 5.1.2.: Spanish Household Labour and Non-Income (before-transfer): Weighted Results
Tail Indices Estimates. renthog in the code book in section 6.1.1.
– — ‹ ·
2002 0.4111 2.5956 12.1858 0.3180
2005 0.3947 1.6320 20.1472 0.3863
2008 0.3950 2.0550 20.6623 0.5729
2011 0.3689 1.8325 28.4891 0.6699
(a) Spanish Household Total Labour and Non-Labour
Income before transfers Tail index Estimates
≠(–+ 1) [right tail slope] — ≠ 1 [left tail slope]
2002 -1.4111 1.5956
2005 -1.3947 0.6320
2008 -1.3950 1.0550
2011 -1.3689 1.8325
(b) Spanish Household Labour Income (post-transfer) Tail Indices Es-
timate Slopes
After examination of income inequality by estimating the lower and upper tail indices of Spain
household income, I observe the following:
1. For both the Labour income (post-transfers) variable and Total Labour p6_labinchhm
and non-labour income (pre-transfer) variable renthog. The inequality trend is consis-
74 Case Study: Spain
tent. Both income variables increase in their log-normal body mean, ‹in Table 5.1.1 and
Table 5.1.2. This suggests overall income of the household population increases over time.
Standard deviation (· in 5.1.1 and 5.1.2) of their lognormal body increase over time, which
suggest inequality within the entire household population increases.
2. The upper tail of both income variables behave similarly. –in Table 5.1.1 and Table 5.1.2,
stably increases over the period 2002-2011. In 2005, –increases very mildly from 2002,
meaning the inequality e ect of the wealthiest population is reduced in the upper tail
of the distribution. However, in 2008, –decreases significantly, which means the richer
households are getting richer faster among those wealthiest Spanish households. GFC
timing correlates with upper income earners getting richer faster.
3. The lower tail of both income variables (denoted as — in Table 5.1.1 and Table 5.1.2),
behave similarly in 2002-2011. — first decreases over the period 2002-2005. This means
the poorer part of the household become more unequal in incomes. There is a divergence
among the poorer parts of the households during this period. Then in 2008 — increases
sharply from 2005, then decreases again from 2008-2011. In the long term, GFC has made
the poorer part of the households poorer. However, — of renthog decreases more than
labinchhm, this means financial returns in the renthog variable may decrease household
incomes. which suggest the social transfers smooth our the income inequality in the poorer
part of the household population.
4. It seems like during the period of 2001-2011, the income of the whole Spanish households
diverges overall. The richer households has a tendency to get richer, while the poorer
households first diverges then converges in incomes.
All other variables’s tail indices are as follows (for simplicity, I omit the slope estimates as they
are easily converted from the tail indices):
Table 5.1.3.: Spending (consumption) on food alim.Weighted Results Tail Indices Estimates.
– — ‹ ·
2002 0.4698 2.4871 -0.2976 0.2171
2005 0.4510 2.5799 -0.2092 0.4602
2008 0.4465 2.6034 0.1147 0.6514
2011 0.4116 2.5302 0.0674 0.6684
(a) Spending (consumption) on food alim.Tail index
Estimates
Table 5.1.3 shows the extremism on both tails of food consumption during 2002-2011. The upper
tail index – is decreasing during this period, which means richer households are spending more
and more on food during this period. The lower tail index — first increases during 2002-2008,
which means the poorer households are converging on food consumption. — decreases from
2005-2008, which means the poorer households are diverging in their food consumption during
this period. The lognormal body of the food consumption distribution shows the mean increases
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during 2002-2008, and then decreases slightly in 2008. The standard deviation of the lognormal
body increases during the entire period.
Table 5.1.4.: Spending (consumption) on other non-durable goods nodur. Weighted Results Tail
Indices Estimates.
– — ‹ ·
2002 0.4434 1.8307 0.3014 0.8136
2005 0.5173 3.5208 -1.1337 1.3917
2008 0.5049 3.3732 -0.6559 1.4268
2011 0.3750 1.6342 1.8293 0.5541
(a) Spending (consumption) on other non-durable
goods nodur. Tail index Estimates
Table 5.1.4 shows the consumption on other non-durable goods during 2002-2011. Upper tail
index –increases from 2002-2005, and then decreases from 2005-2011. This means the richer
households are spending more and more on other non-durable goods during this period. Lower
tail index — exhibits similar behaviour to –, this means the poorer households also diverge
in non-durable goods consumption during 2005-2011. This distribution over the period gets
more and more unequal on both tails. The lognormal body of the distribution shows decreases
from 2002-2005, and then increases from 2005-2011. Standard deviation shows increases from
2002-2008, and decrease from 2008-2011.
Table 5.1.5.: Spending on vehicles gimpvehic
– — ‹ ·
2002 0.4981 3.4991 0.3014 1.2224
2005 0.4486 0.9052 3.3819 0.3670
2008 0.7372 2.4511 4.1277 2.0429
2011 0.5844 2.5071 4.3533 2.1776
(a) Spending on vehicles gimpvehicTail index Esti-
mates
Table 5.1.5 shows the upper tail index – shows some fluctuation during 2002-2011 period. Overall
it increases. This means the richer households consumption on vehicles converges over time. The
lower tail index — decreases sharply in 2005, and then picks up again in 2008-2011. This is an
interesting fact. It reflects the poorer households suddenly diverge in their spending on vehicles
in 2005, however, converge to long-run equilibrium in 2008-2011. Over time, lognormal body
mean increases and standard deviation increases too.
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Table 5.1.6.: Spending on other durable goods p2_70
– — ‹ ·
2002 0.4480 5.1355 -1.4575 0.9737
2005 0.5173 3.5208 -1.1337 1.3917
2008 0.4296 1.6616 0.6859 0.7969
2011 0.4535 3.4865 -1.0452 1.3647
(a) Spending on other durable goods p2_70Tail index
Estimates
Table 5.1.6 shows the spending on other durable goods (except for vehicles) during 2002-2011.
The upper tail – first increases and then decreases to its original level. This means the richer
households diverges in their spending on other durable goods in 2008, the start of GFC period,
and then returns to original level of 2002 in 2011. The lower tail — decreases from 2002-2008,
sharply, which means the poorer households diverges in their spending on other durable goods
during this period, however, it picks up to its inequality level of 2005 in 2011. The lognormal
mean firstly increases from 2002-2008 and then decreases from 2008-2011. It 2011 level was even
lower than 2002. It seems the GFC does have negative impact on durable goods consumption.
Standard deviation first increases from 2002-2005, later decreases from 2005-2008, and then
picks up again in 2011. Over the entire period 2002-2011, the standard deviation increases. The
spending on other durable goods diverges during the research period.
Table 5.1.7.: Total net wealth (total real and financial net assets) riquezanet
– — ‹ ·
2002 0.3623 1.2549 177.1179 0.2984
2005 0.3364 0.6167 601.2848 0.3249
2008 0.3288 0.6216 972.8515 0.3158
2011 0.2973 0.6111 1282.25482 0.3487
(a) Total net wealth (total real and financial net assets)
riquezanet Tail index Estimates
Table 5.1.7 shows the total net wealth variable distribution during 2002-2011. Its upper tail index
– decreases during this period, which means the richer households gets more and more net total
wealth over the research period. The lower tail index — also has a long term trend of decreases,
which means the poorer households are getting poorer and poorer over the period. Lognormal
normal body mean is increasing, which means average households are getting more and more
wealth. Standard deviation is increasing over the period, which means wealth distribution is
diverging.
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Table 5.1.8.: Net financial wealth (total financial net assets) actfinanc
– — ‹ ·
2002 0.3998 2.0852 149.9179 2.3822
2005 0.3511 1.4289 209.7891 2.4173
2008 0.4384 1.7319 238.1213 2.3809
2011 0.4110 1.6212 486.2042 3.0628
(a) Net financial wealth (total financial net assets)
actfinanc ail index Estimates
Table 5.1.8 shows net financial wealth distribution during 2002-2011 period. Its upper tail index
– is fluctuating during the period, but over time increases. This means the richer households are
having not growing richer in financial asset holding steadily. The lower tail index — is decreasing
over time in general, this means poorer families are doing worse in their financial asset holdings.
Lognormal body mean is increasing, which means average households are doing better over time.
Standard deviation is increasing over time, which means the financial wealth level is diverging.
5.2. Gini indices of income, wealth and spending variables
Table 5.2.1.: Gini Indices
variable code book p6_labinchhm renthog
labour income post-transfers labour and non-labour income before transfers
2002 0.3945 0.4144
2005 0.4069 0.4480
2008 0.4324 0.4185
2011 0.4426 0.4395
variable code book alim nodur gimpvehic
spending on food other non-durable goods spending on vehicles
2002 0.2889 0.4637 0.3784
2005 0.3058 0.4683 0.4169
2008 0.3065 0.4540 0.4571
2011 0.3020 0.4203 0.4983
variable code book p2_70 riquezanet actfinanc
other durable goods real net wealth financial net wealth
2002 0.5865 0.5616 0.7990
2005 0.6197 0.5411 0.7928
2008 0.6009 0.5581 0.7917
2011 0.6338 0.5763 0.8087
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Gini indices for both income variables p6_labinchhm and renthog are increasing in the 2002-
2011 period. This in general means more income inequality over time. Except for the renthog
gini decreases a little bit in 2008. As renthog includes financial asset returns, this may be due
to GFC, financial assets such as stocks and bonds drop in value in general.
Food consumption (alim) gini is increasing over time, except for in 2001 it decreases slightly.
This means this variable gets more unequal over time.
Other non-durable goods (nodur) gini is decreasing over time. This mean this variable gets more
and more equal over time.
Vehicle spending (gimpvehic) gini is increasing over time strictly. This means this variable gets
more and more unequal over time.
Other durable good spending (p2_70) gini is increasing over time, although in 2008 GFC period,
it stalls. This means this variable is getting more and more unequal over time.
Real net wealth (riquezanet ) gini is increasing over time, except for in 2005, it decreases
slightly. This mean this variable is getting more and more unequal over time.
Financial net wealth (actfinanc) gini is decreasing strictly over time. This means this variable
is getting more and more equal over time. This is the only key variable that smooths out over
time in our research. This may be due to GFC period, financial assets drop in values.
Chapter 6
Income Elasticity of Spending on
Goods Analysis
Income Elasticity of Demand is defined as follows:
ei =
”Q
Q
”I
I
(6.0.1)
The income data I gathered is collected at low frequency, e.g. once every 2 or 3 years. In the
original formula elasticity in equation on the current page, the numerator is change of quantity.
In my dataset, I only know how much the households spend on each good, and the categories
of goods are not specific. At the time of writing, I use the following regression method as a
proxy of cross-sectional income elasticity of spending on goods in this paper. Please note that
the term “income elasticity of good X” is used in this paper for simplicity.
yit = –+ xit— + ‘it (6.0.2)
where the LHS variable, yit is the spending of household iin year t. The RHS variable –may be
a constant term, xit is the household i’ income in year t. ‘ is the error term. Hence, please note
that results derived in table on page 111 reflect the coe cient — in the above equation. It is not
the elasticity measure described in equation on the current page.
6.1. Fixed Effect and Random Effect Models
I performed the following tests to make sure that the model I am applying is a good fit for the
data. This means I need to decide firstly whether there is indeed a panel e ect in the data,
meaning whether there is heterogeneity among households spending on goods. If there is no
heterogeneity in household spending in a specific good among all the income percentiles, then
random e ect (re) model is a good fit. This simply means the spending on this good is not
sensitive to household incomes. Otherwise, if heterogeneity in household spending on a specific
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good exists, then fixed e ect (fe) model is a good fit. This just means spending on this good
is sensitive to di erent household income percentiles. Random and fixed e ects regressions are
explained in more details later in this section.
My ultimate goal is to analyze the income elasticity of household spending on various goods
across the period the EFF survey covers. Due to the unbalanced panel (old households dropped
out from the panel, and new households were added in to maintain the total) and changing
population weights nature, I can only do panel regression on a single [household-year] basis,
but not across the horizon, since fixed regression (fe) across years require constant population
weights for econometrics reasons. Please note that “weights” mean the sample weights. For a
detailed discussion, please see the technical document on EFF surveys by Bover (2004) (77).
I include a short description below on three settings for the models using STATA: Random E ect
(re), Fixed E ect (fe) and Between E ect (be). Please refer to the Baltagi (2013, chap. 2) (74)
and Wooldridge (2013, chap. 14) (102) for more details on fe and re models using STATA. For
technical details, please see STATA manual (97).
.
Typical panel data assumes the following form:
yit = –+ xit— + ‹i + ‘it (6.1.1)
Where subscript i represents units. In the case of this paper, this is households or income quantile
groups. Subscript t represents time. In the case of this paper, I don’t have continuously yearly
data, due to the low frequency of the survey. ‹i + ‘itis the error term; ‹i is the unit specific
error term. ‘it is the “usual” error term as appeared in many econometric analysis, with its
“normal properties”: mean 0 and uncorrelated with itself and x, and uncorrelated with the unit
di erence error term ‹, and homoskedastic. My goal is to estimate — without the bias from
di erences result from units.
Regardless of the properties of the error terms ‹i and ‘it, rewrite 6.1.1 by taking the mean of
dependent and independent variables, it becomes
y¯i = –+ x¯i— + ‹i + ‘¯i (6.1.2)
where y¯i =
q
t yit/Ti, x¯i =
q
t xit/Ti and ‘¯i =
q
t ‘it/Ti. Subtracting 6.1.2 from 6.1.1, it arrives
at
(yit ≠ y¯i) = (xit ≠ x¯i)— + (‘it ≠ ‘¯i) (6.1.3)
While these above three equations estimate —, my goal is to estimate the fixed-e ect estimator,
also called within estimator, using STATA command xtreg, fe , which estimates the coe cient
in 6.1.3 using Ordinary Least Square (OLS). On the other hand, xtreg, be estimates coe cient
(also called between-estimator) in 6.1.2 using OLS; xtreg, re estimates coe cient (also called
random-e ect estimator) in 6.1.1.
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I divided the households in the sample (weighted) into the quantiles defined in empirical itera-
tions such as Bover (2008) (77) described as below:
• 1st quantile < 20th percentile
• 2nd quantile 20th percentile≠ 40th percentile
• 3rd quantile 40th percentile≠ 60th percentile
• 4th quantile 60th percentile≠ 80th percentile
• 5th quantile 80th percentile≠ 90th percentile
• 6th quantile 90th percentile≠ 100th percentile
6.1.1. Income elasticity on spending variables in EFF dataset
I run random e ect and fixed e ect models as introduced above, and bivariate (single variable
household gross income) and multivariate models (household income, financial and non-financial
wealth, household head age) and select the best model to estimate income elasticity of food and
durable goods in the survey year 2001/2002, 2004/2005, 2008 and 2011. Please see all the
variables used in the following analysis from the original Code book (excerpt) below (except
for p6_labinchhm, which is by author’s own calculation, all others are from the original EFF
dataset):
• h_2002 is the household identifier in 2002 survey
• bage - household head age
• np1 - number of family members in each family
• imp - imputation number (between 1 - 5). In this current version of paper, I use one
imputation for the analysis
• facine3 - population weights (sampling weights)
• percrent - quantiles (ranges from 1-6)
• renthog - total labour (salaries and family business enterprise income) and non-labour
(financial asset return and rental income) household annual income
• p6_labinchhm - author’s own calculations: total labour income (only salaries and family
business enterprise income), excluding non-labour income such as financial and real asset
returns; plus total social transfer such as job seekers’ unemployment allowance; scholar-
ships; child assistances; social securities programs such as pension and annuities incomes;
external transfers from families and relatives not residing in the same households
• alim - annual food consumption
• nodur - annual non-durable goods purchases
• gimpvehic - annual vehicle purchases
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• p2_70 - other durable goods purchases
• riquezanet - the net wealth, Total Assets (both real assets and financial assets) - Total
Debts.
• actfinanc - total financial net wealth.
6.1.2. Year 2001 Income Elasticity of Food Results
In order to find the best fitted models to explain the Income elasticity of spending on various
goods, I follow the following steps. From all the goods and years onwards, I follow the same
steps as below.
1. Load the dataset in the following format in Table 6.1.1. The data looks like the following
format. Please note that the survey takes place in 2002 while asking questions on income and
wealth of households in 2001. Year 2002 and 2001 are used interchangeably in this paper.
Variable percrent is the income percentile groups, ranging from 1-6, from 1 being the lowest
quantile, and 6 the highest. Eyeballing the dataset, it is easy to spot that with each percentile,
for example, the following table the bottom two lines of families 3 and 4 as listed in h_2002
[family id], family 4 has household income 14870 (renthog), larger than family 3, which has an
income of 10700. Intuitively, family 4’s consumption on food (alim) is proportionally larger than
family 3’s, which are 4320 and 3600, respectively. This is also true in the non-durable goods
consumption (nodur). Variable facine3is the sample weights, it is the inverse of the probability
of each household exists in the nation.
Table 6.1.1.: EFF 2001/2002 data (e _2002_imp1_ssub), subset
h_2002 imp facine3 percrent renthog alim nodur
1 1 5799.7153 4 38898 4320 10080
2 1 137.81359 3 17129 7200 7200
3 1 243.75424 2 10700 4320 4200
4 1 23.322895 2 14870 3600 2400
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2. Run random e ect (re) regression. The random e ect does not allow weights option. This is
because random e ect model assumes no heterogeneity in household spending on good (food).
Hence, weights do not play a role in the results. Results are in table 6.1.2. Discussion: Random
e ect regression is equivalent to a normal GLS regression. Important statistics are highlighted
in bold texts. For example, p-values show both variable (renthog - annual household income)
and constant (meaning certain amount must be spent on food for each of the household in
the regression) are significantly di erent from zero. The prob>chi2 = 0.0000, which is <0.05.
This mean statistically significant. This is a F-Test to check whether all coe cients in the
model are di erent from zero. Please note that this is a bivariate model, which may give rise to
misspecification risk on the model. Please see multivariate models in Table 6.1.8 onwards.
Table 6.1.2.: 2001 RE Regression Results [Income Elasticity of Food]
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .06897808   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    3170.1136
     sigma_u    862.88005
                                                                              
       _cons     5770.157   356.8697    16.17   0.000     5070.706    6469.609
     renthog     .0072921   .0006896    10.57   0.000     .0059406    .0086437
                                                                              
        alim        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)      =     111.82
     overall = 0.1287                                         max =      1,003
     between = 0.8645                                         avg =      857.2
     within  = 0.0200                                         min =        552
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: percrent                        Number of groups  =          6
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =      5,143
. xtreg alim renthog, re
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3. Testing whether panel e ect exists in our dataset, meaning if there is any unit di erences in
our data - families make similar decision on food consumption regardless of their income.
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random e ects
alim[Percrent, t] = Xb+ u[percrent] + e[percrent, t] (6.1.4)
Results are as follows. Discussion:This is a test to check whether there is any panel e ect in the
data. The p-value Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000, which means statistically significant. This proves
panel e ect exists in our dataset, meaning there are di erences consumption habits between
income groups. Random e ect model does not fit the data well.
Table 6.1.3.: 2001 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test [Income Elasticity of Food].
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) = 47637.92
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u       744562       862.8801
                       e     1.00e+07       3170.114
                    alim     1.41e+07       3754.958
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        alim[percrent,t] = Xb + u[percrent] + e[percrent,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
.  xttest0
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4. I run a fixed e ect model as a comparison to the random e ect model in step 2: Results are
as below. Discussion: Here I run a unweighted fixed e ect regression as a comparison to the
previous [unweighted] random e ect regression. Please again note that this is a bivariate model
that may give rise to misspecification risk to the model selection. Please see multivariate model
in Table 6.1.8 onwards.
Table 6.1.4.: 2001 FE 1 Results (unweighted) [Income Elasticity of Food]
. 
F test that all u_i=0: F(5, 5136) = 230.03                   Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .25198696   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    3170.1136
     sigma_u    1839.9638
                                                                              
       _cons      5632.71   52.04235   108.23   0.000     5530.685    5734.735
     renthog     .0070721   .0006903    10.24   0.000     .0057187    .0084255
                                                                              
        alim        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4779                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(1,5136)         =     104.94
     overall = 0.1287                                         max =      1,003
     between = 0.8645                                         avg =      857.2
     within  = 0.0200                                         min =        552
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: percrent                        Number of groups  =          6
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      5,143
. xtreg alim renthog, fe
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5. I run the following code to run a Fixed e ects regression using Least Squares Dummy
Variables model (LSDV), and obtained the following results. Discussion: Results show renthog
(household income) is statistically significant, p-value<0.05. Income percentile dummies are also
statistically significant, with p-value<0.05. These are in line with the Breusch and Pagan test
conducted above.
Table 6.1.5.: 2001 Fixed E ect II Regression (no options for weights) [Income Elasticity of Food]
                                                                              
       _cons     3305.547   100.2304    32.98   0.000     3109.053    3502.041
              
          6       5165.33   166.5633    31.01   0.000     4838.795    5491.864
          5      3784.713   170.3505    22.22   0.000     3450.754    4118.673
          4      2701.455   146.4477    18.45   0.000     2414.355    2988.555
          3      1977.315   145.2432    13.61   0.000     1692.576    2262.053
          2        1230.2   146.0264     8.42   0.000      943.926    1516.474
    percrent  
              
     renthog     .0070721   .0006903    10.24   0.000     .0057187    .0084255
                                                                              
        alim        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    7.2501e+10     5,142  14099711.5   Root MSE        =    3170.1
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2872
    Residual    5.1615e+10     5,136  10049620.1   R-squared       =    0.2881
       Model    2.0886e+10         6  3.4810e+09   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(6, 5136)      =    346.38
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     5,143
. regress alim renthog i.percrent
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6. To test whether our data fits fixed e ect model or random e ect model the best, I run a Haus-
man test by Greene (2008) (85). Null hypothesis is that random e ect is the preferred model. It
tests whether the unit error term ‹i are correlated with the regressor, renthog (household gross
income). The results are as follows. Discussion: p<0.05, It rejects the null hypothesis that
random e ect model fits our data. Fixed e ect model is more appropriate than random e ect
for our data. Panel e ect exists in our data: di erent income groups have di erent consump-
tion habits on food. Please note that this test does not have weights option. However, weights
options do not a ect the conclusion.
Table 6.1.6.: 2001 Hausman Test (no weights option) [Income Elasticity of Food]
. 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       45.92
                  chi2(1) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     renthog      .0070721     .0072921       -.0002201        .0000325
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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7. Using weights, running a fixed e ect regression, result are as bellow. Discussion: Prob > F
= 0.0001, which is <0.05. This means the joint coe cients is statistically significantly di erent
from zero. Coe cient of renthog (household annual income) is .0210591, This is di erent from
previous random and fixed e ect coe cients. This is because of the weights options. Some of
the household takes a higher weights in the survey than others. The regression result indicates
household income increases by 1 unit, food consumption demand increase by 0.0210591. This
result already consider income group di erences. This is the coe cient of income elasticity of
demand on food. It is less than 1, and hence it is inelastic. The graphical results are presented
in the next section Figure 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.4a and 6.1.4b.
Table 6.1.7.: 2001 areg result (with weights option) [sum of wgt is 1.3971e+07] [Income Elasticity
of Food]
. 
    percrent     absorbed                                       (6 categories)
                                                                              
       _cons     4849.426   52.81795    91.81   0.000     4713.653    4985.199
     renthog     .0210591   .0018028    11.68   0.000     .0164249    .0256933
                                                                              
        alim        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 6 clusters in percrent)
                                                Root MSE          =  2663.8723
                                                Adj R-squared     =     0.2471
                                                R-squared         =     0.2480
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0001
                                                F(   1,      5)   =     136.45
Linear regression, absorbing indicators         Number of obs     =      5,143
(sum of wgt is   1.3971e+07)
. areg alim renthog [pw=facine3], a(percrent) cl(percrent)
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8. In order to test whether there are more than one variables to a ect food consumption, I also
run a multi-variate regression as follows: Discussion: Results show variable renthog [household
income] is statistically significant, p-value<0.05. bage [household head age] is at a borderline
of statistically significant, p-value close to 0.05. np1 [number of household members] is also
statistically significantly, which is intuitive. actreales [value of real assets] is not statistically
significant. actfinanc [value financial assets] is not. riquezabr [net assets] is collinear with other
variables, hence omitted. nodur [non-durable goods consumption] is moderately statistically
significant, with p-value = 0.022.
Table 6.1.8.: 2001 Multi-variate regression on Food Consumption (weighted) [Income Elasticity
of Food]
    percrent     absorbed                                       (6 categories)
                                                                              
       _cons      1884.08   333.5882     5.65   0.002     1026.565    2741.596
       nodur       .05145   .0157585     3.26   0.022     .0109414    .0919586
   riquezabr            0  (omitted)
   actfinanc     .0000265   .0001765     0.15   0.887    -.0004272    .0004802
   actreales     .0001127   .0001097     1.03   0.351    -.0001693    .0003947
         np1     778.0364   43.37617    17.94   0.000     666.5344    889.5384
        bage      178.711    69.7625     2.56   0.051      -.61926    358.0412
     renthog     .0163428   .0015722    10.40   0.000     .0123014    .0203842
                                                                              
        alim        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 6 clusters in percrent)
                                                Root MSE          =  2515.4476
                                                Adj R-squared     =     0.3285
                                                R-squared         =     0.3300
                                                Prob > F          =          .
                                                F(   5,      5)   =          .
Linear regression, absorbing indicators         Number of obs     =      5,143
note: riquezabr omitted because of collinearity
(sum of wgt is   1.3971e+07)
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Income Elasticity of Spending on Food 2001 (Figures)
The following figures 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 are results for year 2001.
Figure 6.1.1.: EFF 2001 imp1 Scatter Plot of Household Income and Food Consumption by
Income groups (1-6) [same scale]
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Figure 6.1.2.: EFF 2001 imp1 Scatter Plot of Household Income and Food Consumption by
Income Group (1-6) [closer snapshot]
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(a) Group 1 (1-20th percentile)
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(b) Group 2 (20-40th percentile)
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
An
nu
al
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
n 
Fo
od
18000 20000 22000 24000 26000
Constructed total household income annual 2001
percrent = 3, year,  2001 unweighted
(c) Group 3 (40-60th percentile)
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(d) Group 4 (60-80th percentile)
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(e) Group 5 (80-90th percentile)
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Figure 6.1.3.: 2001 EFF Estimated Consumption using areg regression coe cient as in Table
6.1.7
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(a) Estimated Consumption Group 1-5. This is to present a closer
shot of percentile 1st - 90th percentiles. [weighted estimates and
fitted values].
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(b) Estimated Consumption Group 1-6. This is to show the entire
scale of the income distribution of all survey data. [weighted
estimates and fitted values]
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6.1.3. Year 2001/2002 Income Elasticity of Other Non-durable Goods Spending
From hereafter, I only show the key results. Please note that I follow all the steps as in section
6.1.2.
Discussion: renthog [household income] is statistically significant’ constant term is statistically
significant. Both p-values<0.05. Breusch and Pagan test shows random e ect is not appropriate
for our data, with prob>chi2 = 0.000 < 0.05. This means panel e ect [heterogeneity among
households of di erent income percentiles] does exist. Fixed e ect regression is more appropriate.
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Table 6.1.9.: 2001 Household Annual Income and Other Non-Durable Goods Spending Random
E ect Regression Results
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .00403177   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    7285.8107
     sigma_u    463.55687
                                                                              
       _cons     4853.254   227.1486    21.37   0.000      4408.05    5298.457
     renthog       .02734    .001545    17.70   0.000     .0243119    .0303681
                                                                              
       nodur        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)      =     313.15
     overall = 0.1371                                         max =      1,003
     between = 0.9842                                         avg =      857.2
     within  = 0.0372                                         min =        552
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: percrent                        Number of groups  =          6
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =      5,143
. xtreg nodur renthog, re
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  9625.68
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u       214885       463.5569
                       e     5.31e+07       7285.811
                   nodur     6.74e+07       8207.798
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        nodur[percrent,t] = Xb + u[percrent] + e[percrent,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
xttest0
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Discussion: Fixed e ect regression results show renthog [household labour and non-labour
income (before transfers)] and constant term are statistically significant, with p-value<0.05.
Coe cient of fixed e ect regression is slightly di erent from random e ect regression in previous
table.
Table 6.1.10.: 2001 Household Annual Income and Other Non-durable Goods Fixed E ect (I)
Regression Results
. 
F test that all u_i=0: F(5, 5136) = 99.00                    Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .13083332   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    7285.8107
     sigma_u    2826.7379
                                                                              
       _cons     4944.416   119.6079    41.34   0.000     4709.934    5178.899
     renthog     .0223614   .0015866    14.09   0.000      .019251    .0254719
                                                                              
       nodur        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5155                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(1,5136)         =     198.63
     overall = 0.1371                                         max =      1,003
     between = 0.9842                                         avg =      857.2
     within  = 0.0372                                         min =        552
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: percrent                        Number of groups  =          6
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      5,143
. xtreg nodur renthog, fe
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Discussion: All constant terms for all income percentiles are statistically significant. This
confirms heterogeneous impacts of household income have on demand on other non-durable
consumption.
Table 6.1.11.: 2001 Household Annual Income and Other Non-durable Goods Fixed E ect (II)
Regression Results
. 
                                                                              
       _cons     2167.581   230.3577     9.41   0.000     1715.982     2619.18
              
          6      7971.986   382.8091    20.82   0.000     7221.517    8722.455
          5       3921.98   391.5132    10.02   0.000     3154.448    4689.513
          4      2879.194    336.578     8.55   0.000     2219.358     3539.03
          3      1724.986   333.8096     5.17   0.000     1070.577    2379.395
          2      1057.262   335.6096     3.15   0.002     399.3241      1715.2
    percrent  
              
     renthog     .0223614   .0015866    14.09   0.000      .019251    .0254719
                                                                              
       nodur        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.4641e+11     5,142  67367940.2   Root MSE        =    7285.8
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2120
    Residual    2.7263e+11     5,136  53083037.7   R-squared       =    0.2130
       Model    7.3771e+10         6  1.2295e+10   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(6, 5136)      =    231.62
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     5,143
. regress nodur renthog i.percrent
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Discussion: p<0.05, It rejects the null hypothesis that random e ect model fits our data.
Fixed e ect model is more appropriate than random e ect for our data. Panel e ect exists
in our data: di erent income groups have di erent consumption habits on other non-durable
goods. Please note that this test does not have weights option. However, weights options do
not a ect the conclusion.
Table 6.1.12.: 2001 Hausman Test and Sargan-Hansen test, Household Income and Other Non-
durable Goods
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      190.06
                  chi2(1) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     renthog      .0223614       .02734       -.0049785        .0003611
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
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Discussion: Both renthog [household income] and constant term (absorbing all constant dum-
mies for all income percentiles) are statistically significant.
Table 6.1.13.: 2001 Household Income and Other Non-durable Goods,
    percrent     absorbed                                       (6 categories)
                                                                              
       _cons     3680.168   23.63431   155.71   0.000     3619.415    3740.922
     renthog     .0349019   .0008067    43.27   0.000     .0328283    .0369756
                                                                              
       nodur        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 6 clusters in percrent)
                                                Root MSE          =  4525.6915
                                                Adj R-squared     =     0.1867
                                                R-squared         =     0.1876
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(   1,      5)   =    1871.91
Linear regression, absorbing indicators         Number of obs     =      5,143
(sum of wgt is   1.3971e+07)
. areg nodur renthog [pw=facine3], a(percrent) cl(percrent) robust
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Discussion: areg multivariate regression I. It shows collinearity among predictor variables.
Variable bage [household head age] is statistically significant. This means di erent ages of
household heads make di erent decisions on how much households spend on other non-durable
goods. variable np1 [number of household members], actreals [real assets] and a are not statis-
tically significant. Finally, variable actfinanc [financial assets] is statistically significant. 6.1.13
is still best model.
Table 6.1.14.: 2001 Household Income and Other Non-durable Goods, Multivariate Regression
(with weights option).
    percrent     absorbed                                       (6 categories)
                                                                              
       _cons     4529.607   229.4375    19.74   0.000     3939.819    5119.395
   riquezabr            0  (omitted)
   actfinanc     .0016533   .0002854     5.79   0.002     .0009197    .0023869
   actreales    -.0002088   .0001118    -1.87   0.121    -.0004963    .0000786
         np1     72.13679   57.25112     1.26   0.263    -75.03191    219.3055
        bage     -292.126   28.61241   -10.21   0.000    -365.6765   -218.5755
     renthog     .0317192   .0010054    31.55   0.000     .0291347    .0343036
                                                                              
       nodur        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 6 clusters in percrent)
                                                Root MSE          =  4496.8215
                                                Adj R-squared     =     0.1970
                                                R-squared         =     0.1986
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(   5,      5)   = 2480874.86
Linear regression, absorbing indicators         Number of obs     =      5,143
note: riquezabr omitted because of collinearity
(sum of wgt is   1.3971e+07)
> cl(percrent) robust
. areg nodur renthog bage np1 actreales actfinanc riquezabr [pw=facine3], a(percrent) 
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6.1.4. Year 2001/2002 Income Elasticity of Vehicles Purchased
Discussion: The vehicle purchase is positively correlated with household income, and it is
statistically significant with p-value<0.05. However, the constant term is not statistically sig-
nificant, with p-value = 0.228 > 0.05. Breusche and Pagan test for random e ect shows the
prob>chi2 = 1.0000 > 0.05. This means random e ect model is appropriate for our data.
Heterogeneity among household decisions to spend on vehicle purchases does not exist.
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Table 6.1.15.: 2001 Household Annual Income and Vehicles Purchases Random E ect Regression
Results, using General Least Square [gls] option.
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    22941.812
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons    -436.5692   361.9554    -1.21   0.228    -1145.989    272.8503
     renthog     .0615324   .0042593    14.45   0.000     .0531844    .0698804
                                                                              
   gimpvehic        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)      =     208.71
     overall = 0.0390                                         max =      1,003
     between = 0.9976                                         avg =      857.2
     within  = 0.0328                                         min =        552
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: percrent                        Number of groups  =          6
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =      5,143
. xtreg gimpvehic  renthog, re
                          Prob > chibar2 =   1.0000
                             chibar2(01) =     0.00
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u            0              0
                       e     5.26e+08       22941.81
               gimpvehic     5.47e+08       23395.77
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        gimpvehic[percrent,t] = Xb + u[percrent] + e[percrent,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
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Discussion: Weights option, pweight [population weights] is not used in random e ect regres-
sion with maximum likelihood estimates [mle]. iweight [Important weight] is a general weights
option used in case of other weights options are not available. For details on weights, please
see STATA 13 Manual (97; 98). In order to fit random model regression with weights, weights
have to be constant within each unit of panel variable. Hence, I need to use the household id
as panel variable instead of income percentile (quantile). This model reflects our data the best.
By “best”, I mean first of all, I need to determine whether the dependent variable, spending
on goods are sensitive to income percentiles (quantiles). If the sensitivities are not statistical
significant, random e ect model is more appropriate. Otherwise, fixed e ect model should be
used instead.
Table 6.1.16.: 2001 Household Annual Income and Vehicles Purchases Random E ect Regression
using Maximum Likelihood Estimates [mle], with iweights options [importance weights].
LR test of sigma_u=0: chibar2(01) = 0.00               Prob >= chibar2 = 1.000
                                                                              
         rho            0  (omitted)
    /sigma_e      5887.24   1.113753                      5885.057    5889.423
    /sigma_u            0   4162.907                             .           .
                                                                              
       _cons     798.9906   2.211095   361.36   0.000     794.6569    803.3243
     renthog     .0291595    .000053   550.53   0.000     .0290557    .0292633
                                                                              
   gimpvehic        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood  = -1.411e+08                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(1)        =  299846.15
                                                              max =          1
                                                              avg =        1.0
                                                              min =          1
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group:
Group variable: h_2002                          Number of groups  =      5,143
Random-effects ML regression                    Number of obs     =      5,143
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1.411e+08
Fitting full model:
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1.412e+08
Fitting constant-only model:
. xtreg gimpvehic renthog [iweight = facine3], mle
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Discussion: I run the fixed e ect regression for a comparison to the random e ect regres-
sion above. Results do not change much. However, as pointed above, random e ect is more
appropriate. This can be shown in further analysis below.
Table 6.1.17.: 2001 Household Annual Income and Vehicles Purchases Fixed E ect (I) Regression
Results
. 
F test that all u_i=0: F(5, 5136) = 0.58                     Prob > F = 0.7178
                                                                              
         rho    .00088576   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    22941.812
     sigma_u    683.09065
                                                                              
       _cons    -610.7425   376.6255    -1.62   0.105    -1349.089    127.6039
     renthog     .0659102    .004996    13.19   0.000     .0561159    .0757045
                                                                              
   gimpvehic        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5177                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(1,5136)         =     174.05
     overall = 0.0390                                         max =      1,003
     between = 0.9976                                         avg =      857.2
     within  = 0.0328                                         min =        552
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: percrent                        Number of groups  =          6
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      5,143
. xtreg gimpvehic  renthog, fe
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Discussion: I run the following fixed e ect regression for a comparison to the random e ect
regression above. Coe cient of renthog [household income] does not change much from the
random e ect regression. However, as pointed above, random e ect is more appropriate. In this
fixed e ect regression, I add the dummy variables with all income percentiles. Results show all
dummies are not statistically significant. This is in line with the Breusche and Pagan test in
Table 6.1.15.
Table 6.1.18.: 2001 Household Annual Income and Vehicles Purchases Fixed E ect (II) Regres-
sion Results
. 
                                                                              
       _cons    -187.8771   725.3582    -0.26   0.796    -1609.888    1234.134
              
          6      -1783.73   1205.403    -1.48   0.139    -4146.833    579.3723
          5     -366.2256    1232.81    -0.30   0.766    -2783.059    2050.607
          4     -332.5983   1059.828    -0.31   0.754    -2410.314    1745.117
          3     -170.5519   1051.111    -0.16   0.871    -2231.178    1890.074
          2      54.52924   1056.779     0.05   0.959    -2017.208    2126.267
    percrent  
              
     renthog     .0659102    .004996    13.19   0.000     .0561159    .0757045
                                                                              
   gimpvehic        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2.8145e+12     5,142   547362048   Root MSE        =     22942
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0384
    Residual    2.7032e+12     5,136   526326734   R-squared       =    0.0396
       Model    1.1132e+11         6  1.8554e+10   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(6, 5136)      =     35.25
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     5,143
. regress gimpvehic renthog i.percrent
§6.1 Fixed E ect and Random E ect Models 105
Discussion: Hausman Test p-value = 0.0936 > 0.05. The null hypothesis that random e ect
model is not rejected. Random e ect model is appropriate for our data. Panel e ect [het-
erogeneity among units (household income percentile groups)] does not exist. Random E ect
Regression results should be used in the analysis.
Table 6.1.19.: 2001 Hausman Test and Sargan-Hansen test
. 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0936
                          =        2.81
                  chi2(1) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     renthog      .0659102     .0615324        .0043778        .0026112
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
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6.1.5. Year 2001/2002 Income Elasticity of Spending on Other Durable Goods
Table 6.1.20.: 2001 Household Annual Income and Vehicles Purchases Random E ect Regression
Results
                                                                              
         rho    .00766429   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    3480.8175
     sigma_u    305.90595
                                                                              
       _cons     1824.638   301.4502     6.05   0.000     1233.806    2415.469
     renthog     .0029063   .0004787     6.07   0.000      .001968    .0038445
                                                                              
       p2_70        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 6 clusters in percrent)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)      =      36.86
     overall = 0.0178                                         max =        406
     between = 0.8296                                         avg =      279.0
     within  = 0.0024                                         min =        179
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: percrent                        Number of groups  =          6
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =      1,674
. xtreg p2_70      renthog, re robust
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =   105.51
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     93578.45       305.9059
                       e     1.21e+07       3480.817
                   p2_70     1.27e+07       3559.155
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        p2_70[percrent,t] = Xb + u[percrent] + e[percrent,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
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Table 6.1.21.: 2001 Household Annual Income and Vehicles Purchases Fixed E ect (I) Regression
Results
. 
F test that all u_i=0: F(5, 1667) = 10.19                    Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .04245884   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    3480.8175
     sigma_u    732.97066
                                                                              
       _cons      1948.76   98.49586    19.79   0.000     1755.571    2141.948
     renthog     .0019514   .0009674     2.02   0.044      .000054    .0038488
                                                                              
       p2_70        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4211                         Prob > F          =     0.0438
                                                F(1,1667)         =       4.07
     overall = 0.0178                                         max =        406
     between = 0.8296                                         avg =      279.0
     within  = 0.0024                                         min =        179
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: percrent                        Number of groups  =          6
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      1,674
. xtreg p2_70     renthog, fe
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Table 6.1.22.: 2001 Household Annual Income and Vehicles Purchases Fixed E ect (II) Regres-
sion Results
                                                                              
       _cons     955.9302   260.2765     3.67   0.000      445.427    1466.433
              
          6      1919.117   333.7435     5.75   0.000     1264.516    2573.717
          5      1546.468   352.2563     4.39   0.000     855.5562    2237.379
          4      852.3399    325.095     2.62   0.009     214.7024    1489.977
          3      616.9705   327.2603     1.89   0.060    -24.91402    1258.855
          2      316.0153   345.3904     0.91   0.360    -361.4294    993.4599
    percrent  
              
     renthog     .0019514   .0009674     2.02   0.044      .000054    .0038488
                                                                              
       p2_70        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2.1193e+10     1,673  12667584.3   Root MSE        =    3480.8
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0435
    Residual    2.0198e+10     1,667  12116090.4   R-squared       =    0.0470
       Model     995345780         6   165890963   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(6, 1667)      =     13.69
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,674
. regress p2_70 renthog i.percrent
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Hausman Test p-value is 0.0001, < 0.05. The null hypothesis that random e ect model is
rejected. Random e ect model is not appropriate for our data. Panel e ect [heterogeneity
among units (household income groups)] exists. Fixed E ect Regression results should be used
in the analysis.
Table 6.1.23.: 2001 Hausman Test and Sargan-Hansen test.
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0001
                          =       16.15
                  chi2(1) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     renthog      .0019514     .0029063       -.0009549        .0002376
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
Table 6.1.24.: 2001 areg result (with weights option)
. 
    percrent     absorbed                                       (6 categories)
                                                                              
       _cons     1538.141   15.69975    97.97   0.000     1497.784    1578.499
     renthog     .0072426   .0004399    16.46   0.000     .0061117    .0083734
                                                                              
       p2_70        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 6 clusters in percrent)
                                                Root MSE          =  2636.8840
                                                Adj R-squared     =     0.0348
                                                R-squared         =     0.0383
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(   1,      5)   =     271.04
Linear regression, absorbing indicators         Number of obs     =      1,674
(sum of wgt is   4.9478e+06)
. areg p2_70 renthog [pw=facine3], a(percrent) cl(percrent) robust
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Discussion: It shows collinearity among predictor variables. Also, it produced counter-intuitive
results on renthog (household income) and gimpvehic (vehicle purchase), likely due to adding
statistically insignificant variables. Hence, it does not improve the model presented in Table
6.1.20.
Table 6.1.25.: 2001 Multivariate Regression (with weights option). areg multivariate regression
I.
    percrent     absorbed                                       (6 categories)
                                                                              
       _cons     1446.017   221.6972     6.52   0.001     876.1261    2015.907
              
          5     -212.5632   284.5944    -0.75   0.489    -944.1364    519.0101
          4       61.8421   216.9375     0.29   0.787    -495.8135    619.4978
          3      218.0848   359.6445     0.61   0.571    -706.4107     1142.58
          2      139.4601   230.0826     0.61   0.571    -451.9861    730.9063
         np1  
              
     renthog     .0075219   .0005155    14.59   0.000     .0061967    .0088472
                                                                              
       p2_70        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 6 clusters in percrent)
                                                Root MSE          =  2636.8773
                                                Adj R-squared     =     0.0348
                                                R-squared         =     0.0406
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(   5,      5)   =     190.01
Linear regression, absorbing indicators         Number of obs     =      1,674
(sum of wgt is   4.9478e+06)
> )
. areg p2_70 renthog i.np1 [pw=facine3], a(percrent) cl(percrent) vce(cluster percrent
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Discussion: It does not improve the R square, and the statistical significance of both the
household income and its squared term deteriorate. Hence, the best model is the one presented
in Table 6.1.24.
Table 6.1.26.: 2001 Multivariate Regression (with weights option). areg multivariate regression
II.
    percrent     absorbed                                       (6 categories)
                                                                              
       _cons     2205.924   208.7648    10.57   0.000     1669.277    2742.571
   actfinanc     .0006774   .0000426    15.91   0.000     .0005679    .0007868
        bage    -217.4934    76.7095    -2.84   0.036    -414.6815   -20.30541
     renthog     .0051442     .00059     8.72   0.000     .0036274    .0066609
                                                                              
       p2_70        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 6 clusters in percrent)
                                                Root MSE          =  2609.8617
                                                Adj R-squared     =     0.0545
                                                R-squared         =     0.0590
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(   3,      5)   =     128.05
Linear regression, absorbing indicators         Number of obs     =      1,674
(sum of wgt is   4.9478e+06)
. areg p2_70 renthog bage actfinanc [pw=facine3], a(percrent) cl(percrent) robust
6.2. Summary of Results
To save space, and the similarity of results in di erent years and goods, I only include the
most relevant results in Table 6.2.1. I found that coe cient of non-durable goods such as food
consumption responds well with the lower tail indices presented in Table 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.
Table 6.2.1.: Summary on Income Elasticity of Spending on Various Goods
food other non-dur vehicle other dur
2001 0.0211 [areg, wgt] 0.0349 [areg, wgt] 0.0292 [re, mle] 0.0072 [areg, wgt]
2005 0.0097 [areg, wgt] 0.0350 [areg, wgt] 0.0028 [areg, wgt] 0.0095 [areg, wgt]
2008 0.0169 [areg, wgt] 0.0194 [areg, wgt] 0.0176 [areg, wgt] 0.0070 [areg, wgt]
2011 0.0201 [areg, wgt] 0.0298 [areg, wgt] 0.0094 [areg, wgt] 0.0076 [areg, wgt]
Discussion: 2008 other durable goods analysis [highlighted in blue] shows conflicting results
with Breusche and Pagan v.s. hausman test. I treated it as fixed e ect regression. I highlight
significant decreases in red, significant increases in green. I also include the model selected for
the criteria in the brackets beside the statistics.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
There are several key findings:
Income Inequality trend:
1. The Spanish household income and wealth on average, have indeed grown over the period
of 2001-2011, shown by the lognormal body of the distribution mean. However, the income
and wealth also have dispersed further apart within the country, which is shown by the
growing standard deviation of the lognormal body of the distribution.
2. The upper and lower tails of the income and wealth distributions, in general, have decreased
over time. This means the poorer gets poorer, and richer gets richer. However, the richer
households in Spain gets richer slower than the poorer households get poorer. This is shown
by the smaller upper tail movement than lower tail movement in the Labour income post
transfer variable p6_labinchhm, in table 5.1.1. The total income (Labour and non-labour,
pre-transfer) variable, renthog, as presented in table 5.1.2, exhibits similar trends as
p6_labinchhm. However, with the growth of non-labour income such as financial returns
and rental incomes, the upper tail movement is larger than lower tail movement. The
richer is getting richer faster. This would mean the transfer indeed smooth out income
distribution.
3. All income and wealth variables become more and more unequal over time, which is shown
by the Gini indices in table 5.2.1.
Spending variables:
1. Most spending variables have increased on average and also diverged further over time.
These can be seen in the growing lognormal body mean and standard deviation of the
distributions.
2. Most spending variables have become more and more unequal over time, which is reflected
by the Gini indices in table 5.2.1.
Income inequality and consumption sensitivity:
The Income Elasticity of goods are responds to to tail indices changes asymmetrically:
1. Regarding food, when lower tail index increases in year 2005 (highlighted in red in Ta-
ble 5.1.3), meaning poorer population is getting poorer, food elasticity in 2005 decreases
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(highlighted in red in Table 6.2.1). Food is a life necessity, when population gets poorer,
it is less elastic, which is intuitive.
2. For other non-durable goods, the elasticity measures decreases in 2008 (highlighted in red
in Table 6.2.1). At the moment of writing, it still needs to be investigated what has caused
it. It may be either or both the tail indices changes in the lower and upper tails of the
distribution. It may simply because other non-durable goods have a longer useful lives,
e.g. clothing as a non-durable item lasts several years, and hence, it picks up the lower
tail changes one period later than food, which has a much shorter useful life.
3. For vehicles, the elasticity measure decreases in 2005 sharply, and then rise in 2008 and
then decreases in 2011 again. This may be due to the multiple years lifespan of vehicles.
It takes several years to pick up the income e ects.
4. For other durable goods, the elasticity measures stay stable over the period 2001-2011.
This is in line with intuition for goods that have longer life span, the spending on such
goods do not change with income increases/decreases.
Appendix
7.1. Details on variables used from the EFF Dataset
I also use several variables defined in the EFF database (Variable names and definitions adapted
from definitions.doc on Bank of Spain EFF survey information online):
• h_2002, h_2005, h_2008, h_2011, the household identity number
• facine3, the population weights, which is the inverse of the probability of a household
exist in the sample designed in this survey. This is crucial as the unweighted results di er
largely from the weighted results. In this paper, I focus on the weighted sample population
inequality measurements. I firstly normalize the weights, which means proportionate the
weights to the sum of one.
• imp, the imputation series, ranges from 1-5
• renthog, this is the total income (labour and non-labour, gross, before tax) of all the
family members. In the case households do not provide answer to any of the survey
question related income, then a direct imputation is applied to the total.
• riquezanet, this is the net wealth, Total Assets (both real assets and financial assets) -
Total Debts. This is defined after defining all relevant asset and debt variables as follows:
• Real Assets as below:
1. p2_5, main residence value - real asset,
2. otraspr, other real estate asset value - real asset,
3. p2_84, value of Jewelry, work of art, antiques - real asset,
4. valhog, value of business related assets
• Financial Assets as below:
1. p4_7_3, deposits and accounts for payments - financial asset,
2. p4_15, value of listed shares - financial asset,
3. p_4_24, value of unlisted shares and other equities - financial asset,
4. p4_35, fixed income securities - financial asset,
5. allf, total mutual fund value - financial asset,
6. salcuentas, savings account used for home purchase - financial asset
7. valor, pension scheme - financial asset,
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8. valseg, life insurance - financial asset
9. valpenseg = valor + valseg, pension scheme - financial asset,
10. odeuhog,
7.2. Multiple Imputation (MI)
The key point to note for MI is, if the research interest is a point estimate of mean, median,
regression parameter (denoted by Q for example), for each of the five implicates, the MI estimate
Q¯ = 15
5ÿ
i=1
Qˆi. The variance of this estimate Q¯ has two components:
1. Within imputation sampling variance W , the average of the five variance estimates (Vˆi):
W= 15
5ÿ
i=1
(Vˆi)
2. Between imputations variance that reflects the variability due to imputation uncertainty:
B = 14
q5
i=1(Qˆi ≠ Q¯)2
Total variance of Q¯ then can be written as T = W + ( 65 )B.
Alternatively, to obtain MI estimates, it may be possible to do the following: If only mean of the
statistics are of interest, instead of analyzing the five implicates separately, one can construct a
complete dataset by combining the five implicates successively. This is equivalent to construct a
unique dataset with 5 times of the actual number of respondents. The calculation can be done
by dividing the weight variables (facine3, discussed immediately below) by five, and calculate
the desired statistic. Carlin et al. (2003) (79) describes the procedure for analysis using MI
dataset by STATA.
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Chapter 8
Introduction
Background Being the first country to witness the development of both pension liability buy-
in/outs and longevity-linked securities, UK has become one of the most important global centers
of pension longevity markets during the past two decades. In today’s low interest rate regime,
coupled with slow recovery of asset prices to pre-crisis period, as well as stable, long-term
longevity improvement, pension schemes may face large funding deficits. On the other hand,
Solvency II regulatory reform has created uncertainties to measurement of pension scheme’s
balance sheet, which motivates pension industry to adopt a de-risking strategy. These factors
all contribute to the historical peak of the global pension risk transfer market in the past
decade. According to Aon Hewitt (2015) (103), by the end of 2014, the global pension risk
transfer market has grown to the size of £35 billion, with £22 billion of these transactions being
longevity swaps (£8.8bn in 2013), and bulk annuities reached around £13.2 billion (£7.8bn in
2013). Bulk annuities, or buy-in/outs transactions are indemnity-based solutions which allow
the pension sponsors to transfer part or all pension liabilities to a buyer, usually a specialty
insurance company. Through these instruments, pension schemes sell their liabilities outwards
by paying a buy-out premium. An alternative hedging solution for the pension schemes is to
implement their own Asset-Liability Management (ALM) strategy, with longevity swaps being
part of it to hedge the unfavourable longevity improvements. Currently there are mainly two
types of longevity derivatives: Among the recent market transactions of longevity securities, the
majority of those transactions are bespoke, or customised, indemnity-based longevity swaps that
hedge the longevity risks of specific pension schemes or annuity providers’ portfolios, which are
similar to the annuity reinsurance o ered in the reinsurance markets currently1. The other type
of longevity swaps are linked to a population index such as the LifeMetrics index developed
by JP Morgan (see Coughlan et al (2007)(112)). They are referred to as the indexed-based, or
standardized longevity swaps. Please see Tables A.0.1 A.0.2 and A.0.3 in Appendix for a list of
recent longevity transactions.
1It is worth noting that the fundamental di erence between the bespoke longevity swap and a traditional
reinsurance contract is that the longevity swaps are usually backed up by collateral, whereas reinsurances are
not. The lack of collateral associated with the traditional annuity reinsurance contracts are possibly due to
the fact that longevity risk transfer through reinsurance programme is part of the global de-risking strategy
of the pension plans or annuity providers, before the innovation of longevity swaps
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8.1. Bespoke v.s. index-based longevity swaps
Early examples of bespoke, or customized longevity swaps are the transactions agreed between
Babcock International and Credit Suisse in 2009. The cash flows exchanged between the hedgers
(pension plans and annuity providers, etc) and the hedge suppliers (specialty (re)insurers, in-
vestment banks and hedge fund etc.) are designed to match exactly the survival index of the
hedgers’ pensioners/annuitants portfolio. To sum up, the advantages of the bespoke longevity
swaps are significant: They provide a perfect hedge to the longevity risk hedgers. However, the
costs associated with setting up such transactions are usually high. This is because the hedge
suppliers need to put up substantial regulatory capital to ensure the pension liabilities can be
met with a high probability. At the same time, the hedge suppliers expect the buy-out price
includes a premium relative to the longevity risks being transferred. Moreover, these bespoke
securities are viewed as static, buy-and-hold hedges that sit on the hedgers’ balance sheets which
do not generate further market transactions.
In contrast, the other type of longevity securities is index-based, or index-linked, standard-
ized longevity swaps. For example, pension sponsors can structure such longevity swaps by
combining several q-forwards (112) designed by JP Morgan. These instruments exchange cash
flows between the hedgers and hedge suppliers that linked to a broader index (e.g. a national
population), usually larger and more reliable than the hedgers’ portfolios. This design makes the
index-based transactions more transparent, and easier to manage and structure, which induces
lower set-up cost and better liquidity than the bespoke ones. Moreover, some pension scheme is
too large to hedge with bespoke solutions. This makes indexed longevity hedge is currently the
most practical and only available solution for hedging the longevity risk associated with deferred
pensions and deferred annuities, as well as those super large schemes. Moreover, the specialist
longevity insurance companies may use indexed longevity swaps to hedge their exposure instead
of purchasing reinsurance as a cost-e ective solution.
Nonetheless, the disadvantages of these index-based longevity hedge are obvious, which is the
mismatch of the survival experience between the hedgers’ own portfolios and the reference popu-
lation, which would cause mismatch of cash flows. The index-based hedges are imperfect, leaving
a residual amount of risk that cannot be hedged. This specific risk is called basis risk.
8.2. Basis risk
Basis risk can arise when there are di erences, errors, or mismatches between the cash flows
linked to the underlying hedged instrument and hedging instrument. In the context of longevity
risk, it arises when the pension schemes or annuity providers (exposed or hedged population)
have a di erent demographic characteristics from the population associated with the hedging
instrument (hedging population). Previous literature (Cairns et al. (2011) (107), Richards and
Jones (2004) (126) and Li and Hardy (2009) (121)) list a exhaustive factors of longevity basis
risk. We summarize them as follows:
• Gender mismatch
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• Age mismatch
• Geographical mismatch (country mismatch)
• Subpopulation mismatch (mortality experience di erences between a specific pension fund
and the national population)
• Social economic status, lifestyle, etc.
We di erentiate the definition of basis risk and sampling risk. As mentioned in Coughlan et
al. (2011) (114), the latter refers to the demographic experience di erences due to size of the
population. For example, smaller pension fund may experience larger variations in higher age
groups due to the number of pensioners is in each age group is smaller. This is also called
“random risk”. Due to the existence of basis risk, when the hedgers contemplate whether to
hedge their longevity risks, or what instruments they should use (either the customized or
indexed-based hedge), the foremost and essential step should be to evaluate and quantify of the
basis risk, then compare the longevity risk reduction by the hedges and the costs associated.
The basis risk arise from gender and age can be dealt with, without too much troubles by index-
based longevity hedge, if structured properly. However, the basis risk due to sub-population and
social-economic status di erences are more challenging to evaluate and hedge. In this paper, we
would like to address this question formally.
8.3. Value hedge v.s. cash flow hedge
Value hedging is fundamentally di erent from cash flow hedging. Cairns et al. (2011) (107)
briefly discusses the two concepts.
A value hedge is used to hedge the present value of a series of future pension liability cashflows.
Value hedge is important to in the situation when short-term solvency requirements is more
onerous than meeting cashflows in the long term. In case of mergers and acquisitions, pension
plans’ present values are more important relative to the operation business. Therefore, value
hedge can be very e ective.
A cash flow hedge is designed to deliver a series of future cash flows to match the pension plan’s
liability cash flows. Cash flow hedge strategy often involves defining a specific asset strategy to
fund the liabilities. Our paper takes into account the cash flow fluctuations of the pension fund
balance sheets due to the longevity hedging instruments. This gives us a holistic view of the
hedge e ectiveness of the instrument across the hedging horizon.
8.4. Previous literature on basis risk modeling
This paper is linked to several strands of academic literature. Firstly, there are several papers
on longevity basis risk modelling. Cairns et al. (2011) (107) set up a framework for assessment
of longevity basis risk.It provides a case study to examine the basis risk between the mortality
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experiences of the assured lives of Continuous Mortality Investigation (CMI) index and the
national population (English and Welsh, or E&W) index. The results show that the the two
populations have a stable, long-term correlated trend, with the CMI population being a subset
of the E&W one. The results of this UK case study show that the basis risk between two
correlated populations can be hedged e ectively with a appropriately designed, static, index-
based longevity swap. This paper considers value-hedging instead of cash-flow hedge.
Using the same dataset of the E&W and CMI populations, Salhi and Loisel (2012) (127) propose
multivariate approach for forecasting pairwise mortality rates of related populations. They
focuse on modeling the long-term behaviours between the two correlated populations (one is the
sub-set of the other), assuming that the two mortality time-series cannot wander o  in opposite
directions in the long term, without mean reverting, on grounds of biological reasonableness.
They aim to propose a consistent approach to forecast pairwise mortality to assess basis risk
embedded in the index-based longevity securities.
Dowd et al. (2011) (111) (see also Jarner and Kryger, 2011) design the so-called gravity mor-
tality model for two related but di erent sized populations. The larger population is modeled
independently, while the sub-population is modeled in terms of the spreads to the larger one.
Based on the Age-Period-Cohort (APC) mortality model, the spreads between the two popula-
tions depend on the gravity (or spread reversion parameters) for the period and cohort e ects2.
This model is also tested on the E&W and CMI population data.
Several other authors investigate basis risk of two correlated populations or a group of popula-
tions in various ways. Hardy and Li (2011) (121) propose an augmented common factor model
for a group of populations, imposing a common mortality age factor, but allowing each popula-
tion to have its own mortality age pattern and level of mortality. They use data of the female
populations of Canada and the United States, and show the goodness-of-fit and ex-post forecast-
ing results suggest that the augmented common factor model performs better than others. They
use this model to quantify the basis risk in a longevity hedge of 65-year-old Canadian females
structured using a portfolio of q-forward contracts predicated on U.S. female population. Their
results show significant hedging e ectiveness and longevity risk reduction of the indexed-based
longevity instruments. However, this paper makes a strong assumption that the annuity amount
of the hedged population is homogenous ($1), which is a highly hypothetical case.
Cox and Lin (2007) (109) investigate the basis risk between populations associated with annuity
portfolios and life insurance portfolios, and their results suggested that this basis risk is man-
ageable. Yang and Huang (2013) (132) propose an optimal longevity hedging strategy not only
on the internal natural hedging between the annuity portfolio and the life insurance portfolio,
but also on external hedging using longevity-linked securities. They propose an optimal hedging
strategy based on the insurer’ profit function, based on immunization theory. They address the
2Their arguments lie in the sizes of the two related populations, recourse to the planetary analogy that "a binary
star system with two stars of more or less equal mass exerting similar gravitational pulls on each other". If these
are two similar sized populations, the gravitational pulls between the two populations are equivalent relatively.
If one population is significantly smaller than the other, and is a subset of the larger one, its gravitational
pull on the larger one is negligible. Biological reasonableness suggests that the two related populations do not
have mortality experience that deviate from each other for a prolonged period.
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basis risk problem by applying Yang and Wang (2013)(133)’s multi-population mortality model
to capture the mortality experience di erences for the annuity and life insurance policy holders.
8.5. Research contribution
Our research contributes to the current academic literature and pension industry practices in
various ways. Firstly, most of the literature modelling basis risk use a theoretical pension plan
data, e.g. a pooled assured lives in a country, rather than a real occupational pension plan.
This may underestimate the basis risk because pooled assured population is much larger than
any specific pension plan, which may smooth out the mortality improvement characteristics. To
the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one to link mortality experience of a pension
scheme to sizes of annuities, and set up a formal framework to hedge longevitybasis risk.
Secondly, through the literature survey on the most recent papers on longevity basis risk quan-
tification and hedging, we found that previous literature mainly focus on value hedging rather
than real cash flow dynamics across the hedging horizon of the pension scheme. A design of
longevity hedging instrument based on real cash flow and Marking-to-Market (MTM) dynamics
provides more realistic insights on the hedge e ectiveness of the instruments across the hedging
horizon.
Also, previous papers make explicit or implicit assumption of homogeneous pension annuity
payments to each pensioner, which could render hedge e ectiveness results less robust. In
our paper, we firstly examined the pension income heterogeneity within our pension scheme,
rooted from the income distribution theory established by Pareto (1896a, b) (124), (125)3. The
heterogeneity of the pension income across ages and years suggest there may exist multiple
sub-populations within pensioner population, which may be linked to their respective mortality
experience curves. Our paper divide pensioners into their respective age-pension4-year buckets
and discover systematic mortality di erentials across groups and with the national index, which
subsequently can be applied to e ective longevity basis risk hedging strategy.
Our framework provides a thorough overview of the asset-liability management strategies for
pension plans and annuity providers. Once basis risk can be measured and managed, the
longevity risk transfer market could become popular for trading parties rather than a pure
hedgers-led market as it is now.
8.6. Outline of the rest of the paper
Chapter 9 provides a mortality experience study which compares the mortality experience be-
tween the UK pension scheme and the national population. It firstly examine the opposite re-
3For a brief review of the recent development on income distribution models, please see Neal and Rosen (2000)
(123), Kleiber and Kotz (2003) (118), and Chotikapanich (2008) (110), and the latest article by Toda (2012)
(131). These literature suggest income and wealth may be power-law distributed in both the upper and the
lower tails.
4This refers to the size of pension annuities.
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lationship between pension annuities and mortality experiences, using a simple Cox Regression
(Cox 1972 (108)). We then set up a dynamic pensioner bucketing strategy based on Gaussian
mixture models (based on income distribution models, see Colombi (1990) (106)) and Expecta-
tion Maximization algorithm (developed by Dempster et al. (1977) (115)). Our model breaks
down pensioners into di erent sub-populations, according to their age-pension-year index. The
best mixture model of the pension population is then selected based on the Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion (BIC) developed by Schwarz (1978) (130). The mortality di erentials of each
sub-population to the national population can be quantified.
In Chapter 10, we construct a portfolio of q-forwards (developed by JP Morgan) to hedge
each of the sub-populations, based on time-varying hedge ratios suggested by the mortality
di erentials in the previous step. Section 10.1 presents the Marking to market (MTM) and
Profit and loss(P&L) dynamics of the pension scheme’s portfolios. We consider cash-flow based
measurement to provide a holistic view of the hedge e ectiveness of the index-based longevity
instruments.
Chapter 10.2.1.3 concludes and summarizes the main results.
Chapter 9
Pension Data Analysis
9.1. Pension mortality experience studies
The mortality data of English and Welsh (E&W hereafter) population from Human Mortality
database (HMD hereafter) for the period of 1930-2012 for both sexes is available. This is the
national population index used in this paper, We refer this population as population 1 (pop 1),
or simply E&W hereafter. We refer the pension scheme population as population 2 (pop 2), or
simply Scheme hereafter. Pop 2 is a sub-population of pop 1.
The pension scheme in our research has around 40,000 lives, and was established in early 1900s,
and reached a mature period since 1990s, with the highest number of pensioners reaching re-
tirement age (65). The mortality data is available from 2004 - 2009 for both sexes.
Below is a sample of scheme data:
Table 9.1.1.: Sample Pension Scheme Data
Ref Sex Date of Birth Date of Retired Date of Death Pension Annuity
1 M 01/01/1939 01/01/2004 01/04/2009 £1, 300
2 M 01/01/1939 01/01/2004 01/04/2010 £1, 900
3 M 01/01/1939 01/01/2004 01/07/2009 £500
4 F 01/01/1949 01/01/2003 01/01/2010 £1, 000
5 M 01/01/1940 01/01/2002 01/04/2009 £8, 900
With these information, we calculate the death counts in each calendar year (t) and each age
(x), Dx, t, and exposure to death, Ex, t, and estimate the raw mortality rates, mx, t by the
relationship mx, t = Dx, tEx, t . We include the graphical results comparing pop 1 and pop 2 with
age brackets of 5 years in Figure 9.1.1. At first glance, the pensioners have generally lower
mortality experience than the national population, both males and females. This is in line with
the assumption the pensioners in occupational pension scheme have better access to medical care
and health services, higher incomes from their secure employment, which could possibly lead to
better longevity improvements than the national population. This is similar to the findings in
Coughlan et al. (2011) (114) that the assured population collected by the Continuous Mortality
Index (CMI) generally have lower mortality experience than the national population.
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9.1.1. Cox regression: annuity and mortality
Figure 9.1.1 suggests scheme members have generally lower mortality rates than the UK national
population in our research horizon. To quantify the relationship between mortality rates and
annuity incomes, we firstly run Cox (1972) (108) regressions as follows.
Cox (1972) (108) regression is originally used to analyze survival functions of di erent patient
groups undertaking di erent treatments in the medical science area. The purpose of this model
is to simultaneously explore the e ects of several covariates (variables) on the survival rates of
the populations. The advantage of Cox Regression is that it tests the e ects of each of the
independent covariates simultaneously. If the covariate has a positive regression coe cient, it
means that the hazard risk of this covariate is higher if the values of it is higher, and vice versa.
In simple terms, Cox regression is a parametric model based on the exponential survival function
as follows:
log hi(t) = –+ —1xi1 + —2xi2 + ...+ —kxik (9.1.1)
Or, it can be rewritten as
hi(t) = exp(–+ —1xi1 + —2xi2 + ...+ —kxik) (9.1.2)
Cox (1972) (108) regression can be viewed as a linear model for the log-hazard function as in
Equation 9.1.1, or as a multiplicative model for the hazard function as in 9.1.2. The letter i in
the above equations refer to each individual patient in the treatment group, which is individual
pensioners in our pension population. The letter xÕs are the covariates. The constant – refers
to a log-baseline models based on the assumption of the survival distribution such as Compertz,
Weibulls, etc. In contrast, Cox Regression is a semi-parametric procedure because the baseline
hazard function, –(t) = log(ho(t) is unspecified. This makes the Cox regression flexible and
widely used.
We run two Cox (1972) (108) regressions on our pensioners to prove there exists a negative
relationship between pensioner annuities and their mortality rates. Pension annuity can be an
e ective identifier of social-economic characteristics that lead to mortality di erentials, with
absence of other data such as occupation, postcodes, medical history, lifestyles, etc.
Cox Regression 1 Regress mortality rate on covariates of Ages, Sexes and Annuity amount
(divided by £1000). Results are summarized in Section 9.1.2
Table 9.1.2.: Cox (108) Regression 1 pensioners in £1,000 bucket
Covariates Coe cient Standard error z-stat p-value
Age 0.0238 0.0006 41.9746 0
Sex (0≠M , 1≠ F ) ≠0.1196 0.0109 ≠10.9513 6.55e≠28
Annuity in £1K bucket ≠0.0055 0.00095 ≠5.8265 5.66e≠09
Covariates Hazard Ratio Survival Ratio Lower bound Upper Bound
Age 1.0241 0.9765 0.9754 0.9775
Sex (0≠M , 1≠ F ) 0.8873 1.1271 1.1032 1.1514
Annuity in £1K bucket 0.99454 1.0056 1.0037 1.0074
Conclusion:
• The coe cient of the covariate Age is positive, 0.0238. As pensioners’ages increase, the higher hazard risks
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they face. The relative risk for Age is e0.0238 = 1.024. Thus the mortality rate for pensioners one year
older is 1.024 times higher on average, after adjustment for the e ects of all other covariates in the model.
• The coe cient of the covariate Sex is negative. Please note that we denote males as 0, and females as 1.
Hence, the higher the value of this covariate, the lower the hazard risk is. In other words, being female
has a better chance to survive in this particular population. The relative risk for the covariate Sex is
e≠0.1196 = 0.8873. The mortality rate for female is 88.73% of that of a male, after adjustment for the
e ects of all other covariates in the model.
• Similar to Sex, the coe cient of the covariate Pension Amount (£1,000 bucket) is negative. The relative
risk for the covariate Pension Amount (£1,000 bucket) is e≠0.0055 = 0.9945. Thus the mortality rate for
pensioners with £1,000 more in their pension amount tends to decrease to 99.45% of that of the group of
pensioners in a lower pension amount bracket, after adjustment for the e ects of all other covariates in the
model.
• The p-values for all three covariates are all significant. The analysis is valid.
Cox Regression 2 In order to examine the e ects of the pension amount with di erent buck-
ets (£4, 000), we run Cox Regression with a di erent set of covariates as follows (Results are
summarized in the Table 9.1.3):
Table 9.1.3.: Cox (108) Regression 2 (pensioners in £4,000 bucket)
Covariates Coe cient Standard error z-stat p-value
Age 0.0238 0.0006 39.5956 0
G1(0≠ others, 1≠ PM < £4K) 0.0335 0.0119 2.8066 0.0050
G2(0≠ others, 1≠ PM£4K ≠ 8K) ≠0.1045 0.0141 ≠7.4198 1.17e≠13
G3(0≠ others, 1≠ PM > £8K) ≠0.1645 0.0169 ≠9.7367 2.10e≠22
Covariates Hazard Ratio Survival Ratio Lower bound Upper Bound
Age 1.0224 0.9781 0.9770 0.9791
G2(0≠ others, 1≠ PM£4K ≠ 8K) 1.0340 0.9671 0.9448 0.9900
G3(0≠ others, 1≠ PM > £8K) 0.8483 1.1788 1.1404 1.2185
• Age: The coe cient of covariate Age is 0.0222. The relative risk for this covariate is e0.0222 = 1.0224. This
means the hazard rate of the pensioners su er a mortality rate of 1.0224 times if they are one year older,
after adjustment for the e ects of the other covariates in the model.
• Sex: Similar to Cox Regression model 1, hence can be ignored here.
• Group 1 Pensioner annuity size £0≠ 4, 000 (27, 628 lives): The coe cient of covariate Group 1 is 0.0335.
The relative risk for this covariate is e0.0335 = 1.0340. This means the pensioners in this group has a
mortality rate of 1.0340 times higher than those who are not in this group, after adjustment for the e ects
of the other covariates in the model. This is in line with our intuition since this is the lowest band of the
pension amount buckets.
• Group 2 Pensioners annuity size £4, 000≠ 8, 000 (6, 181 lives): The coe cient of covariate Group 2 is
≠0.1045. The relative risk for this covariate is e≠0.1045 = 0.9008. This means that the pensioners in this
group has a mortality rate of 90.08% of those who are not in this group, after adjustment for the e ects of
all other covariates in the model. This is also intuitive since this is the middle band of the pension annuity
buckets.
• Group 3 Pensioners annuity size £8, 000+ (4, 037 lives): The coe cient of covariate Group 3 is ≠0.1645.
The relative risk for this covariate is e≠0.1645 = 0.8483. This means that the pensioners who are in this
group has a mortality rate of 84.83% of those who are not in this group, after adjustment for the e ects of
the other covariates in the model. This is intuitive because this group is the highest band of the pension
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amount buckets. The pensioners in this group are supposed to be wealthiest, and healthiest, and should
have lowest mortality rate among all three pension amount buckets.
• p-values of all covariates are significant - The regression results are valid.
• We select the £4, 000 bucketing strategy as an example to identify the negative relationship with mortality
experiences and pension annuity amounts. We found similar results when dividing pensioners using £5, 000
buckets. However, without further analysis, Cox Regression alone cannot identify the optimal age-pension-
year bucketing strategy. We need to use a more rigorous method to identify sub-populations according to
their pension annuity incomes in each year across our research horizon.
9.1.2. Pension scheme cash flow analysis
As the UK pension scheme used in our research was established in early 1900s, and reached its
maturity in 1980s - 1990s. By maturity, we mean the number of retirees reaches the highest.
We expect the cash flows due to liabilities would fluctuate during our research horizon due to
various factors. Firstly, the individual annuity amounts are highly heterogeneous as discovered in
many income and wealth distributions found in various countries (See Colombi (1990) (106) for
example in the UK income distribution). A panel study on our UK pension scheme annuity cash
flow across our research horizon (2004-2009) can be found in Figure 9.1.2. In the left sub-figure
of 9.1.2, we observe multiple (possibly three or more) modes in the distribution, which means
there may exist multiple sub-populations within our pension scheme. In the right sub-figure of
9.1.2, we observe heavy-tailedness in the pension annuity distribution, with a tail index of around
3.14. This is consistent to the results suggested in previous income distribution literature. The
estimation method is the standard Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) Goodness-of-Fit test, details of
which can be found in Chakravart, Laha and Roy (1967) (113). In simple terms, K-S test is
used to determine if a sample statistics is from a population with a specific distribution. The
p-value shows that the heavy-tailedness is significant and the result is valid.
The second factor that contributes to the fluctuation of the cash flow due to liabilities are the
age-year bracket. Granular results of 2004 can be found in Figure 9.1.3. We observe that the
lower age groups (age 65-69, age 70-74 and age 75-79) have more pronounced e ects of multiple
sub-populations by pension annuities, while for the higher age groups (age 80-84, 85-89 and 90-
94), this e ect is less pronounced. This suggests we need a consistent and robust methodology
to divide pensioners into age-pension-year groups to e ectively hedge the basis risk arising from
mortality di erentials with regard to the national population. Moreover, it is well known that
the number of male senior executives are larger than females. Hence, it makes sense to break
down the analysis for both sexes. The results for these analyses can be found in figure 9.1.2.
9.1.3. Pensioner bucketing strategy: income distribution approach
From the previous two sections, we draw two conclusions: Firstly, Section 9.1.1 suggests there
is a negative relationship between pension annuity and longevity. In other words, the higher
the annuity income is, the longer the pensioner survives. Secondly, Section 9.1.2 suggests that
there exists multiple sub-populations in the scheme based on the (pension) income distribution
analysis.
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Therefore, we can make use of existing income distribution models based on mixture mod-
els (Flachaire and Nunez (2007)(116)) to identify pensioners belonged to their respective sub-
populations by sizes of their annuity incomes (as a proxy of their social-economic characteristics
with absence of other variables), which then links to their respective mortality curves. This
approach is pioneering in comparison to the traditional actuarial approach so far has been
introduced to price longevity risk related instruments. The reason is that, majority of the pric-
ing model assumes homogeneous pension payout, and pensioner bucketing strategy does not
take into account such di erences. Practitioners bucket pensioners into di erent groups due to
their socio-economic characteristics. However, there is no consensus and a scientifically robust
method to do that. Hence, our approach provides evidence that income distribution is a con-
venient method in case all other social-economic characteristics are not available. Please note
that, our approach will be further refined if other social-economic characteristics and medical
history of pensioners are available.
We followed the notation used by Flachaire and Nunez (2007)(116) and set up a mixed popula-
tions model as follows:
We assume that this scheme population can be broken down into k sub-populations whose
incomes (in this case the annuities) are characterized by log-normal distributions with mean µk
and standard deviation ‡k. The density function can be expressed as
f(y) =
Kÿ
k=1
pk · (y; µk, ‡k) (9.1.3)
where ·(⇧;µ, ‡) is the lognormal distribution with mean µ and standardiviation ‡. A point
worth noting is that number of modes used to detect heterogeneity, the number of subpopulations
defined, K, could change over time. Alternatively, a conditional model can be defined as below
by letting the mixing probabilities vary with exogenous individual characteristics:
f(y|X) =
Kÿ
k=1
pk(X) · (y; µk, ‡k) (9.1.4)
where pk(X) is the probability of a pensioner belonging to a homogeneous subpopulation k.
It is assumed that these mixing probabilities depend on a linear index of X. In reality, the
optimal number of subpopulations can be chosen to minimize some criterion, e.g. BIC criterion
by Schwarz (1978) (130).
For a fixed number of components K, we can estimate f(y) by maximum likelihood. An al-
ternative conditional model can be set up as follows according to the intuition of individual
characteristics influence the magnitude of the group-specific pension income µk. Subsequently
the individual characteristics could be used to model the mean of the subpopulations rather
than the probabilities of belonging to a subpopulation. This conditional model is as below:
f(y|X) =
Kÿ
k=1
pk · (y; µk(X), ‡k) (9.1.5)
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where the conditional mean Equation 9.1.5 can be assumed to be linearly dependent on X,
for instance, µk(X) = X—k, and they are used to analyze the intra-group variability, whereas
conditioning probabilities in Equation 9.1.4applies when the research is focused on inter-group
variability.
In our case, if we want to detect inequality in pension incomes among groups such as “high
income group”, “medium income group”, and “low income group”, then Equation 9.1.4 has a
higher potential to provide an answer. If we would like to analyse the income inequality within
each group, then Equation 9.1.5 is more appropriate.
9.1.4. The mixture model
Our objective is to explain the distribution of individuals across groups using the means of the
individual characteristics, similar to regression analysis. We set up the following model as in
Flachaire and Nunez (2007) (116):
Yi = X
c
i — + ‘i (i = 1, 2, , ... ,n) (9.1.6)
where Xci is a centered vector of individual characteristics.— is an l-vector of parameters. ‘i is
i.i.d. random variable which has a normal distribution with mean of 0 and standard deviation
of 1, N (0, 1).
For k = 1, 2, , ...K, we define a dummy variable Z as belows:
Zik =
I
1 if Ui œ [“k≠1, “k ]
0 if Ui /œ [“k≠1, “k ] (9.1.7)
where ≠Œ = “0 < “1 < ... < “K≠1 < “K = +Œ. In our case, we have a few candidates models
with di erent pension income brackets. We will elaborate that in details later.
The vector Zi = (Zi1, Zi2, , ..., Zik) has value of 1 in the ikth entry of the matrix of Zik, and a
value of 0 otherwise.
We assume that given vector Zi, the logarithmic transformation of pension income Yi, yi has a
density function as follows:
f(yi|Zi) =
Kÿ
k=1
ZikÏ(yi; µk, ‡k) (9.1.8)
Where Ï(·; µ, ‡) is the normal distribution density function with mean µ and standard deviation
of ‡.
We follow the identifiability constraint and impose that µ1 < µ2 < ... < µK to avoid the classic
label switching problem mentioned by Redner and Walker (1984).
Z Õis are assumed to be independent and follows a multinomial distribution ofM (1; pik, pi2, ..., piK),
where
pik © E(Zik) = F(“k ≠Xci —)≠F(“k≠1 ≠Xci —) (9.1.9)
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where F(·) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the normal distribution. This means
the probability any pensioner belonging to the k-th group is the probability that a standard
normal variable belongs to a certain interval with bounds depending on the values of that
individual’s characteristics.
Hence, we conclude that the logarithmic transformation ofYi, yi follows the mixture densities as
follows:
f(yi|Xi) =
Kÿ
k=1
pikÏ(yi; µi, ‡k) (9.1.10)
Consequently, if we define µ = (µ1, µ2, ... ,µK), ‡ = (‡1, ‡2, ..., ‡K), “ = (“1, “, ..., “K≠1) and
◊ = (µ, ‡, “, —)’, the log-likelihood function of yi can be written as follows:
ln(◊, y) =
nÿ
i=1
log f(yi|Xi) (9.1.11)
The Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) can be calculated by equating the first derivatives of
the log-likelihood function 9.1.11 to zero, with respect to all the parameters. Since there is no
analytical solution can be found, an iterative algorithm can be used to solve such equation.
9.1.5. Estimation of the optimal mixture model
Since equation 9.1.11 does not necessarily globally concave, with respect to unknown parameters,
iterative algorithm like Newton Raphson method can produce diverging results. Alternatively,
Expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm developed by Dempster et al.(1977) (115) often ex-
hibits slow linear convergence. Since the methodology used in this case is not the focus of this
paper, we choose EM as an implementation example, and our results show consistence and
convergence among most of the age-annuity-year groups. In short, EM algorithm is an itera-
tive method to find maximum likelihood or maximum a posteriori estimates of parameters in
statistical models, where the model depends on unobserved latent variables. The EM iteration
alternates between performing an expectation (E) step and maximization (M) step. This E step
creates a function for the expectation of the log-likelihood evaluated using the current estimate
for the parameters, while the M step following computes parameters maximizing the expected
log-likelihood found on the previous E step. These parameter-estimates are then used to deter-
mine the distribution of the latent variables in the next E step. It continues to reiterate until it
reaches a stable maximum of log-likelihood function.
The full log-likelihood of our model can be written as below:
ln(◊, Z, y) =
nÿ
i=1
Kÿ
k=1
Zik(log Ï(yi; µk, ‡k) + log pik) (9.1.12)
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To maximize the log-likelihood function, we apply the EM method as described above. In
practice, the optimal number of sub-populations is the unknown variable, hence we need to
select the best mixture model based on criterion like Baysian Information Criterion (BIC) by
Schwarz (1978) (130). The BIC of our log-likelihood function can be written as follows:
BIC = ≠2ln(◊ˆ, y) + (3K ≠ 1+ l) log n (9.1.13)
We present the EM and BIC Results as follows:
• Total Scheme Population (males & females): As discussed in 9.1.2, since the pension income distri-
bution in males and females diverge significantly across age-year bucket, it makes sense to run analysis for
sexes separately. Hence, we omit the results for the total populations hereafter.
• Male pensioners: The BIC converges to its minimum value around 4≠ 8 number of components (sub-
populations by pensioners’ annuity amounts) for most age-year groups. The BIC statistics simulation
results can be found in B.0.2 and B.0.3. We visualize the sub-populations and their distributions by EM
algorithm as follows:
– B.0.5 (age 55≠ 59) - BIC not converging at its minimum value. It means the BIC is not stably
decreasing to a minimum value, there may exist several possible numbers of sub-populations that is
viewed as statistical significance. The result of BIC not converging may be due to one or more of the
following reasons: The variable (pension income) probably is not enough to capture the longevity
variation. An alternative explanation would be that this set of pension income and longevity data
does not exhibit the desired statistical property very well. It may also be due to the lower number
of pensioners in this bucket, or size of pension scheme is not large enough.
– B.0.6 (age 60≠ 64), B.0.7 (age 65≠ 69), B.0.8 (age 70≠ 74), B.0.9 (age 75≠ 79), B.0.10 (age 80≠ 84)
- BIC converging at its minimum value.
– B.0.11 (age 85≠ 89), B.0.12 (age 90≠ 94) and B.0.13 (age 95≠ 99) - BIC not converging.
• Female pensioners: Similar to the male pensioners’ cases, the BIC converges to its minimum value
around 4-8 number of components (sub-populations). The BIC simulation results can be found in B.0.4.
We visualize the sub-populations and their distributions with EM algorithm as follows:
– B.0.14 (age 55≠ 59) - BIC not converging at its minimum value.
– B.0.15 (age 60≠ 64), B.0.16 (age 65≠ 69), B.0.17 (age 70≠ 74), B.0.18 (age 75≠ 79), B.0.19 (age
80≠ 84), B.0.20 (age 85≠ 89), B.0.21 (age 90≠ 94) and B.0.22 (age 95≠ 99) - BIC converging at
its minimum value.
We follow the analysis using the groups that have the most significant income distribution pat-
terns and where the BIC is converging to a stable minimum value.
A summary table with key statistics of EM and BIC and the number of sub-populations can
be found in A.0.4, A.0.5
In this paper, we arbitrarily choose the optimal number of sub-populations is 3. In many cases,
the BIC converges to a stable minimum value at a higher number (»3) of optimal number of
sub-populations. However, as the number of sub-populations goes up, the number of pensioners
remain in each sub-population goes down naturally. This gives rise to sampling risk, which
is unfavourable for our analysis. The problem is particularly serious in higher annuity sub-
population groups and old age groups, in which the number of pensioners is very small (only a
dozen of pensioners).
134 Pension Data Analysis
Figure 9.1.1.: Scheme Mortality Experience Comparison v.s. E&W
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Figure 9.1.2.: Histogram and log-log plot of pension annuity of the entire scheme from inception
(1950s) to present (2012)
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Figure 9.1.3.: Pension cash outflow using age-year bucketing strategies based on Cox regression
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Chapter 10
Longevity Swaps
Previous sections examined the granular details on the relationship between annuity sizes and
mortality experiences of the UK pension scheme in our study. We bucketed pensioners in this
UK pension schemes into three sub-populations according to their demographic characteristics
(age-annuity-year). In this section, we are going to study the Marking-to-market, or MTM and
Profit and Loss, or P&L of longevity swaps written to hedge those sub-populations’ longevity
improvements, using the national index (E&W population).
Longevity swap is a form of instrument that ties the cash flows to the survival rates of specific
populations. There are two trading parties involved in the structure of the longevity swaps, the
hedgers and the hedge suppliers. Currently, there is no widely accepted MTM framework on
longevity swaps, the counter-parties of the longevity risk transactions look for reference model
from similar markets, such as insurance swap markets. The details of setup of longevity swaps
can be found in Bi s et al. (2014) (104). We adopted the same notations in Bi s et al. (2014)
(104) for simplicity.
Setup Suppose that the hedgers have obligations to pay a stream of cash flows to the policy
holders, XT1,XT2, ...XTn, which are linked to the actual survival experience of the hedgers’
portfolio. The stream of cash flows also depend on the interest rates and inflation rates. In this
paper, we assume that interest rates and inflation rates are hedged and fixed the interest rate
at 5% flat across the horizon. We define the liability of longevity hedgers at a payment date
T > 0 is given by the random variable (n≠NT )XT , where n refers to the number of lives in
the population at the start of the hedge, and NT refers the number of deaths occurs during the
period [0,T ]. The form of hazard function is unknown, and we assume that death times have
common intensity (µt)tØ0. Thus, the expected number of survivors at time T can be written as
EP [n≠NT ] = npT (10.0.1)
• pT denotes the survival probability of the reference population, denoted as below:
pT = E
P [exp(≠
⁄ T
0
µtdt)] (10.0.2)
• pT can be calculated using Lee-Carter mortality model (see Lee and Carter (1992) (119))
• P denotes the real world probability measure, or the physical probability measure
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In the financial markets, as previous academic literature has suggested, it is commonly believed
asset pricing follows a risk-neutral pricing probability measure (denoted by P˜) rather than the
real world probability measure, or the physical probability (denoted by P). Hence the expected
market value of the aggregate liability of a pension plan or annuity provider that has the survival
probability pT can be expressed as follows (without making assumption on the pricing measure
for now):
EP˜
Cÿ
i
exp
A
≠
⁄ Ti
0
rtdt
B
(n≠NTi )XTi
D
= n
ÿ
i
EP˜
C
exp
A
≠
⁄ Ti
0
(rt + µt)dt
B
XTi
D
(10.0.3)
As illustrated in previous sections, there are two types of longevity securities available for the
hedgers to choose, the customised longevity swaps and the index-based ones. One point worth
noting is that in longevity swaps, the fixed rate refers to a swap curve, which represents the
best estimated survival rates across the hedging horizon, rather than one single (fixed) rate as
in interest swaps. At each point of the longevity swap curve, the survival rate is pertained to
its respective individual payment date.
In the customised longevity swap case, the hedger pays a fixed survival rate (a series of
swap rates), p¯N œ (0, 1) against the realized (floating) survival rate experienced by the hedged
population during T (0 < T < 1). The net cash flow to the hedger at time T is
n(
n≠NT
n
≠ p¯N ) (10.0.4)
Hence the market value at inception of the longevity swap can be expressed as follows:
S0 = nE
P˜
C
exp
A
≠
⁄ T
0
rtdt
B1
n≠NT
n
≠ p¯N
2D
= nEP˜
C
exp
A
≠
⁄ T
0
(rt + µt)dt
BD
≠ nB(0,T )p¯N (10.0.5)
where B(0,T ) denotes the present value of a zero coupon bond with a maturity of T years.
By the definition of swap rate, the swaps are priced at time 0 at the inception using the fair
priced swap rate. Setting S0 = 0 , the swap rate (curve) can be calculated as follows:
p¯N = p˜T +B(0,T )≠1CovP˜
A
exp
A
≠
⁄ T
0
rtdt), exp
A
≠
⁄ T
0
µtdt
BB
(10.0.6)
P˜t refers to the risk adjusted survival probability as defined in equation 10.0.2, with the expec-
tations under risk-neutral pricing measure P˜.
The structure of index-based longevity swaps are very similar to the bespoke ones. In the
indexed longevity swap case, the hedger needs to pay a fixed rate that is linked to a specific
index1, denoted by p¯I œ (0, 1), against the actual survival experience of the index population.
1examples are the HMD, Lifemetrics developed by JP Morgan or the Life expectation index developed by
Deutsche Borse
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Assuming the reference population has mortality intensity denoted as µIt tÆ0, the survival prob-
ability of the index population can be expressed as It = exp(≠
s t
0 µ
I
sds). The fixed swap curve,
P¯ I can be denoted as in equation 10.0.6, replacing µ and P˜T , with µI and P˜ IT , respectively.
10.1. MTM and P&L of Longevity Swaps
Generally speaking, in the case of customised/bespoke longevity hedge, where basis risk is not
present, at each payment date, the di erence between the pre-set mortality rate and the esti-
mated mortality rate using the most recent mortality data reflects the cash inflow or outflow
for the hedger. This is also called pure "cashflow" hedge. Though these customised hedges can
provide perfect hedge to the hedgers, in abnormal financial market conditions or in the case
when mortality improvement trend shifts significantly in direction and magnitude, the hedge
e ectiveness of such instruments could be dampened. Bi s et al. (2014) (104) illustrate some
numerical examples of the MTM and P&L e ects of a bespoke longevity hedge on a hypothet-
ical population based on the English and Wales males aged 65 years at the year 1980, with a
maturity of 25 years, assuming the interest rate is hedged away through interest rate swaps, flat
at 5% annually. The figures are included in Appendix B.0.1 on page 166. The market value at
time t of a customised longevity swap in a longevity hedger’s view can be expressed as below:
St = nE
P˜
t
C
exp
A
≠
⁄ T
t
rsds
BA
n≠Nt
n
exp
A
≠
⁄ T
t
µsds
BBD
≠ nB(t,T )p¯N (10.1.1)
with nEP˜t
Ë
exp
1
≠ s Tt rsds2 1n≠Ntn exp 1≠ s Tt µsds22È representing the floating rate payments
from the hedge suppliers to the hedger at time evaluated at time t, and nB(t,T )p¯N representing
the fixed swap curve linked to payments from the hedger to hedge supplier. EPt [ú] represents
the conditional expectation under risk-neutral pricing measure P, given all information available
at time t. B(t,T ) represents the market value of a zero-coupon bond with time-to-maturity of
T ≠ t. The MTM process for indexed longevity swap is similar to customised ones, simply
replacing µ and P˜T , with µI and P˜ IT , respectively.
10.2. Index-based longevity swaps on UK pension scheme
In this paper, we are going to use the granular real world pension data to set up the MTM and
P&L results of the index-based longevity swaps. We set up the index-based longevity swaps as
below:
• The reference population is the national population, English and Welsh populations, males and females,
respectively.
• The hedged population is the male pensioners and females pensioners in the UK pension scheme.
• For male and female pensioners, we divided them into groups according to the EM and BIC results, and
the age band is 5 years. For instance, age 65≠ 69, age 70≠ 74, age 75≠ 79, age 80≠ 84. We are focusing
on these four most populated age groups there are four age groups for both males and females.
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Table 10.2.1.: Detail example statistics: Female pensioners Group I age 65≠ 69, pension amount
£0-£1,700
Years 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
E&W female m65≠69, t 0.01215 0.01206 0.01147 0.01131 0.01108 0.01055
Female pensioners m65≠69, t,G1 0.0042 0.0018 0.0024 0.0065 0.0092 0.0026
• Both male pensioners and female pensioners can be divided into three pension annuity groups accordingly to
the EM and BIC results. 2. We denote these three annuity groups as High-income (H),Middle-income
(M) and Low-income (L), respectively.
Female pensioners can be divided into the following three pension annuity groups. The pension
annuity is modeled as a log-normal distribution:
• Group 1Low-income (L) : £0≠£1, 700, n = 9, 982. with µ = 844, ‡ = 381
• Group 2 Middle-income (M): £1, 700≠£6, 800. n = 5, 489. µ = 2, 884, ‡ = 1, 781
• Group 3 High-income (H): £6, 800≠£117, 500(max). n = 608. µ = 12, 856, ‡ = 14, 284
10.2.1. MTM and P&L Main Results
10.2.1.1. Detailed Example I Female pensioners G1 (£0-£1,700), aged 65≠ 69
Hedging Female Pensioners Group 1 aged 65-69 (FP G1 (£0-£1,700), aged 65-69) using national
female population, see mortality experience comparision between the national E&W female
population and female pensioners, age 65-69, with di erent bench marks at hedge ratios h1 =
0.3939, and h2 = 0.2318 in 10.2.2.
• The average hedge ratio (denoted as ”) is calculated as the average fraction of mortaltiy rate of the
female pensions and the national female population as in 10.2.1 and 10.2.2. The hedge ratio is denoted
by h1 = 0.3939. This means on average of the research period 2004≠ 2009, the female pensioners (aged
65≠ 69, in G1)’ mortality is around 39% of the national female population.
• We also calculated the hedge ration h2 = 0.2318 using solver to minimize the standard deviation of the
MTM results across the hedgin horizon.
• We hedge the pension annuity portfolio of female pensioners age 65≠ 69 in Group 1, using a portfolio of 6
q-forwards (See LLMA (2010) (122)) based on the national index of female pensioners aged 65≠ 69.
• The hedge horizon for the pension fund is 6 years, from 2004 to 2009.
• The inception date of 6 q-forwards is the end of year 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008.
• The notional amount is the mean of the pension annuities viewed as a normal distribution, which is £844,
with standard deviation of £381. The number of contract is the number of the pensioners in this group
and age band, which is 9, 982.
• Our hedging portfolio include the following 6 components ( Illustrative diagram as in 10.2.1):
2In some cases of the less populated age groups, the BIC does not converge. The BIC converges and reaches
minimum around 6 components (sub-populations) in most cases. However, in this case, the number of pen-
sioners in each sub-population is relatively small, in some cases only a dozen of lives. This would give rise
to unwanted sampling risk rather than basis risk. Hence we would like to keep the optimal number of the
sub-populations as 3 as an example. We will leave this issue to further research
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Figure 10.2.1.: Hedging Portfolio Design: Female Pensioners age 65-69, G1
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– 1 Q-forward with inception date at the end of year 2003, and maturity of 1 year (terminates at the
end of year 2004). The forward rate is qˆ65≠69, 20043.
– 1 Q-forward with inception date at the end of year 2004, and maturity of 1 year (terminates at the
end of 2005). The forward rate is qˆ65≠69, 20054.
– 1 Q-forward with inception date at the end of year 2005, and maturity of 1 year, (terminates at the
end of 2006). The forward rate is qˆ65≠69, 2006
– 1 Q-forward with inception date at the end of year 2006, and maturity of 1 year (terminates at the
end of 2007). The forward rate is qˆ65≠69, 2007
– 1 Q-forward with inception date at the end of year 2006, and maturity of 1 year (terminates at the
end of 2008). The forward rate is qˆ65≠69, 2008
– 1 Q-forward with inception date at the end of year 2007, and maturity of 1 year (terminates at the
end of 2009). The forward rate is qˆ65≠69, 2009
• The MTM and P&L results are illustrated in 10.2.3
3The notation qˆ refers to the best estimate of mortality rate of age 65≠ 69, at the end of year 2004, using
historical mortality experience data. In our case, we use 1961 ≠ 2003 as our sample period for mortality
projection. We project mortality rates using standard classic Lee-Carter (1992) (119) mortality model. The
MTM and P&L results may be di erent depending on the mortality models adopted. We are not claiming
Lee-Carter model is the best model here. However, this is not the focus of our paper.
4Similar to qˆ65≠69, 2004, we estimate qˆ65≠69, 2005 using historial mortailty experience data from 1961≠ 2004.
Alternatively, rolling window sample period 1962≠ 2004 can be used
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Figure 10.2.2.: E&W and Female Pensioners Group 1, age 65-69, hedge ratios h1 and h2
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10.2.1.2. Detailed Example II Male & Female pensioners (Moving Average Hedge Ratio
cases)
In this section, we showcase some examples of male age-pension-year groups hedging results
using a index-linked longevity instrument. We choose the pensioners groups that are e ective.
By saying e ective, we mean that based on all selection criteria as follows:
• By applying EM algorithm, the Gaussian Mixture models divided pensioners into their respective sub-
populations, so that the BIC converges to a minimum in the simulation exercises (Refer to A.0.4 for BIC
convergence results).
• Each sub-populations within the age-pension-year group are well populated, with no less than 30 pensioners
(Refer to A.0.4 for details). This makes sure that our analysis is valid, with no sampling risk due to sample
size too small.
The age groups that meet these above criteria for male pensioners are age 70-74, age 75-79, and
age 80-84. The set-up of the index-based longevity instrument are designed as follows:
• Use Lee-Carter (1992) (119) as a benchmark model for mortality rate projections for the E&W national
population (index)
– Use 1961-2003 as a starting in-sample to project the mortality rate in year 2004, index2004,LC
– Use 1961-2004 as in-sample to project the mortality rate in year 2005, ...
– ...
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Figure 10.2.3.: Female Pensioners Group 1 age 65-69, Short q-forwards MTM, P&L, and Cash-
flow mismatch of q-forwards, hedge ratios
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– Use 1961-2008 as in-sample to project mortality rate in year 2009
• Use EM algorithm to divide pensioners according their respective sub-populations (sub-pop1 - Low-income;
sub-pop 2 - Middle-income; sub-pop 3 - High-income).
• Calculate the mortality experience (Mortality Rate, MR hereafter) during 2004≠ 2009 for sub-populations
• Calculate the Hedge Ratios (HR) using a simple Moving Average(MA(2)) Process such that
– MAHRpop(i),2006 = Avg[
MRpop(i), y2004
index2004
, MRpop(i), y2005index2005 ]◊ index2006,LC
– MAHRpop(i),2007 = Avg[
MRpop(i), y2005
index2006
, MRpop(i), y2006index2006 ]◊ index2007,LC
– ...
– MAHRpop(i),2009 = Avg[
MRpop(i), y2007
index2007
, MRpop(i), y2008index2008 ]◊ index2009,LC
• Then calculate the MTM and P&L using the index ◊MAHR to hedge the respective sub-population
mortality experiences (Results in Figures 10.2.8, 10.2.9 10.2.10 10.2.7 etc...)
• The portfolio consists of the following q-forwards
– 1-year Q-forward inception in 2004, does not exchange cashflow in 2005 because we do not have the
date to calculate the MAHR in 2005.
– 2-year Q-forward inception in 2004, exchange cashflow in 2006, the projected mortality rate is
MAHRpop(i),2006, and the realized mortality rate is the sub-populations’ actual mortality experience
in 2006
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– 3-year Q-forward inception in 2004, exchange cashflow in 2007, the projected mortality rate is
MAHRpop(i),2007, and the realized mortality rate is the sub-populations’ actual mortality experience
in 2007
– 4-year Q-forward inception in 2004, exchange cashflow in 2008, the projected mortality rate is
MAHRpop(i),2008, and the realized mortality rate is the sub-populations’ actual mortality experience
in 2008
– 5-year Q-forward inception in 2004, exchange cashflow in 2009, the projected mortality rate is
MAHRpop(i),2009, and the realized mortality rate is the sub-populations’ actual mortality experience
in 2009
Figure 10.2.4.: Male Pensioners age 70-74 index-linked security MTM, P&L, hedge ratios
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Figure 10.2.5.: Male Pensioners age 75-79 index-linked security MTM, P&L, hedge ratios
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Figure 10.2.6.: Male Pensioners age 80-84 index-linked security MTM, P&L, hedge ratios
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Figure 10.2.7.: Female Pensioners age 65-69 index-linked security MTM, P&L, hedge ratios
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Figure 10.2.8.: Female Pensioners age 70-74 index-linked security MTM, P&L, hedge ratios
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Figure 10.2.9.: Female Pensioners age 75-79 index-linked security MTM, P&L, hedge ratios
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Figure 10.2.10.: Female Pensioners age 80-84 index-linked security MTM, P&L, hedge ratios
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Figure 10.2.11.: Female Pensioners age 85-89 index-linked security MTM, P&L, hedge ratios
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Figure 10.2.12.: Female Pensioners age 90-94 index-linked security MTM, P&L, hedge ratios
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10.2.1.3. Detailed examples: Male pensioners (Quadratic Hedging)
In this section, we implement a hedging strategy based on Bi s et al. (2014) (104) example 4.2
on page 19. We summarize the hedging strategy as below:
• Considering the pension scheme is facing a time-T liability arising from a portfolio of pure
endowments issued to m individuals with common-G-predictable intensity of mortality µ.
• Denote Hedging portfolio as HT œ FT Let HT = Smi=11·if(P 1T ), with f(·) a bounded
positive function
• Consider a self-financing strategy ﬁ = (ﬁ1,ﬁ2)Õ where ﬁjt denotes the amount of wealth
invested in asset P j at time t in the class of square-integrable, F-predictable process solving
the optimization problem
minﬁE[(HT ≠Xx,ﬁT )2] (10.2.1)
• Xx,ﬁ is the wealth process associated with the investment strategy ﬁ starting from a given
initial wealth level x > 0
In our example, as a common first step, we use Lee-Carter (119) model to estimate E&W
mortality experiences from year 2004 to 2009. Note that the in-sample period is expanding as
in the previous section5. Taking the age-band 65≠ 69 as an example, the hedge portfolio XT
consists of the following 6 instrument:
• 1-year maturity q-forward, with inception at the end of year 2003, matures at the end of
year 2004, denoted by qi65≠69,2003≠2004, where i denotes the pension income group (High-
income, middle-income and low-income)
• 2-year maturity q-forward, with inception at the end of year 2003, matures at the end of
year 2005, denoted by qi65≠69,2003≠2005,
• 3-year maturity q-forward, with inception at the end of year 2003, matures at the end of
year 2006, denoted by qi65≠69,2003≠2006,
• 4-year maturity q-forward, with inception at the end of year 2003, matures at the end of
year 2007, denoted by qi65≠69,2003≠2007,
• 5-year maturity q-forward, with inception at the end of year 2003, matures at the end of
year 2008, denoted by qi65≠69,2003≠2008,
• 6-year maturity q-forward, with inception at the end of year 2003, matures at the end of
year 2009, denoted by qi65≠69,2003≠2009,
The results are as follows:
5Using 1961≠ 2003 year’s data to predict year 2004’s mortality rate, using year 1961≠ 2004’s data to predict
year 2005’s data, ... etc
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Figure 10.2.13.: Male Pensioners age 70-74 index-linked security MTM, P&L, quadratic hedging
ratios
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Figure 10.2.14.: Male Pensioners age 75-79 index-linked security MTM, P&L, quadratic hedging
ratios
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Figure 10.2.15.: Male Pensioners age 80-84 index-linked security MTM, P&L, quadratic hedging
ratios
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Figure 10.2.16.: Male Pensioners age 85-89 index-linked security MTM, P&L, quadratic hedging
ratios
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
3 subpop (EM) v.s. EW Males, age 85−89, Quadratic Hedging min mismatch HT & LT
 
 m85−89, Pop1, Males
m85−89, Pop2
m85−89, Pop3
m85−89, E&W, Males
LC expand reg projection
QH1 Hedge Curve
QH2 Hedge Curve
QH3 Hedge Curve
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
MTM v.s. Avg & Act P&L, Male age 85−89, Quadratic, LC exp
 
 MTM Male 85−89 Pop1
MTM Male 85−89 Pop2
MTM Male 85−89 Pop3
Average P&L Pop1
Average P&L Pop2
Average P&L Pop3
Actual P&L Pop1
Actual P&L Pop2
Actual P&L Pop3
158 Longevity Swaps
Figure 10.2.17.: Male Pensioners age 90-94 index-linked security MTM, P&L, quadratic hedging
ratios
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Conclusion
The paper is the first to use a scientifically robust methodology to analyze pensioner’s income
(and potential other socio-economic variables) and longevity improvements. In real business
world, pension fund or annuity providers, and/or longevity hedge providers may have more
information on pensioner’ socioeconomics status, e.g. post-code, home value, real asset and
financial assets, or tax return information, medical history, health status. These variables all
contribute to the pensioners’ mortality/longevity experiences. The Expectation Maximization
methods allow multiple variables as inputs. These are going to improve the estimation. However,
using only one variable, pensioner’ income, our paper is able to derive three (or more) clear sub-
populations that have varying levels (high, middle and low) of mortality experience curves.
Adopting this pensioner bucketing strategy, the hedger and hedger providers are both better o 
using index-based longevity swaps, due to their cost-e ectiveness. Cashflow can be measured
precisely across the hedging horizon, assuming various hedging strategies. For majority of the
cases analyzed in this study, MTM is mostly positive across the hedging horizon, while PL may
be positive or negative. This is because we use Lee-Carter (119) as baseline projecting model, it
is known to underestimate longevity risk, especially for the very old ages. This is the situation
many pension funds are facing at the UK now. The Figures in Bi s et al. (2014) (104) (Figure
B.0.1 on 166) have similar patterns to the findings of this paper. The di erence is time scale.
As the swap in Bi s et al. (2014) (104) is of longer time horizon, the cash flow mismatch and
hence MTM and PL can be more pronounced. This is the case with potential longevity deals as
pension fund cares about long-term impacts on their portfolio and balance sheet.
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Appendix A
Tables
Date Fund\Hedger Hedge Provider Approx size Solution
1. Nov 2016 Canadian Bank Canada Life $35M Longevity swap
Note Company, Ltd Assurance & reinsurance
2. Nov 2016 AXA France RGA Re e1.3B Longevity swap
& reinsurance
3. Oct 2016 Unnamed DB Zurich / Pacific Life Re £50M Longevity swap
pension scheme & reinsurance
4. Aug 2016 Two Pirelli Zurich / Pacific Life Re £600M Longevity swap
pension plans
5. Aug 2016 Manweb Abbey Life £1B Longevity swap
(ScottishPower)
6. Jun 2016 Pension Insurance Prudential Insurance £1.1B Longevity
Corp. Company of America reinsurance
7. Apr 2016 Legal & General Prudential ? Longevity
reinsurance
8. Dec 2015 Unnamed UK Zurich / Pacific Life Re £90M Longevity swap
pension plan & reinsurance
9. Nov 2015 RAC (2003) SCOR SE £900M Longevity swap
pension scheme & reinsurance
10. Nov 2015 Philips UK Pension Insurance £2.4B Buyout & Longevity
pension fund Corp. & Hannover Re & reinsurance
11. Sep 2015 Scottish & Newcastle Friends Life £2.4B Longevity swap
pension fund (plus Swiss Re) & reinsurance
12. Aug 2015 Legal & General Prudential £2.9B Longevity
reinsurance
13. Jul 2015 Aegon Canada Life e6B Longevity swap
Re & reinsurance
14. Jul 2015 AXA UK RGA Re £2.8B Longevity swap
Pension Scheme
15. Jun 2015 Pension Insurance Prudential Insurance £1.6B Longevity
Corp. Company of America reinsurance
16. Jun 2015 Delta Lloyd RGA Re e12B Index-based
Longevity swap
Table A.0.1.: Longevity Market Deals 2008 - 2016(1) - continued on next page. Deals highlighted
in red are index-based longevity swaps. Cyan ones are longevity solution structured to target
capital market investors. Blue one is the first longevity deal originated in North America.
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Tables 161
Date Fund\Hedger Hedge Provider Approx size Solution
17. Apr 2015 Pension Insurance Prudential Insurance ? Longevity
Corp. Company of America reinsurance
18. Mar 2015 Bell Canada Pension Sun Life Financial Inc. CAD$5B Longevity swap
Plan (BCE Inc.) (plus SCOR & RGA Re) & reinsurance
19. Feb 2015 ScottishPower Abbey Life £2B Longevity swap
20. Jan 2015 Rothesay Life Prudential $450M Longevity reinsurance
21. Jan 2015 MNOPF Pacific Life Re £1.5B Longevity swap & reinsurance
via incorporated cell
22. Dec 2014 Rothesay Life Pacific Life Re £1B Longevity reinsurance
23. Oct 2014 Legal & General Prudential £2.2B Longevity reinsurance
24. Aug 2014 Delta Lloyd RGA Re e12B Index-based
longevity swap
25. Aug 2014 Phoenix Group Phoenix Life £900M Longevity swap with
simultaneous quota share
26. Aug 2014 Rothesay Life Prudential £1B($1.7B) Longevity reinsurance
transaction
27. Aug 2014 AXA France Hannover Re e750M Longevity swap
28. Jul 2014 BT Pension Scheme Prudential Insurance £16B Pensioner bespoke
Company of America longevity swap
29. Jun 2014 Total UK Pension Insurance £16B Buy-in and longevity
pension plan Corporation/Hannover Re reinsurance transaction
30. May 2014 Royal London RGA International £1B Longevity reinsurance
Reinsurance Co. transaction
31. Mar 2014 AkzoNobel Legal & General £3.6B Buy-in, bulk annuity and
/Prudential longevity reinsurance
32. Mar 2014 Aviva Swiss Re / Munich Re £5B Pensioner bespoke
/SCOR longevity swap
33. Dec 2013 BAE Systems Legal & General £1.7B Pensioner bespoke
/SCOR longevity swap
34. Dec 2013 Astra Zeneca Deutsche Bank & Abbey Life £2.5B Pensioner bespoke
longevity swap
35. Dec 2013 Carillion Deutsche Bank & Abbey Life £1B Pensioner bespoke
longevity swap
36. Dec 2013 Aegon Société Générale CIB eEuro1.4B Longevity swap to capital
/ SCOR market investors & reinsurers
37. Nov 2013 Pension Insurance Reinsurers £1.4B Longevity reinsurance
Corp.
38. Oct 2013 Philips Pension Rothesay Life £0.484B Pension insurance
Fund including longevity risk
39. Aug 2013 Cobham plc Rothesay Life £280M Bulk annuity and
longevity insurance
40. Jul 2013 EMI Group Pension Insurance £1.5B Buy-out of all liabilities
Pension Fund Corp. including longevity risk
41. Jun 2013 Canadian Wheat Sun Life Assurance $150M Annuity buy-in and
Board Company of Canada Asset Transfer
42. Jun 2013 Bentley Deutsche Bank £0.4B Annuity buy-in and
/Abbey Life Asset Transfer
43. Apr 2013 Abbey Life Hannover Re £1B Longevity reinsurance
/Rothesay Life
44. Feb 2013 BAE Systems Legal & General £3.2B Pensioner bespoke
/Hannover Re longevity swap
45. Dec 2012 LV Swiss Re £0.8B Pensioner and all members
over 55 longevity swap
46. Dec 2012 Pension Insurance Munich Re £0.4B Longevity reinsurance
Corp. transaction
47. Oct 2012 Verizon Prudential £7B Pension liability
buy-out
48. Jul 2012 Pension Insurance Munich Re £0.3B Longevity reinsurance
Corp. transcation
49. Jun 2012 General Motors Prudential $26B Pension liability
Corp. buy-out
50. May 2012 AkzoNobel Swiss Re £.1.4B Pension bespoke
Corp. longevity swap
Table A.0.2.: Longevity Market Deals 2008 - 2016(2) - continued on next page. Deals highlighted
in red are index-based longevity swaps. Cyan ones are longevity solution structured to target
capital market investors. Blue one is the first longevity deal originated in North America.
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Date Fund\Hedger Hedge Provider Approx size Solution
51. Apr 2012 Berkshire Council Swiss Re £100M Pensioner bespoke
longevity swap
52. Feb 2012 Aegon Deutsche Bank eEuro 12B Capital Markets
longevity swap
53. Dec 2011 Pilkington Legal & General £1B Pensioner bespoke
Hannover Re longevity swap
54. Dec 2011 British Airways Goldman Sachs £1.3B Pensioner bespoke
/Rothesay Life longevity swap
55. Nov 2011 Rolls-Royce Deutsche Bank £3Bn Pensioner bespoke
longevity swap
56. Aug 2011 ITV Credit Suisse £1.7Bn Pensioner bespoke
longevity swap
57. Feb 2011 Pall J P Morgan £0.1B Non-pensioners index-
based longevity hedge
58. Jul 2010 British Airways Goldman Sachs £1.3B Synthetic buy-in
/Rothesay Life (longevity swap
plus asset swap)
59. Feb 2010 BMW Abbey Life £3B Pensioner bespoke
/Deutsche Bank longevity swap
60. Dec 2009 Royal Berkshire Swiss Re £1B Pensioner bespoke
longevity swap
61. Jul 2009 RSA Insurance Goldman Sachs £1.9B Synthetic buy-in
/ Rothesay Life (longevity swap
plus asset swap)
62. May 2009 Babcock Credit Suisse £0.5B Pensioner bespoke
longevity swap (three schemes)
63. Sep 2008 Canada Life JP Morgan £0.5B Pensioner bespoke
UK arm longevity swap
64. Feb 2008 Lucida JP Morgan ? Index-based
longevity swap
Table A.0.3.: Longevity Market Deals 2008 - 2016(3). Deals highlighted in red are index-based
longevity swaps. Cyan ones are longevity solution structured to target capital market investors.
Blue one is the first longevity deal originated in North America.
Table A.0.4.: Key Statistics for Gaussian Mixture Model Selection, Male pensioners, k=3
k=3 M, age 55-59 M, age 60-64 M, age 65-69 M, age 70-74 M, age 75-79
logllh
Low-income range G1 £0-3,300 £0-9,700 £0-13,000 £0-2,100 £0-2,000
Medium-income range G2 £3,300-18,000 £9,700-22,000 £13,000-22,000 £2,100-13,500 £2,000-11,000
High-income range G3 £18,000+ £22,000+ £22,000+ £13,500+ £11,000+
w1 0.26 0.36 0.37 0.31 0.36
w2 0.68 0.60 0.59 0.6 0.56
w3 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08
µ1 £1, 585 £1, 314 £1, 169 £987 £1, 024
µ2 £7, 400 £7, 865 £6, 855 £4, 992 £4, 234
µ3 £26, 645 £30, 601 £29, 948 £20, 612 £18, 512
‡1 £981 £911 £751 £510 £546
‡2 £3, 727 £4, 291 £4, 082 £2, 758 £2, 233
‡3 £19, 723 £24, 518 £29, 467 £20, 286 £16, 436
BIC Converge (Yes) v.s. (No) No No No Yes Yes
Tables 163
k=3 M, age 80-84 M, age 85-89 M, age 90-94 M, age 95-99
logllh
Low-income range G1 £0-2,500 £0-2,500 £0-2,500 £0-1,900
Medium-income range G2 £2,500-11,000 £2,500-10,600 £2,500-11,500 £1,900-8,500
High-income range G3 £11,000+ £10,600+ £11,500+ £8,500+
w1 0.50 0.60 0.68 0.66
w2 0.45 0.36 0.29 0.30
w3 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04
µ1 £1, 179 £1, 185 £1, 177 £983
µ2 £4, 195 £4, 279 £5, 033 £4, 855
µ3 £19, 310 £18, 455 £21, 779 £19, 985
‡1 £688 £745 £818 £709
‡2 £2, 238 £2, 308 £2, 746 £2, 608
‡3 £18, 463 £15, 578 £18, 761 £13, 401
BIC Converge (Yes) v.s. (No) Yes No No No
Table A.0.5.: Key Statistics for Gaussian Mixture Model Selection, Female (denoted by F in the
table) pensioners, k=3
k=3 F, age 55-59 F, age 60-64 F, age 65-69 F, age 70-74 F, age 75-79
logllh
Low-income range G1 £ £0-1,900 £0-1,500 £0-1,700 £0-1,400
Medium-income range G2 £ £1,900-10,000 £1,500-8,900 £1,700-7,400 £1,400-6,000
High-income range G3 £ £10,000+ £8,900+ £7,400+ £6,000+
w1 0.56 0.53 0.46 0.46 0.50
w2 0.41 0.43 0.48 0.49 0.45
w3 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05
µ1 £849 £855 £1, 169 £987 £1, 024
µ2 £3, 919 £3, 783 £6, 855 £4, 992 £4, 234
µ3 £20, 375 £19, 882 £29, 948 £20, 612 £18, 512
‡1 £532 £496 £378 £357 £369
‡2 £2, 138 £2, 151 £1, 693 £1, 431 £1, 255
‡3 £20, 305 £20, 046 £13, 870 £10, 547 £8, 727
BIC Converge (No) v.s. (Yes) No Yes Yes Yes Yes
164 Tables
k=3 F, age 80-84 F, age 85-89 F, age 90-94 F, age 95-99
logllh
Low-income range G1 £0-1,600 £0-1,700 £0-1,700 £0-1,900
Medium-income range G2 £1,600-7,000 £1,700-6,700 £1,700-6,500 £1,900-7,300
High-income range G3 £7,000+ £6,700+ £6,500+ £7,300+
w1 0.59 0.60 0.68 0.66
w2 0.36 0.36 0.29 0.30
w3 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04
µ1 £845 £1, 185 £1, 177 £983
µ2 £2, 610 £4, 279 £5, 033 £4, 855
µ3 £11, 526 £18, 455 £21, 779 £19, 985
‡1 £402 £393 £396 £452
‡2 £1, 290 £1, 344 £1, 355 £1, 460
‡3 £9, 250 £9, 132 £8, 147 £12, 203
BIC Converge (Yes) v.s. (No) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Appendix B
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166 Figures
Figure B.0.1.: MTM P&L customized Longevity swap written on National Population [adapted
from Bi s et al (2014) (104)]
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Figure B.0.2.: Male panel, 2004-2009, 1D extended k
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168 Figures
Figure B.0.3.: Male panel, 2004-2009, 1D extended k
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Figure B.0.4.: Female Panel, 2004-2009, 1D pension amount
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170 Figures
Figure B.0.5.: Male Panel, 2004-2009, age 55-59, k=3
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Figure B.0.6.: Male Panel, 2004-2009, age 60-64, k=3
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Figure B.0.7.: Male Panel, 2004-2009, 65-69, k = 3
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Figure B.0.8.: Male Panel, 2004-2009, 70-74, k=3
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Figure B.0.9.: Male panel, 2004-2009, 75-79. k=3
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Figure B.0.10.: Male panel, 2004-2009, 80-84. k=8
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172 Figures
Figure B.0.11.: Male panel, 2004-2009, 85-89 k = 3
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Figure B.0.12.: Male panel, 2004-2009, 90-94 k = 3
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Figure B.0.13.: Male panel, 2004-2009, 95-99, k=3
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Figure B.0.14.: Female panel, 2004-2009, 55-59, k=3
−8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
x 104
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
x 10−4
X
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y d
en
sit
y
Gaussian mixture models EM (k=3) 1D Age 55−59, 2004−2009
µ1 =20374.5655
µ2 =3919.8039
µ3 =849.3262
σ1 =20304.8804
σ2 =2138.4415
σ3 =532.4379
W1 =0.035032
W2 =0.40686
W3 =0.55811
llh =−45553.8128
BIC1 = 91170.4379
BIC2 = 91130.4009
−6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10
x 104
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Pension Amount
Ag
e 
at
 re
tir
em
en
t/a
ge
 st
ar
tin
g 
to
 re
ce
ive
 p
en
sio
n
Gaussian mixture models EM (k=3) 2D Age 55−59, 2004−2009
Figure B.0.15.: Female panel, 2004-2009, 60-64, k=3
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Figure B.0.16.: Female panel, 2004-2009, 65-69, k=3
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174 Figures
Figure B.0.17.: Female panel, 2004-2009, 70-74, k=3
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Figure B.0.18.: Female panel, 2004-2009, age 75-79, k=3
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Figure B.0.19.: Female panel, 2004-2009, age 80-84, k=3
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Figures 175
Figure B.0.20.: Female panel, 2004-2009, age 85-89, k = 3
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
x 104
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
x 10−4
X
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y d
en
sit
y
Gaussian mixture models EM (k=3) 1D Age 85−89, 2004−2009
µ1 =11471.1166
µ2 =2705.5693
µ3 =836.2155
σ1 =9132.026
σ2 =1344.4231
σ3 =393.4028
W1 =0.042632
W2 =0.32601
W3 =0.63135
llh =−154746.2561
BIC1 = 309569.7083
BIC2 = 309520.0821
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
x 104
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Pension Amount
Ag
e 
at
 re
tir
em
en
t/a
ge
 st
ar
tin
g 
to
 re
ce
ive
 p
en
sio
n
Gaussian mixture models EM (k=3) 2D Age 85−89, 2004−2009
Figure B.0.21.: Female panel, 2004-2009, 90-94, k=3
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Figure B.0.22.: Female panel, 2004-2009, age 95-99, k=3
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Thesis Conclusion
This thesis is composed of three parts, each of which studies an aspect of EVT used in finance
area. In particular, the phenomena of heavy-tailedness in several distributions examined in this
thesis has shaped our understanding of the respective matters.
Part I studies an interbank network of an advanced emerging economy. It provides heavy-
tailedness evidence of network structure, as opposed to early pioneer researchers’ poisson-
distributed network distribution assumed in social or biological network studies by Erdos and
Rényi (1959). This is important because the structure of network have potential impacts on its
(in)stability. Heavy-tailedness in network structure means nodes (financial institutions) in the
network have asymmetric trading relationship with their neighbours. This is similar to advanced
economy of Austria and another emerging economy, Brazil. Some nodes are better connected
than other ones. Those in the "core" are mainly composed of domestic banks, and the ones at
the peripheral are mainly composed of foreign banks. This so-called preference attachment may
cause new banks enter into the market to connect to the already well connected banks.
The paper also examines whether TBTF is related to TICTF. This is done by a simple regression
by linking the size of institutions and its importance measured by centrality. Results show bigger
institutes are more central than smaller ones. However, there are exceptions: The smaller but
well connected banks should be paid attention to, from a regulatory point of view. TBTF has
its merits.
The paper shows interconnectedness risk in the real world could be a major source to conta-
gion among financial institutions, which may cause further contagion to other sectors and real
economy. It simulates default events led by ideosyncratic risks of each institute in this network,
using a pre-defined sequential default mechanism. Results show that credit risk is not a major
source of contagion, while second round e ect, such as fire sale loss and liquidity problem seem
to contribute more.
Limitation: This paper has limited period of data, hence calibration of the default mechanism
using real world data becomes di cult. In may require further sensitivity analysis to test how
the model results change in respect to the varying parameters. On the other hand, using public
data set may gives alternative estimation of such parameters.
Part II studies Spanish household income inequality and a (proxy) elasticity measure of con-
sumption of various goods in the decade of 2001-2011. The paper estimates both the lower and
upper tails of the income distribution, and found that in 2005, the poorer households are getting
poorer, with their incomes diverge, while in the long-term, the income of the poorer households
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converge. The richest households behave opposite in their income. In 2005, the richest families
get richer [only mildly as the tail index of – only increases slightly], while in the long term, their
incomes are diverging.
These trends in income inequality of both tails have asymmetric impacts on the respective house-
holds’ consumption behaviour on various goods. The goods with shortest useful lives (food) is
most responsive to lower tail movement, with its’ coe cient to household income dropped sig-
nificantly from 0.0211 to 0.0097, in 2001 and 2005, respectively. While other non-durable goods
respond one period later, as its’ useful lives are normally longer.
Durable goods such as vehicles, have varying coe cients with household incomes. It first de-
creases from 0.0292 to 0.0028, from 2001 to 2005, respectively. Then it increases to 0.0176 in
2008, then decreases again in 0.0094. One of the possible reasons could be vehicles have long
life span, hence it does not require replacement frequently. However, It requires further analysis
to draw a solid conclusion. Other durable goods’s coe cients with household income does not
change significant during 2001-2011. This may be because they have very long life span, even
longer than the observation period, hence they do not require replacement. This also needs
further analysis.
Here EVT enhances our understanding of the income inequality in both tails of the distribution.
It also shows its lognormal mean is moving to the right, meaning general households’ incomes
are increasing. It’s lognormal volatility is also increasing, meaning households’ incomes are di-
verging over time.
Part III analyzes basis risk of a longevity swap written on a real world UK pension portfolio,
referenced to the national population. Heavy-tailedness in pensioner income distribution can be
viewed as important input as modelling assumptions. Extreme large pension income may cause
pension fund’s funding deficit, given its longevity exposure. This factor has not been taken into
consideration by previous papers or practitioners’ modelling.
According to income distribution theory developed by Colombi (1990) (106), as an extension
from the previous step, the paper then divide pensioners according to their pension incomes,
then set up hedging instruments [index-longevity swap] to hedge the di erent sub-populations,
referenced to the national population. It shows similar MTM and P&L results to my previous
publication, Bi s et al (2014) (104). Basis risk can be managed and index-based longevity swap
can be implemented to hedge pension fund’s longevity exposure.
Limitation: Calculating MTM and P&L may not be enough to make solid conclusion on hedge-
e ectiveness. It requires quantification of risk reduction in the context of accounting standards.
All three parts show EVT can be used to measure di erent finance and economic events, espe-
cially as the first sign of problems.
